Introduction
The Center for Faith and Sexuality published a pastoral paper by Preston Sprinkle and Gregory Coles (henceforth, SC). The title of the paper states the question the authors aim to answer, “Is Same-Sex Attraction a Sin?” They answer “no.” I contend that this incorrect answer stems from the authors’ inadequate view of anthropology and action, which leads to exegetical and theological errors. In what follows, I offer a brief overview of the paper. Then, I construct an account of anthropology and action that provides the necessary categories to think through same-sex attraction (SSA) and moral acts. With these categories in place, I critique SC’s view of anthropology and action by arguing that it undermines their exegetical work, leads to heinous conclusions, reduces man to an irrational beast, misunderstands Christ’s temptations, and fails to rightly account for the role of the mean in moral reasoning. Finally, I offer pastoral insights properly suited to help believers overcome SSA temptation, rightly order heterosexual sexual desire, think correctly about singleness, and maintain ecclesial unity.
Analysis
SC begin their paper by noting the shift that has occurred in evangelicalism over the past decade and a half. According to the authors, there was a time in the early 2010s when certain individuals, such as Kevin Deyoung and Rosaria Butterfield, once denied that SSA temptations were sinful but have since changed their view. Despite these shifts, SC contend that the Bible prohibits Christians from creating a list of sins not sanctioned by Holy Scripture. Since SSA temptations are not sinful, believers should not be called to repent of these temptations. In order to make their case, they examine the language of attraction, exegete biblical texts, clarify areas of confusion, and conclude with pastoral reflections. My analysis follows the order of their presentation.
SC describe sexual attraction along the same lines as the American Psychological Association’s definition of sexual orientation. They write, “When we talk about ‘attraction,’ we’re talking about what the American Psychological Association calls ‘sexual orientation’: ‘an enduring pattern of emotional, romantic, and/or sexual attractions to men, women, or both sexes’” (4). Succinctly put, “Sexual attraction simply means that when a person experiences a sexual temptation, it will be toward a specific group of people” (4). According to their position, one can resist acting on their attractions or lusting, both of which would be sinful, but this does not change that the person is fundamentally SSA, a state that requires no repentance and is not sin in itself.
SC then develop their biblical case. They explore Matthew 6:12-13, James 1:2-4, 12-15, Hebrews 4:14-16, and Matthew 5:27-28. While interpreting these passages, they rely on the axiom that “temptation calls for resistance, not repentance” (7). Temptation does not give way to sin unless one acts upon it (8). Along the way, they reject the distinction between internal and external temptation (11). The temptations themselves are involuntary whereas lust or the external action involves the consent of the will. Jesus and Paul condemn acting upon these temptations but not the temptations as such. Those who maintain that SSA is a sin and condemn those unwilling to call it such are at risk of promoting another gospel, rendering them akin to the Judaizers in Galatians.
When SC address the confusions and complexities surrounding SSA, they seek to disambiguate key terms. These terms include actual and indwelling sin; concupiscence; internal and external temptation; desire, attraction, and lust. They also raise but then punt on the question of whether Jesus had an unfallen human nature.[1] Ultimately, SC arrive at three important conclusions. First, the distinction between indwelling and actual sin is unhelpful because it obscures those acts of which Christians ought to repent (20). The same may be said of concupiscence. Instead, they prefer epithumia, the Greek term behind our English word lust and its Latin equivalent concupiscentia. Second, internal and external temptation fail to account for Jesus’ temptations, so this distinction is likewise rejected. Third, they maintain that desire is akin to attraction. Desire and attraction are synonyms and appear neutral. Jesus, after all, desired to have the cup of suffering removed from him but this was neither lust nor a sinful action (23). They contend that distinctions should be drawn from and adequately account for the data of Scripture.
The paper concludes with five pastoral reflections. First, repentance should only be called for where there is sin. Since SSA is not sin, believers should not be called to repent of temptations insofar as lust or external action are absent. Second, they reject calls for SSA Christians to find the answer in marriage. If the sexual appetite is oriented toward members of the opposite sex, as SC claim Jared Moore and Rosaria Butterfield argue, this leads to the absurd conclusion that the sexual appetite must be fully satisfied. This requires marriage and a commitment to as much sex as the appetite directs, lest the Christian have an appetite that was tempted to be satisfied but left unfulfilled (25). Third, those who require SSA Christians to alter their orientation add unbiblical requirements that simply do not work. Fourth, Christian freedom does not consist in freedom from temptations, but freedom to resist lust and external actions associated with temptations. Any insinuation otherwise results in hopelessness and heaps burdens upon those with temptations. Fifth, and finally, disagreements on these matters should not create disunity in Christ’s body. Christ prayed for unity. Differences on this matter should not erect a barrier in Christian fellowship.
SC offer a proposal that aims to exegete Scripture, interact with theological concepts, engage historical and contemporary language, and offer pastoral reflection. Unfortunately, their account misses the mark as I demonstrate in my response.
Anthropology and Action: A Constructive Account
I agree with SC in some respects. Language has been muddied. Changes have occurred in the past several years.[2] However, I disagree on the method used to determine which language is helpful and whether the changes have been for the better. In what follows, I offer a constructive account of anthropology and action that I hope corrects their view and clarifies language in future conversations.
Anthropology, Natures, and Teleology
Language of orientation, attraction, and desire will always suffer when unmoored from philosophical concepts, such as nature and teleology.[3] Contemporary conversations reduce these terms to the intentions of the mind and desires of the individual as if orientation is purely siloed to a first-person subjective account of reality.[4] This account understands orientation solely as the desire the particular person experiences without attention to the broader philosophical picture. Desire, attraction, and orientation become synonymous with what a person longs for in the recesses of their mind or heart.
This view becomes plausible if we reject the notion that humans have natures ordered to particular ends, which would be considered a third-person objective account. On this account, orientation, inclination, intention, and purpose are not determined by the particular subject, but by the telos or end of human nature as such. The subject ought to recognize that their orientation is determined by what they are and then conform their mind to their nature with delight. SC reduce their account of humanity to the intentions of the mind, a first-person subjective account, rather than the ordering of human nature, a third-person objective account. Why should we accept SC’s assumed account of human nature?
We shouldn’t. The world doesn’t work this way. SC’s vision of reality fails to account for reality itself. By way of example, consider trees. Trees are oriented to dig deep roots into the ground and inclined to spread their branches to receive nutrients necessary for life. They also intend to distribute seeds upon the earth where they might be received and nourished by the soil. This is the natural telos of trees. Since trees have a vegetative soul, they lack consciousness to reach their end. Their orientation and inclination arise apart from subjective desires and are revealed in their nature.
The organs of the human body serve as another example. The stomach is for food. It receives and digests food so that nutrients might be extracted and the body strengthened. This is the natural telos of the stomach. Although the stomach belongs to those with instincts, such as dogs, and rationality, such as humans, the workings of the stomach are not directed by instinct or rationality.[5] Organs and trees lack consciousness but not telos. They are ordered and inclined to ends that complete their nature.
In order to discover the nature of the thing in question, such as a tree or stomach, we observe the objects upon which it acts and discern the operations by which it acts. These operations demonstrate the powers of the thing in question, for an operation cannot occur without a power. Trees possess the power to bear fruit and stomachs the power to digest food. Trees do not see because they lack the power of sight, as do stomachs. The absence of the power of sight demonstrates that the tree and stomach do not operate on visible objects as objects of sight.[6] Once powers are understood in light of their operations, we may then discern what the particular thing or nature in question is.
The language of “nature” refers to what a particular thing is as discerned by how it acts, also known as a principle of action. By their nature birds fly, dogs bark, trees grow leaves, and stomachs digest food. When thinking about “nature” we should avoid two errors. First, “nature” can be used simply to describe things as they are. On this view, one can see in nature that bad trees bear bad fruit. Even though bad fruit exists in nature, it ought not to be this way. A tree ought to bear good fruit, otherwise it is a deformed tree. Likewise, a kidney ought to filter fluid and release it into the bladder. When it fails to do so, the kidney is described as “bad” or “deformed.”[7] Nature, according to its precise philosophical meaning, refers to the particular essence of a thing.[8] Nature can be used broadly to include all created things insofar as they have finite natures but, in this instance, we are using it technically of those things that have particular natures ordered to ends, such as trees, dogs, and humans. The second error to avoid is placing nature and creation in competition — as if we must choose one or the other. This dichotomy need not exist. When speaking of homosexual relations, Paul does not feel the need to refer back to the very beginning to demonstrate that they are contrary to God’s design, as if one must be in possession of Genesis 1–3 to explain the sinfulness of homosexual relations. He simply deems homosexual acts as acts against human nature (Romans 1:26–27).[9] That is, these acts are contrary to the essence of humanity as discerned in the telos of the sexual act. Creation refers to the origin of all things and nature to the essence of the thing that has an origin and is knowable through its operations.[10]
Let us consider human nature. Humans are rational animals. They belong to the genus known as animality by virtue of their bodily powers. Their specific difference, which identifies their species, is rationality. Rationality is the ability to understand by forming concepts, judge by separating and joining concepts together, and reason — properly so-called — by engaging in causal analysis.[11] The specific difference of rationality ought to inform how we employ our animality as we pursue ends fitting to our nature.
Humans pursue these ends by acts of the will, one of the three appetites humans possess. An appetite is a power that moves toward objects that satisfy its end. The will is called a rational appetite because it follows what reason reveals to be good. This occurs when the will puts the intellect of man to work so it might find a satisfying good. The intellect finds that which appeals to the will and directs it to that object. The good pursued by the will may be an actual good that completes man’s nature. Sometimes, the will does not pursue what is actually good, but only that which is perceived as good. This is because the will never pursues evil as evil but only that which is evil because it perceives it as good.[12]
The other two appetitive powers are the concupiscible and irascible appetites. These appetites are called sensible appetites, as opposed to the rational appetite that is the will, because they concern sensible goods. The concupiscible appetite concerns the simple goods of life often associated with taste and touch, or food and sex respectively.[13] The irascible power concerns goods that are difficult to obtain and require courage. A mother who gives birth to a child is a great example. She endures pain and hardship, not for her own sake, but to receive a good on the other end. The concupiscible and irascible appetite are indirectly influenced by reason whereas the will is essentially rational. These latter two appetites may, and should, be elevated and regulated by reason such that we do not use our animal powers in a manner similar to brutish beasts.[14]
Because rationality consists in having an intellect and a will, humans ought to order themselves to ends that complete or perfect their nature. The stomach ought to receive and digest food, but it can fail to do so. If the stomach’s failure occurs apart from the human will, this is evil or bad, but not sin. Sin properly belongs to humans insofar as they can order their ends by rationality. Those with a deformed stomach cannot use their reason and will to repent of their stomach’s failings with the hope of restoration because the stomach is not ordered by reason. Medical intervention is required and reason can direct one to that end. The failure of the stomach is involuntary.[15] Corruption or deformity of the stomach results in poor stomach function. In order to restore stomach function, doctors must treat the underlying conditions detrimental to the stomach’s performance.
A human would be in sin if they filled their stomach by voluntary and deliberate action with destructive objects not suited to the stomach or refused to preserve their health by filling their stomachs in a disproportionate manner. Destructive objects are the kind of objects upon which the stomach cannot act, such as a ceramic ashtray. Although a ceramic ashtray can be in the stomach, the stomach cannot perform its proper functions upon the ashtray nor distribute it to other parts of the body that can. The stomach, and related organs, will be harmed. The stomach cannot properly act upon a ceramic ashtray because it is not material suited to digestion.
Improper proportionality is measured by the necessary means to preserve and enjoy life in conjunction with the capacity and ends of the organ. It can occur when humans voluntarily and deliberately harm their bodies by supplying too much or too little nutrients necessary for health. Gluttony and anorexia serve as examples of these intemperate sins. What is considered proportionate may change throughout the various phases of life (e.g., infancy, teen years, old age) and in various circumstances (e.g., competing for a marathon, enjoying a wedding feast, or fasting for disciplinary or spiritual purposes). As rational animals, humans differ from trees, dogs, and individual organs in their ability to volitionally subvert good ends to which they are ordered by nature.
This leads to a discussion of the language of “end,” “inclination,” “orientation,” and “teleology.” As seen, these terms can be applied to trees, stomachs, and humans in general. The telos of a thing depends upon the thing or nature in question. Different natures have different ends. It is the end of a human to be rational because that accords with human nature. It is not the end of a human to grow leaves and drop acorns. As stated earlier, nature is a principle of action. It is the nature of a tree to grow seeds corresponding to its kind with the telos of growing into the fullness of a tree and producing more trees. It is the nature of a stomach to receive and digest food. When trees and stomachs act in accordance with what they are, their nature, they are completed or perfected as they reach their telos.
Telos can refer to the completion of a thing, such as a healthily formed stomach or a full-grown tree. It may also refer to the end of a particular act upon an object, such as digestion or growing leaves. These distinctions apply to humans as well.[16] Humans grow into healthy and fully formed rational animals as the completion of their nature. They also perform certain acts that have ends, such as procreation. On account of human rationality, a further distinction is required: the ends of an agent as intended by their intellect. The intentions of the agent can and ought to correspond with the nature of the act, but this is not always the case.[17] Sometimes, we can engage in an act and produce an effect intended in the act even if we did not intend the effect with our reason. Consider the phrase, “An unintended pregnancy.” The sexual act is oriented to the generation of offspring even if the mind did not intend this effect or willed contrary to the effect. This is the telos of the act even if it is not the desire of the mind. The telos of the act is the proximate end whereas the reasons or reasoning of the agent is the remote end.
Action: Objects, Circumstances, and Ends
Having provided a brief and basic anthropology, human action can now be considered. In action, one should consider the object, circumstances, and end of the act. The object of the act is that about which the act concerns itself. Killing, for example, is an object of an act. Not all things that kill, however, are human. Trees kill bushes. Sharks kill seals. Humans kill humans. The object of the act in these three examples is only moral in the instance of humans killing humans. We make this distinction for two reasons. First, the act of killing can have a natural effect apart from the human intellect and will, for it simply means that a life has been terminated.[18] The natural effect of an act, also considered the object, must be respected by human reason. One human cannot put a gun to another human’s head, pull the trigger, and claim that they did not intend to kill the other person. The act itself tends toward killing even if the stated intention of the agent is otherwise. Second, only certain things can be killed. For example, rocks cannot be killed. They lack a principle of life. Here too, human reason must respect that certain things, such as rocks, cannot be the object of killing because of what they are.
From these distinctions, one can further discern that the matter, the thing acted upon, must be able to receive the act. The rock cannot receive the act of killing for it is not a thing with a principle of life, so it cannot die.[19] A human can receive the act of killing that comes at the hands of another human. When a moral agent acts, something additional is present in reality and discernable because the human intellect and will are introduced in the act upon the object. Thus, the act of homicide is no mere natural act of killing when humans are involved. It is described as accidental when no reason for moral fault exists on either side, murder when one unjustly takes the life of the innocent, self-defense when one preserves life with due and proportionate means, and capital punishment when justly executed by the state. In all these instances, the thing acted upon remains the same, a human able to undergo death. Yet, the manner in which the human is operated upon is different because it bears a different relation to reason, respectively: accidental, innocent, unjust aggressor, justice distributed by the proper authority.
In all the above-mentioned instances of human killing, the thing acted upon remains the same, a human. The thing that is acted upon is known as the matter of the act. The manner in which it is acted upon is different in each instance, which allows us to differentiate between murder and the various other instances of killing. Here, we consider the manner in which something is acted upon, which is known as the form. The object of the act includes matter — the thing acted upon — and form — how it is acted upon.[20] Occasionally, the language of “object” can be used in a more narrow sense as another way of describing the matter. The object of the act also has its own proximate end which differs from the remote end to be discussed soon.
Every time an agent acts there are individuating features that need to be considered. The board game known as Clue assumes the object of the act, murder. Players seek to discover three circumstances that surround the act (who, where, with what?). Keeping with the theme of murder, we will identify the circumstances by adding to the traditional categories of the board game. Every human action has a where (the billiard room), when (8:37 P.M.), how (swiftly), who (Colonel Mustard), upon what (Mrs. Peacock), by what means (lead pipe), why (because Mrs. Peacock was going to expose his hidden past), and what subsequent effects (rendering Mr. Peacock a widower and her children motherless).[21]
Some circumstances touch upon mode of the act, such as where, when, and how. Others touch upon the causes of the act. The efficient cause of the act is the agent who brings about the change. The thing upon which change is brought about is the what or material cause. The instrumental cause is that by which the agent brings about change upon the object, such as a lead pipe. The agent’s reasons or why is the final cause of the act. Finally, some circumstances touch upon the effects insofar as they refer to the thing acted upon.[22]
Circumstances can make a bad act worse, a good act better, and a good act bad. They cannot make a bad act good. If Colonel Mustard decided to kill his father instead of Mrs. Peacock, it would not merely be murder, but parricide. Here, the matter and form remain the same — it is still murder — but the matter acted upon bears a unique relation to Colonel Mustard, making his murder worse. Circumstances can add further deformity to an act. Using a different example, giving to the poor is good but it is a better act if one gives out of their poverty (Luke 21:1–4). Performing a good act, but at the wrong time, in the wrong place, or in the wrong way, can make an act bad. Blessing your friend is a good act but it shouldn’t occur with a loud voice or early in the morning lest these circumstances render the act itself bad (Prov 27:14). As may even be evident from these examples, some circumstances have no bearing upon the moral act at all. It may be true that Colonel Mustard has green eyes, but having green eyes makes no moral difference in this case.[23]
One of the above circumstances is significant enough to be treated on its own — the why. This is the remote end of the act, which is also known as the end of the one acting. This differs from the proximate end, which is the end of the act itself. The remote end explains why this particular agent chose the act in question. Colonel Mustard decided to find a fitting means to silence Mrs. Peacock upon discovering that she was going to expose illicit details about his past. The end of his particular action, as opposed to the ends of someone like Jeffrey Dahmer, differ. Both Dahmer and Colonel Mustard chose the same means (murder) to bring about a proximate end of death suited to their particular but different remote ends or reasons for acting. Like circumstances, the remote end of the act can’t make a bad act good (Rom 3:8) but it can make a good act, such as praying or performing deeds of mercy, bad (Matt 6:1–6). Further, the remote end of the agent can make a bad act worse and a good act better.
Anthropology, Action, and the Sexual Act
Let us apply this reasoning to the sexual act as our anthropology and theory of action converge. As a natural act, the sexual act is a procreative act.[24] For humans, it is also a unitive act. By this act and this act alone can two persons become one flesh and produce offspring. The nature of the sexual act is unitive and procreative. We can say more about this act, but we cannot say less. Because of the nature of the act, the sex of the persons (actor or subject and object) must be sexually complementary. The actor and the matter acted upon must be male and female since this alone corresponds with the nature and end of the act.[25] Up to this point, we have the necessary ingredients for the sexual act as a sexual act but not enough information to determine whether a particular act in question is moral.
One might be tempted to discuss intentions at this point, the remote end, but patience is required. Intentions cannot make a bad act good and more information is required in order to determine whether the sexual act in question is morally upright. The object of the sexual act cannot merely be considered as a natural act. It must also be considered as moral. Thus, further inquiry into the thing acted upon is required. Here, a distinction is required between circumstances that surround the object of the act and those that bear more directly upon the matter acted upon.[26] For example, does the man in question act upon a woman who is single or married to another man? Is the man in question single or married to another woman? If both are single, the sexual act is fornication by reason of its occurrence outside of any marriage bond. If one or both persons are married to another, a marriage bond is broken. This is an act of adultery. If the persons in question are married to each other, it is the conjugal act. The natural sexual act remains the same even if the moral nature of the act is distinguished by reason on account of circumstances directly bearing upon the matter acted upon. It is still the act whereby two become one flesh (1 Cor 6:16), and children are produced regardless of the circumstances that bear directly upon the matter insofar as the two are male and female.
To illustrate the difference between circumstances that directly bear upon the matter acted upon and those that do not, consider Bathsheba. When she bathes, Bathsheba does so as Uriah’s wife since that is who she is. Being Uriah’s wife is a circumstance that does not directly bear upon her as one who bathes. She bathed before she was Uriah’s wife, as Uriah’s wife, as David’s wife, and as a widow. Those four relations have no bearing upon bathing. They are accidents irrelevant to the nature of the act itself. However, being Uriah’s wife is morally relevant to the material that is acted upon by David in the sexual act.[27] Thus, the object of the act is adultery.[28]
We are now in a place where we can begin to examine intentions. If the act is fornication or adultery, then the intentions cannot make this bad act good. The most sincere and pure intentions are mired by bad acts though it is still better to have good intentions than bad intentions. Intentions can make these acts worse, for one can intend many further evils in the acts of fornication and adultery, such as spite or vengeance. These acts are not unnatural or disordered in themselves as it concerns the natural act of sex. Male and female are suitable material for the sexual act. They are disordered on account of the moral relation between the parties involved.
Human intentions cannot make adultery or fornication good but they can make a good act, the conjugal act, bad. When a husband intends to exclude his wife from the goods of the conjugal act by making her a means of his wrongfully selfish satisfaction, the good act becomes evil on account of his intentions. The same may be said when a wife uses the conjugal act to manipulate her husband and exclude him from the good of the conjugal act, making him a means of her wrongfully selfish satisfaction.
Let us examine circumstances. Some circumstances surrounding the sexual act have no bearing on the moral nature of the act. Whether the object has green eyes is irrelevant insofar as the man’s wife has green eyes and the green eyes in question happen to belong to his wife. But green eyes in themselves have no bearing upon the moral nature of the sexual act since they do not touch the generative powers humans possess nor do they introduce any new form into the act.[29] Other accidental features irrelevant to the sexual act fail to change the moral act. Hair color, skin color, weight, height, and other accidents of the object of the sexual act do not alter the nature of the sexual act because they do not bear upon the nature of the moral act itself.[30]
Consider how some circumstances may at first glance seem benign but end up altering the moral nature of the act. In many instances, time and place appear irrelevant to the sexual act. One time of day versus another seems to have no bearing upon the morality of the act. Place may seem similarly benign. However, if the place is physically or virtually public such that others can view the act, it becomes exhibitionism or pornography. These circumstances alter the morality of the same sexual act as the participants find pleasure in becoming objects of pleasure for others outside of the conjugal union. The place is no longer rightly classified as a mere place, accidental to the act. Instead, the place changes the object of the act by making it viewable to others, not on account of mere coordinates but because the private act is now ordered by reason to public exposure.[31]
Voyeurism differs from exhibitionism even though the married couple in our example is seen in both instances. On exhibitionism, the couple uses their reason to make a private act public and expose themselves to others for sexual pleasure. If the couple’s end, which is the remote end and the why of the agent’s act, is to be seen, then the place will necessarily change so that the object of the act is no mere sexual act but a sexual act as viewable and exposed. The couple will find means suited to their end. On voyeurism, the couple rightly keeps the act private, but a “peeping Tom” seeks to make the couple an object of his pleasure apart from the couple’s awareness and despite the couples rational ordering of their sexual acts to its rightfully private place. Thus, “being seen” is not sufficient to change the nature of the morality of the act for the couple in question. They still performed a good act. One must further inquire into the ordering of those who are seen and those who see to rightly determine the nature of the moral act rightly.
Age, like time and place, may be such that it does not alter the morality of the act. Consider a 25-year-old single male engaging in sexual relations with a 30-year-old single female, this is simply fornication. Age does not change the moral nature of the act in this instance. The act is still fornication if she is a 20-year-old. A decade changed nothing. It is a mere accidental circumstance. However, if the female is a 10-year-old, the act is pedophilia, not fornication. The difference between a 20-year-old and a 10-year-old cannot be reduced to a mere difference of a decade as in the previous instance since the nature of the moral act has been fundamentally altered. Even though the matter of the sexual act is female — a potentially suitable object of the sexual act if rational and bodily maturation occur — the age of the female can be such that it changes the nature of the moral act in question. In this instance, it does.
She is not a suitable subject of the sexual act at present because circumstances relating to her age reveal underlying factors that render her a presently unfit object of the act in question. Age, in this instance, directly affects the material acted upon in the sexual act. She is morally unfit to receive the act because she is not able to receive the sexual act as a natural act. She is neither intellectually, volitionally, nor bodily ready to receive the act. Accordingly, she cannot consent because she does not understand and her body is severely harmed in the act. For these reasons, pedophilia is a violation of the soul and body. When she grows into marriageable years, she becomes fit matter for the sexual act. This act must occur within the confines of marriage, otherwise it is not a conjugal act, but fornication or adultery.
The same cannot be said of same-sex relationships. Because of our animality, we will either be male or female. The two sexes complement one another in many ways, as eminently manifested in sexuality. Those of the same sex cannot engage in the sexual act with each other because it is procreative and unitive by nature. This is not because of age, as in the case of pedophilia. The female subject in question could be the proper subject of a marriage union insofar as she matures bodily and mentally.[32] The same is not true of same-sex relations. Two males cannot engage in the procreative and unitive sexual act with each other; neither can two females.[33] For this reason, persons of the same sex cannot actually marry for they cannot engage in the act requisite to the union. Same-sex marriage is not marriage as to its essence; it is marriage in name only.[34] A person of the same sex is not a proper object of the sexual act because they cannot act upon the other in such a way that the sexual act can be received and it can never be performed within the marriage union because it depends upon the consummation of the one flesh union which is ordered toward procreation.[35]
The circumstances surrounding the act or the object of the act fail to make it better, although they can make it worse. All pornography is heinous, but homosexual pornography includes added moral deformity since unfit objects engage in immoral acts in a virtually public manner. Age may compound the heinous nature of the act, if the act is a case of pedophilia against someone of the same sex, but it can never render a member of the same sex a fit object.
Should a male choose to engage in sexual acts with sexually mature female of a different species, this act is known as bestiality. In this instance, heterosexuality and age make no difference since the matter in question, a beast, cannot engage in sexual relations with a human on account of its inability to receive the sexual act in its body. It is unfit matter by virtue of its species. Further, it cannot share in the sexual act as a human sexual act since it lacks a rational soul necessary to elevate the sexual act to a human sexual act.
An Additional Piece: Habits
Up to this point, we have considered nature, teleology, and action. These pieces must be in place if we wish to discuss these matters with clarity. But one further component needs to be added, and this is habit. The notion of habit is often unaddressed in contemporary Protestant literature, and SC’s article is no exception.[36]
What is a habit? We typically associate habits with particular acts, such as biting nails or smoking cigarettes. Historically, habits have been discussed in a manner akin to SC’s definition of attraction. Habits are not our nature, a principle of action, but a second nature. They are a firm and fixed disposition that confirms and directs the powers of our nature so that we freely perform certain acts with ease and pleasure. They also explain why our powers are directed to specific acts. Humans have various powers capable of bringing about all kinds of ends due to their intellectual and volitional capacities. The human intellect and will are capable of contemplating many great truths and loving the best goods as well as turning away from the truth to a lie and performing every manner of evil conceivable. In this way, we differ from animals who operate by mere instinct. Habits are guided and developed by reason. Instincts are mere repeated acts that lack rationality. For this reason, habits are properly ascribed to parts of humanity that are directly or indirectly under the control of reason.[37]
The dog eats like an animal and engages in sexual relations without a sense of decency or shame. For humans, eating is often a social act and is preceded by gratitude in the form of prayer. Humans recognize that exhibitionism and incest fail to conform to the nature of the sexual act as performed by humans. Dogs aren’t exhibitionist because they lack rationality. The public nature of the sexual act between dogs is the same kind of sexual act between humans but humans are moral beings, so the act is morally different though it is naturally the same.[38] There is no shame when a dog engages in sexual relations as a dog since the dog lacks rationality. There is shame when a human engages in sexual relations as if they were a dog precisely because humans are rational. Habits help confirm and perfect the powers of man insofar as they are able to be guided and directed by rationality. Habits are distinctly human. When these human powers are confirmed and fixed in their strength such that certain actions regularly and pleasantly follow, it is called a habit.
Anthropology and Action: A Critique
With these theological and philosophical foundations in place, a proper critique of SC can follow. SSA temptations are sinful because the matter of sexual desire is not fit to receive the sexual act from someone of the same sex. Those with SSA may be habitually attracted to members of the same sex. However, they are neither ordered nor inclined to these persons sexually since a sexual act between two persons of the same sex is always disordered by virtue of their inability to enjoy the unitive and procreative act because they are the same sex. This desire is incapable of being rightly ordered on account of the matter of the act. A desire or attraction to someone of the same sex contradicts the orientation of their human nature. The male sex is oriented to the female sex and the female sex is oriented to the male sex.[39] This is the inclination arising from human nature. As a consequence, the matter of desire is always improper material under the aspect of sexual act. It is not immoral to desire someone of the same sex as a friend, for they can be a fitting object as a friend.[40] However, to desire them sexually simply is to desire them as an object of action that they are unable to receive. In what follows, I demonstrate how SC’s failure to adequately account for anthropology and action undermines their exegetical work, leads to heinous conclusions, reduces man to an irrational beast, misunderstands Christ’s temptations, and fails to account for the role of the mean in ethical reasoning.
Undermines Their Exegetical Work
SC’s work to demonstrates that language of desire may be neutral is irrelevant because their anthropology and theory of action is incomplete. For this reason, SC’s exegesis falls apart. Desire takes its moral shape from its object. Some objects of desire, such as food, are good, but they must be desired in the right way, at the right time, and for the right end. If any one of these is missing or deformed, the object is wrongly desired even if the object is a good object. Other objects are indifferent, neither morally good nor bad in themselves, such as walking. Finally, some objects are simply bad. This is not because the substance is bad in itself. Technically speaking, there are no bad substances. Everything created by God is good (1 Tim 4:4). As I have tried to consistently communicate throughout this article, the object is only a bad object insofar as it is considered in relation to the act it receives.[41] The object of SSA is not a proper object — or matter — of the sexual act nor can it ever be.
SC’s approach claims to be biblical. They place great stock in the fact that Scripture uses the language of desire in ways that allows for non-sinful temptation. Lexically, that is fine insofar as one is satisfied to blow the dust off a surface they are unwilling to even scratch. One can only be so content if they already imbibe the philosophical notion of a first-person subjective account of humanity that prohibits the object of desire from informing the nature of desire. But this philosophically underdeveloped account of reality is ultimately unsatisfying.
By offering a truncated account of reality, SC leave important questions unanswered. Their own answer is so lexically constrained that it cannot explain why Scripture can use desire in good, indifferent, or evil ways. According to them, it just does. The question isn’t even addressed. Their account is so philosophically and exegetically thin that it makes Pharaoh’s seven emaciated cattle look plump.
To be precise, one should say that desire is a movement of the will — the rational appetite — toward that which pleases it.[42] If the will was repulsed by the object in question, it would move away from the object in what is known as aversion. On SC’s scheme, if a movement toward a particular object is neutral so too is a movement away from an object. This seems consistent with their argument if not a consequence of their view. A person may be moved toward someone of the same sex without lusting or acting upon their desire which allows for the same person to have an aversion toward someone of the opposite sex without cursing them in their mind or hurting them by an external act.
Two chief problems exist with this view of desire. First, if a desire for things that cannot lawfully be acted upon are not bad, then a desire for things that can lawfully be acted upon are not good. If the desire for an unlawful object does not reveal the sinfulness of sin then neither does the desire for a lawful object reveal the work of grace upon the soul. Neither aversion to God nor desire for God could be considered moral in itself. Likewise, aversion to pedophilia and desire for pedophilia would also be morally neutral; no movement of the will being better or worse than another. Whether one is drawn to or repulsed by the object in question is morally irrelevant to SC.
Second, “desire” may be a neutral term in the abstract, but SC wrongfully assume this means that desire is neutral in the concrete. When joined to an object and the end of the one who acts, desire is no longer indifferent, but good or evil. For example, “kill” is a neutral term in the abstract.[43] Without the object, circumstances, and end of the act, one cannot discern whether the killing is justified. Yet, each concrete act of killing is either justified, unjustified, or an accident. Desire always takes an object in the concrete and the object determines the morality of the desire along with the morally relevant circumstances and ends.
Because SC implicitly exclude the object of desire from shaping the moral act, they can write, “We cannot treat Paul’s words about chosen behaviors of mind and body as if they describe the experience of sexual temptation” (13). SC beg the question here. They assume that the desire is not sinful even if the object of desire is forbidden by Paul. Further, whenever desire is described as sinful, they assume this necessitates lust. They then claim that Scripture never condemns SSA temptations because these are not a species of lust. But in doing so they’ve prevented Paul from speaking about sinful desires at the outset. Yet, this is the very question at hand. No lexical difference between neutral desire, good desire (1 Tim 3:1), and lust exists, which renders their exegetical work futile. They miss the obvious point of all the texts they exegete: the object desired, lusted after, or acted upon, is the sole difference in these texts. Only if they beg the question in favor of their position can they be pleased with their exegesis.
As a Christian, pastor, and theologian, I am eminently concerned with being “biblical” in my approach. For these reasons, I am also worried about exegetes who fail to recognize or acknowledge the philosophical reasoning or consequences of their position. What often passes as “biblical” is Scripture cloaked in today’s unrecognized philosophical assumptions and undercooked theological reasoning. The reason desire can be used in various ways simply is because the object of desire informs the moral nature of desire itself. Once one recognizes this, one can rightly account for its varied use in the text of Scripture. Only when one rejects this notion could it possibly be argued that SSA temptations are not sinful. This philosophically underdeveloped and bare lexical approach comes at the cost of reading Scripture well.
Leads to heinous conclusions
Their account of reality and Scripture leads to heinous conclusions. Consider SC’s claim that SSA temptation is not morally culpable:
“This general rule of thumb — “temptation is not sin” — was readily applied to sexual temptation, including same-sex sexual temptation. That is, because the broad category of temptation isn’t sin, a smaller subset of that category (sexual temptation) also isn’t sin. Because sexual temptation isn’t sin, an even smaller subset of that category (same-sex sexual temptation) also isn’t sin. Therefore, same-sex attraction — a pattern that includes sometimes facing same-sex sexual temptation — is clearly not a morally culpable sin” (1).
SC reason as follows:
Sexual temptation isn’t sin.
SSA is sexual temptation.
Therefore, SSA isn’t sin.
Any subset of sexual temptation, or any temptation more broadly, would not constitute sin on their view. Consider the following identical reasoning:
Sexual temptation isn’t sin.
Child-attraction is sexual temptation.
Therefore, child-attraction isn’t sin.
One can substitute “child” with all manner of sexual temptations, including but not limited to open sexual relations, trans-attraction, orgies, dog-attraction, and the like. The logic of SC’s position allows for this reasoning, leaving them on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, they can reject this reasoning and offer a better argument. On the other hand, they could bite the bullet and acknowledge their reasoning entails that all manner of sexual temptation is without sin. The embrace of this line of reasoning should be sufficient for its own refutation. Any position that spouts such ungodliness is pure folly.
Reduces man to an irrational beast
Besides the exegetical and philosophical shortcomings, SC leave readers with a tragic view of man. They treat humans like beasts by denying them the ability to reason about their sexual appetites. I am willing to grant that SSA may arise apart from an individual’s reason insofar as reason is narrowly confined to a conscious choice. Sexual desire often begins in the body, as does hunger. These desires fall under the concupiscible appetite discussed earlier. However, these powers are subject to human reason, albeit indirectly. These temptations may initially arise apart from one’s reasons and choices. Yet, they still happen with one’s reasons and choices and, accordingly, can be submissive to the intellect and will.[44]
This raises a fundamental question. Is SSA a mere instinct of nature untouched by reason or can it be subordinated to human reason and thus guided and corrected? If the desires are absolutely involuntary, then they do not differ from a deformed stomach. The intellect and will cannot act upon or resolve the stomach deformity. In this way, SSA temptations are unalterable and deformed because, like a deformed stomach, they are against human nature.
This seems to be an inappropriate place to locate SSA temptations. The attraction component of SSA lies in the will, not according to particular acts but as it is an appetite that can be affected by goods perceived by the intellect. The will is the location of the moral defect, or that upon which sinful acts depend.[45] This is why theologians identify the affecting of the will as its “first motions.”[46] The will, then, is deformed. In the case of SSA, the will is moved by matter unfit to receive the sexual act, thus it is moved by an unlawful object, the person of the same sex as desirable for the sexual act.[47] The movement of the will is not aversion, as it ought to be, but desire or attraction. It is a movement toward the forbidden object. If the will is moved by a forbidden object apart from an elicited act of the will, this does not render it indifferent. Rather, it says something about the person’s disposition or habitude. Something within them is wrong causing them to desire something wrong.[48] Because these desires are rightly seated in or submissive to the intellect and will, they are morally culpable.[49]
SC make two errors with regard to SSA temptations. First, if desire isn’t sufficient to render something sinful, from where do sinful acts of the will arise? Where do second motions of the will come from if the first motions of the will are not sinful? It would seem that the fount of sinful motions of the will can be traced back to the first motions of sinful desire. As Turretin writes, “The effect ought to correspond with the cause; nor could lust bring forth actual sin unless it is itself sin.”[50] This is the teaching of Christ. Good trees bear good fruit and bad trees bear bad fruit (Matt 7:17). SC want to explain good and bad fruit without a good or bad tree. Likewise, James states that bitter water flows from a bitter source and salt water does not flow from fresh water (James 2:9–12). Yet, by divorcing desire from acts of the will, SC lose any explanatory power for the change in the waters.[51]
Second, if attraction is in the will and the will follows reason, then the will is subject to change. The will is not ordered to any finite created good as the good.[52] Thus, it is not fixed on a particular object. It is mutable until man arrives in his fixed state in glory or hell. Until then the will can be moved away from forbidden objects and it can be directed to actual goods, rather than perceived goods contrary to human nature.
The view of man put forth by SC identifies those with SSA as Nebuchadnezzar before his reason returned to him. He is nothing but a helpless beast, unable to lift his eyes to the God of heaven and plead for God’s new creation grace to rightly order his sexual desires rightly.
Misunderstands Christ’s temptations
Our account also needs to consider the temptations of Christ, a point upon which SC build a significant amount of their argument and yet fundamentally misunderstand. According to SC, Christ in the Garden of Gethsemane serves as an example of how to steward desires that are “contrary” to God (23). The divine and human will are purportedly at odds (23).[53] Is this because Jesus desires good or bad things (23)? Although his instincts do not align with the Father, he disciplines himself to respond rightly. SC contend that this is the path forward for Christians who have SSA temptations.
If we apply the concepts discussed throughout this article, we may gain a clearer understanding of Christ’s temptation. But, before explaining Christ’s temptations, consider the account offered by SC up to this point. SC do not carry their logic far enough. Sexual temptation is not sin on their view. Any subset of sexual temptation is also not sin. As I demonstrated above, the logic of this view requires that Jesus could or did have SSA temptations, along with temptations toward children, open sexual relations, trans-attraction, orgies, dog-attraction, and the like. On SC’s account, this is at least plausible. Further, they would not consider it problematic. In the midst of all of these temptations, he would still have been a perfect redeemer. Again, the heinous nature of such statements is sufficient for their own refutation. If SC wish to defend these notions, let them take up their pen and carry forth the logic of their position that all may see how they implicate Christ in the conclusions which they draw.
How then should one account for Christ’s temptations? Let us consider Satan’s temptations in the wilderness along with Christ’s prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane. First, Satan tempts Christ with food. Christ ate bread throughout the Scripture and man lives by bread, just not bread alone (Matt 4:4). The object of the act considered in itself is an acceptable object, materially and formally. Second, Christ was called to display divine power and prerogative in a near-death experience. Christ would do just that later in his ministry, but not as a mere display of power unto a vain end. Rather, he would suffer death on the cross, be buried, and rise again on the third day as a marvelous display of divine power sweetly joined to wisdom. His angels were present in his suffering, resurrection, and ascension.[54] Third, Satan offered him the kingdoms of the world through ungodly means. Christ acquired these same kingdoms of the world through godly means. Jesus rejected the bread that was useful to sustain his life though he ate of it in other instances. He refused to perform vain feats of power that are mere pleasantries to the eye though he would manifest his power and wisdom in the resurrection. Though he rejected the means of Satan, Christ still received all authority on heaven and earth as his proportionate and perfect reward. In the first temptation, the circumstance made the object, eating the bread, wrong. In the second temptation, a good object would have been corrupted by a bad remote end. In the third temptation, the object was a bad means and could not justify the end.
Not a single temptation here resembles SSA. The object of bread is an appropriate object of desire in itself while the object of SSA is always a forbidden object. The act of demonstrating divine power is good insofar as it has the appropriate end and reveals wisdom. SSA acts never have an appropriate end because the act is disordered by nature.[55] The kingdoms of the world were eventually received as part of the joy set before Christ but, as SC rightfully contends, lust and same-sex relations can never be enjoyed. All of this is natural to Christ’s humanity and office as Mediator. SSA temptations are always and only unnatural by virtue of the object. No circumstances or ends can make SSA good. Up to this point, Christ’s temptations have not helped SC’s case. But let us now consider Gethsemane.
Contrary to SC’s contention, the account in the Garden does not reveal contrary or contradictory wills. A contrary will wills the opposite. For example, God willed that the Son go to the cross but the Son, according to his humanity, willed not to go to the cross. But neither the text nor sound theological reasoning reveal that the Son, according to his humanity, willed contrary to the Father.[56] A contradictory will wills something other than what has been willed. For example, God willed that the Son go to the cross but the Son willed to die by stoning instead. Yet, this is not what occurs in Christ’s prayer.
What does occur? The Son asks if it is possible for the cup to pass from him. The cup, taken simply and in itself, is pain that should be avoided. Drinking it involves bearing the wrath of God and suffering as an innocent one at the hands of sinful man in a manner that renders them murderers. No human can rightly desire these things in themselves. Asking if it is possible to avoid the bitterness of the cup accords with human nature and, consequently, with the will of God. The matter of the object is unpleasant and destructive to human life, which the Son enjoyed and was required to preserve.[57] It is equivalent to asking if it is possible to avoid a painful medical procedure but accepting it insofar as one is assured that it is ordered toward health. Or, it is like a husband running into a burning building to save his bride, knowing that he will likely die. The husband seeks to avoid the death of all parties involved but is willing to die if it means his bride can live.
Christ asks if it is possible for the matter of the object to be avoided. He recognizes the pain about to be brought upon his body and soul. His petition reveals his true humanity and demonstrates that he has an irascible appetite and human will. The Son wills to preserve his life and honor his Father. He seeks to avoid the bitterness of the cup, an unjust death at the hands of his fellow men under the authority of Pontius Pilate and suffering the wrath of God. The evils the Son wishes to avoid cannot be willed in themselves in a holy manner. The goods the Son must will must be pursued but cannot be maintained if he is to follow his Father’s will, just as one undergoes a painful medical procedure or runs into a burning building. Therefore, the Son must forego certain goods to be pursued and receive the cup insofar as it is ordered to the greater good of divine justice (proximate end) and brings many sons to glory (remote end) so that God may be glorified (ultimate end).[58] He willingly submits. The cup is material able to receive the form of public propitiation (Rom 3:25). The Son drinks it to the dregs, but not because it is a good cup in itself. The bitter cup is ordered to a good end, and the Son receives his beautiful bride for drinking it. He also possesses the very thing he had a right to and sought to preserve in Gethsemane, blessed life.
Again, this temptation does not support the notion that SSA temptations are without sin. Christ’s request is a request to preserve and protect his nature, which is a good petition in itself rightly ordered under the will of God as revealed in human nature. SSA temptations are contrary to and harm human nature. Christ giving himself up as a sacrifice for sinners is not unnatural even if it is higher than nature. SSA temptations are neither natural nor higher than nature, but unnatural and deformed, destroying human nature. Christ’s will is not contrary or contradictory to his Father’s will whereas SSA contradicts man’s natural telos.[59]
SC’s Christological case, like other parts of their paper, only makes sense if one pays no attention to the details behind the curtain. Not only are their anthropology and theory of action underdeveloped, so too are their Christological arguments. They fail to draw out the implications of their views and do not sufficiently demonstrate that Christ’s temptations support the claim that SSA temptations are not sinful.
Fails to Account for the Role of the Mean in Moral Reasoning
Before moving on to pastoral reflections, one final word should be said about what makes an act right or wrong. SC contend that good objects can lead to bad desires, but they do not specify how. Using food as an example, they write,
A desire for something fundamentally good, like food, can become distorted into a sinful desire when it isn’t disciplined within the boundaries set by God. The shift from involuntary hunger to voluntary gluttony doesn’t happen because good food has turned into evil food. It happens because we’ve stopped responding to our appetite in a God-honoring way (23).
But food, unlike SSA temptations, is a fitting object for the human stomach. As mentioned earlier, it can become a sin on account of immoderation in excess or deficiency, but not on account of the object. SSA temptations are not problematic because of excess or deficiency. The problem is that the appetite is ordered to the wrong object. Food is the proper object of the concupiscible appetite.[60] Thus, their analogy does not support their position but only further demonstrates what is lacking in their process of reasoning.
Good objects can be good objects even when wrongfully desired; the nature of the object remains good by virtue of its matter, form, and proximate end. Good objects can be corrupted by bad circumstances or remote ends (the end of agent). A comparable analogy to SSA temptations is ceramic ashtray attraction.[61] If a man desires to eat ashtrays, his desires are sinful because ashtrays are not an object of food. They destroy mouth, throat, and stomach.
Pastoral Reflections
Theology matters. What you think affects how you live. Since the account offered here presents a different way of thinking about SSA, it is appropriate to offer different pastoral counsel.
For those who struggle with SSA temptations
You are not a beast driven by instinct and untouched by grace. SC’s account shamefully depicts you like Nebuchadnezzar whereas this account affirms that you are a human made in the image of God. You are a new creation in Christ Jesus. The old things isolated to your past, the old things present with you today, and the old sins from Adam that remain in the world and our flesh do not reign in your life. Christ reigns in you. God has made you new. The work of God’s grace goes beyond the tips of your fingers; it touches your very soul. It reaches behind all SSA desires and enables you to mortify them by the Spirit of God (Rom 8:13). Your SSA desires aren’t beyond the touch of God’s grace or out of reach of your own reason.
For these reasons, you should repent of disordered SSA temptations. The matter you desire (a person of the same sex) is not fit to receive the sexual act from you. Adam did not have SSA temptations in his state of innocence. Christ, the impeccable God-man, did not either. On the contrary, Christ came to save us from this sin. His grace enables you to employ your reason to direct your will away from improper objects and rightly order yourself to proper goods while cultivating good and godly desires.
As a consequence, you should never identify yourself as a SSA Christian. The presence of sin in your life is general, not particular. Sin remains as an internal principle of your flesh that must constantly be mortified. When your will consents, it becomes particularized in what is known as actual sin.[62] To attach a qualitative deformity in the form of a particular sin to your self concept is unbecoming of the name you bear in Christ.[63] He has set you free from the dominion of sin in your life such that sin does not reign in your mortal body. If you name the sin, you explicitly acknowledge that particular forms of sin reigns in you. Christ, your King, reigns in you. Day-by-day he enables you to mortify particular sins and weaken your sinful desires.
For those with heterosexual desires
Order your sexual desires properly. For those looking to marry, sexual desire ordered toward the right object — a person fit for marriage — is a good thing. Sexual desire is a good given by God in our nature that ought to be pursued in the right way, at the right time, with the right person, and for the right ends. As a male, you are ordered toward the female sex. As a female, you are ordered toward the male sex. One is ordered by nature to the opposite sex. This should not be conceived as a subjective desire to have sexual relations with any and all members of the opposite sex but a recognition of the fundamental and natural orientation of humans by virtue of embodied existence.
The sexual appetite supplied by God is a good gift because it properly inclines you to a sexual union wherein intimacy and the propagation of the species occur. It is given to you in your human nature as a good that drives you to order your life, find a spouse, get married, and have children. As the appetite for food is good, so too is the appetite for sex. Both can and ought to be rightly ordered. Likewise, both appetites can and ought not to be abused.
SC characterize some as arguing that any sexual desire outside of marriage is sin (5). Whether their characterization is accurate, I will leave others to decide. Regardless, I think this is a faulty position. The marriage union is by nature a sexual union, a good to be desired (Gen 2:18). This union is a one-flesh union consummated in the conjugal act. Throughout marriage, husbands and wives owe a debt of sexual love to each other (1 Cor 7:3-4). God willing, children follow. To desire marriage simply is to desire a sexual union in covenant. One cannot tear asunder the covenant from the sexual union nor the sexual union from the covenant. Marriage is not a mere covenant wherein sexual relations can rightly occur. Rather, it is a covenant that rightly orders sexual relations for the propagation of the human race, the preventing of wandering lusts, and mutual companionship grounded in the one flesh union. Because these two have joined themselves together in covenant by the sexual union, they are joined until death.[64]
Prior to marriage, this natural orientation toward the opposite sex becomes more concrete as one discovers the particular person with whom they wish to enter into an intrinsically sexual union.[65] Since this is the nature of the union and that which is first in intention is last in execution, it is a purpose of the mind to have a sexual relationship and create offspring with that particular one by engaging in the procreative act that is essential to the marriage union. However, since what is first in intention (a purpose of the mind to fulfill one’s natural inclination with this particular one) is last in execution (the sexual union itself), then bringing illicit thoughts or actions associated with the telos into the present becomes sinful. In other words, while ordering our will in the right direction (the conjugal act in the context of marriage), we must yet avoid lust and sexual immorality.
A helpful philosophical category can be employed here. One can conceive of something in the mind without an accompanying image. One can conceive of necktie without an image of a particular necktie. A concept refers to what a thing is, its essence, whereas an image concerns a particular necktie that has color, length, material, and other associated features. When one chooses to enter into an intrinsically sexual union with another through marriage, they are intending to have a sexual relation with that one by virtue of the nature of that particular union. This conception in the mind differs from an image.[66] One can conceive of entering into a sexual union with a particular one without imagining what it would be like to be in sexual union with the same one.
If you do not desire to enter into a sexual union, then do not pursue marriage. If entering into a sexual union with that particular one is not a desirable concept, then do not marry that one. If you do desire to enter into a sexual union with that one, do not engage in sexual acts outside of the union or indulge in lust by fantasizing about that person in the present as if they were your spouse.[67] Count them as the one you hope to be your spouse should the Lord will (James 4:13–17).
For those with heterosexual desires in a marriage union, you must still rightly order your sexuality. You can err with your spouse in excess, a form of sexual gluttony. You can err in defect, failing to render each other the debts owed (1 Cor 7:3). With regard to the sensible good — the good which pleases the senses — in the marital union, one ought to be temperate, not immature or insensible. You can also err by taking your body and mind away from the proper object of your sexual union and setting your desires upon another or simply having no desire for the one God has given to you by his providence. This is always wrong. Guard your marriage by enjoying a good thing in a good way with the good spouse provided to you by God’s kind providence.
This counsel differs significantly from another characterization set forth by SC. They write, “If every unfulfilled sexual appetite presents an opportunity for sexual temptation, and if experiencing sexual temptation is a morally culpable sin, then Christians who have any sexual appetite must pursue marriage and try to have at least as much sex as that appetite directs them” (25). It is quite telling that SC think this is a serious objection, as if those who disagree cannot conceive of an appetite ordered by reason. Even their objections are framed in a manner that treat sexual appetites the way a dog treats food.
How might this objection be answered? The amount of food differs from person to person, as discussed above. The same is true for sex in marriage. One must affirm the goodness of sexual relations with the spouse, engage in these relations, and moderate sensible pleasure in a manner appropriate to the persons and state of the marriage union. Moderating a good appetite differs from having an intrinsically disordered appetite.
For those with the gift of celibacy
The gift of celibacy does not render you asexual. You are still male or female and, as such, by nature you are ordered to the opposite sex. You must also order yourself rightly as one with a particular sex. You may not possess a desire to fulfill a God-given appetite with a member of the opposite sex. This is not the same as SSA temptation, which is an ungodly desire and a sign that you need to rightly order your sexual appetite consistent with God’s design. A burning of the sexual appetite for the wrong material need not be taken as a sign of singleness, but a desire that must be reordered.
If you do find yourself with this gift, use it for the good of the kingdom of God. Married couples are to be fruitful and multiply, filling the earth. Those with the gift of celibacy are called to be fruitful as fathers and mothers in the faith.
Celibate men, raise up and cultivate godly doctrine and practice in Christ’s church. Celibate women, receive and nurture all manner of life, physical and spiritual, so that you may nourish and beautify all that God has put within your grasp. The fruitfulness of the celibate life ought to spiritually mimic the physical fruitfulness of the marriage life. “Asexuality” and SSA do not picture fruitfulness, but a turn away from life unto death. Instead, cause life to flourish for the sake of the kingdom of God. This includes promoting, preserving, and protecting the marriage institution as an institution.
For those concerned with unity
Christian unity is a cause of great concern and should be pursued. SC outline the terms of unity by relegating differences of SSA to the level of a lesser debate and matter of Christian freedom (26–28). Meanwhile, they claim that calling for repentance of SSA is pastorally unwise and akin to the error of the Judaizers while, ironically, they align themselves with the Roman Catholic view of concupiscence.[68] The issue of the Judaizers was not a lesser debate, nor was the Reformation. So, which is it? SC cannot have it both ways.
Instead, we should preach the freeness of the gospel of grace for those who experience SSA. The grace of God forgives actions and attractions that are contrary to our nature. The grace of God is great enough to cover those who do not think the attraction is itself sinful. But unity cannot tolerate antinomianism about personal, pastoral, and theological issues that touch the nature of humanity and fall under the light of nature and light of faith. The halfway house established by SC will not serve as a source of true peace and thus it cannot be a basis for unity.
Conclusion
The pastoral paper published by the Center for Faith and Sexuality does not offer pastorally correct answers because it is built on a faulty foundation. It leads Christians away from the truth of nature and Scripture and fails to call evil evil (Isa 5:20). Accordingly, it robs humans of their humanity. The sinfulness of sin is not understood. Thus, neither is the need for divine grace for forgiveness and healing. Their anthropology and theory of action is ill-equipped for the task at hand.
Christians will do well to reject this teaching. Those with same-sex attraction will find a better account of the law of God and power of grace should they look elsewhere. There is abundant life to be enjoyed and the blessing of forgiveness for all with sinful desires.[69]
[1] Unfortunately, this pattern persists throughout SC’s paper. Whether discussing Romans 7, Christ’s fallen nature, or concupiscence, they refer to fundamental theological and exegetical points as “theorizing” or acknowledge that they are “debated,” or state that the issue won’t be “settled” (18, 19). A clear presentation need not address every issue, but it should at least demonstrate an awareness of the consequences of adopting certain positions. One could reject John Owen and side with Pelagius’ interpretation of Romans 7, but why should one interpret the Bible like a heretic? One could theorize about Christ’s humanity, but shouldn’t Christ’s impeccability be upheld? And how might this line of thinking change the way we view his temptations and ours? If they reject impeccability, they should simply state why and how that affects their understanding of temptation. Yes, concupiscence is a difficult debate, but shouldn’t one explain the difference between theological and philosophical understandings of concupiscence in order to understand how it became a theological term that describes the pervasive and perverting nature of sin? Furthermore, what are the consequences of agreeing with Pelagius on Romans 7 and Rome on the doctrine of concupiscence? Surely implications surrounding the doctrine of justification by faith alone are at stake. But these implications are never explored.
A principled paper differs from a minimalist paper. A principled paper can outline positions so that readers can discern what views follow as entailments. A minimalist paper loosely joins atomistic ideas together without providing readers with a coherent way of thinking. While some find this latter option pious and humble, pastors and scholars should labor more diligently to follow the God of peace rather than produce confusion (1 Cor 14:33).
[2] The language of “change” is unhelpful, but it’s SC’ term. I would argue that the “changes” noted by SC are only considered changes in light of our contemporary dialogue as measured by the past few decades. It is better to identify these changes as returns. Individuals who have repented forsook contemporary confusion to return to the old paths.
[3] Although I am not making a biblical case for these concepts, I think Jesus’ words in Matthew 7:17 indicate that these philosophical notions are operative in Scripture. A tree is a substance that produces fruit. A tree is still a tree whether the fruit is good or bad as it has the same nature or essence. The language of “good” and “bad” in the text indicate that a tree has either lived up to and acted in accordance with what it is, or whether it has failed through some deformity or privation (the lack of a good a thing ought to have given its nature). Jesus aptly shifts from metaphysical goodness to the goodness of the tree and its fruit to moral goodness. This should lead one to conclude that moral goodness is a subset of metaphysical goodness.
[4] The concept of first-person subjective and third-person objective accounts is indebted to David Oderberg. See Oderberg, “The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Law” in Natural Moral Law in Contemporary Society (Washing, DC: Catholic University of America, 2010), 72–73.
[5] On this point it helps to distinguish acts of a human and human acts. Acts of a human are those acts of the human body not ordered by rationality. This would include the growth and loss of human parts like teeth or hair. Human acts are properly human because they are ordered, whether potentially or actually, by rationality. They are distinctly human. Even though the dog and the human have stomachs and eat, the manner in which humans eat ought to conform to their rationality. This includes praying before you eat, fasting for disciplinary or spiritual purposes, and waiting for others to get their food as a polite gesture. We see that reason elevates the powers that humans share with dogs. For example, dogs and humans procreate. Humans choose spouses, promise each other in marriage, make vows, and engage in the conjugal act with dignity as they procreate. These are distinctly human acts because they are able to be ordered by rationality.
[6] Trees act on visible objects that humans can see but they do not act upon the object as a thing the tree sees. The tree does not “look” at the ground before it drops the acorn even if you watch the acorn fall from the tree onto the ground.
[7] Here, we would say that the kidney has a privation; it lacks a good it ought to have evidenced by its failure to function in accordance with what it is, or its nature. The notion of privation is a philosophically defensible and theologically necessary concept. The rejection of evil as a privation makes evil a substance either created by God or by the creature. In order for privation to serve its proper place in philosophical and Christian theological discourse, Christians must deny that a gap exists between “is” and “ought.” The “is” here is the form of a thing, or its nature. The “ought” is a good that a thing ought to possess or successfully actualize given its nature or form. Christians must affirm privation lest they fall into the error of Manicheanism. As an entailment, they should also reject what is commonly called the “is-ought fallacy” or the “naturalistic fallacy.” John Frame serves as an example of someone who affirms that a gap exists between “is” and “ought” as he follows David Hume on this point. He believes that reasoning to an “ought” from an “is” succumbs to fallacious reasoning. Consequently, he also denies the theory of privation. See, John Frame, The Doctrine of God, (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2002), 163–168; John Frame, The Doctrine of the Christian Life (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 95–96. For a better path forward on privation, see Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Sin and Salvation in Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2006), 3:140. Thomas Goodwin applies this reasoning to Paul’s words in Romans 7:18 where Paul speaks of the lack of good dwelling within him. He writes, “He says, there was no good in him; a privation therefore it is of all good and grace, and therefore a sin; for, privatio est carentia entitatis debita inesse, it is a want of something in the subject, which ought to be there. If, therefore, this good ought to be there (else it is not a privation of it), then it is a sin, for it ought to be there by the law of God.” Thomas Goodwin, An Unregenerate Man’s Guiltiness before God, vol 10 of The Works of Thomas Goodwin (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2021), 56.
[8] For biblical texts that support this precise meaning, see Romans 11:24; Galatians 4:8; 2 Peter 1:4. As I will demonstrate below, Scripture connects nature and teleology in passages such as Romans 1:27–28.
[9] The Bible does refer back to creation and Christians can and should follow this pattern. One need only look to our Lord’s teaching on marriage in Matthew 19:3-12. I believe Paul’s point is similar to the point I make here. One can merely look at what a human is and discern that certain acts conform to human nature whereas other acts contradict it. The “is” referred to here simply is human nature. One need not be able to trace everything chronologically through history by the light of faith to discern how things once were in order to know how they ought to be. The nature of the thing in question is sufficient to instruct in natural matters. The intelligibility of the created order as discerned from below by rational creatures should lead one to look upward to the Maker of all. This requires an effect-to-cause kind of reasoning wherein one can discern the intelligibility in the effect and understand something about its cause. This vertical reasoning follows a pattern that works from below to above rather than requiring that one reasons chronologically backward to the creation account in order to understand what is manifest before their eyes in the present. There are many things that eye has not seen and ear has not heard (1 Cor 2:6–10). These things are received by faith. There are other things that are seen, heard, and have entered into the heart of man. These are taught to us by nature and discerned through sound reason. See Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol 2, trans by George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1994), XI.ii.17. Henceforth, IET.
[10] The argument that a particular nature has an origin need not make reference to Genesis 1–3. An argument from Genesis 1–3 is horizontal as it is chronological, historical, and places an emphasis on time. These can be helpful arguments either employed in service to faith or as an argument from faith that depends upon revelation in Scripture. One can also make vertical arguments. These are philosophical and consider the essence of the thing in question. Since the particular essence, as it exists now, is not the reason for its own existence, it is dependent upon another for its being. The dependence is not merely a chronological dependence through time, but the acknowledgement that the nature in question possesses a derived existence that simply cannot be explained by something temporally prior that also has a derived existence. All that which has a derived mode of existence can only be explained by that which is existence or being itself. This is God (Exod 3:14).
[11] Elsewhere, I offer a brief and accessible anthropology that develops these and other related themes. See “The Constitution of Man: An Examination of Monism, Dichotomy, and Trichotomy.” In Eikon 7, no. 2 (Fall 2025): 48–57.
[12] Judas committed high treason when he betrayed the God-man, but he did so for the sake of an apparent good. His actions were evil. He misperceived the good and handed over the Lord of Glory. Turretin argues that we only pursue evil as good, which is the most “commonest principle” impressed upon our nature. See Turretin, IET, XI.i.20; XI.ii.17.
[13] My treatment of concupiscence is indebted to Francis Turretin. See Turretin, IET, IX.xi.19-22. There, he distinguishes between concupiscence discussed philosophically as an appetite and theologically and popularly to speak of original sin. In this essay I am using it philosophically. For Turretin’s philosophical use of the term, see IET, XI.xxi.1.
[14] Thomas Goodwin represents a Reformed theologian who articulates this basic and widely held conception of human nature. He writes, “Every man, you know, hath three lives in him: he hath the life of reason, which the reasonable soul liveth; and he hath the life of sense, which is the life that a beast liveth; and he hath the life of plants.” He continues, “As the life of reason is the eminent life of a man, which a man as a man leadeth; and if you exhort a man to live as a man, you would exhort him to live the life of reason in a more eminent manner, though he exercise other acts of life too; so it is here, the eminent act of faith is to live upon the free grace of God in Christ, to live upon the righteousness of God revealed in the gospel, revealed from faith to faith.” Thomas Goodwin, The Object and Acts of Justifying Faith, vol 8 of The Works of Thomas Goodwin (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2021), 301-302.
[15] In this instance, the failure of the subject’s stomach does not arise from a failure of their will. Further, the failure is not in their will, but in their stomach. For these reasons, it can be called involuntary.
[16] The distinction between the perfection of a thing and the end of an act is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic finality. An acorn has the final cause of being an oak tree (intrinsic finality) that drops acorns and produces other oak trees (extrinsic finality). Intrinsic finality is the final cause of the efficient cause whereas extrinsic finality is the final cause that follows from the formal cause in question.
[17] Here, we can distinguish between the end of the act (the proximate end) and the end of the one who acts (the remote end). This distinction is developed further throughout the article. The two ends need not always coincide nor is it always immoral when they do not. For example, you may desire to have a rosebush planted in your front yard. You hire a landscaper to plant the rosebush in your front yard. The end of the act of planting a rosebush is the same for you and your landscaper, or it ought to be if he wishes to get paid by you. You and the landscaper wish for the rosebush to be planted. However, you want the rosebush on account of the beauty it adds to your front yard. The landscaper acknowledges the beauty and fittingness of the rosebush but plants it for the sake of earning money to provide for his employees and family. The proximate end of planting a rosebush is shared by you and your landscaper. Though the proximate end may be shared between you and the landscaper, the remote ends differ and may be many (beauty or providing for employees and family). Regardless of the remote end, you and the landscaper respect the proximate end of planting a rosebush as you seek your respective remote ends.
[18] It is helpful to distinguish between the natural species of the act and the moral species. The moral species of the act is introduced when a moral agent (with an intellect and a will) acts in accord with its nature. The natural species does not go away but is contained in the matter of the act. The natural species can be abstracted from the moral species of the act.
[19] Recall the above analogy that ashtrays cannot be digested.
[20] The matter can remain the same and the form can differ. This allows us to distinguish between murder, capital punishment, and self-defense. Further, the form can stay the same and the matter can change. Stealing is the unlawful taking of that which rightly belongs to another. One can steal (the form) many things (the matter). If one steals a person, it is manstealing. If one steals a car, it is grand theft auto. When one steals in secret, it is called thievery. When one steals in an open and brazen manner, it is robbery. The form remained the same throughout. The matter changed in several instances as did the manner in which one stole the matter.
[21] The subsequent effects may be numerous as they go above and beyond the proximate end of the act itself. For example, not every instance of murder renders Mr. Peacock, or some other person, a widower. Further, Colonel Mustard’s act cannot rightly be reduced to making Mr. Peacock a widower, since this could be the effect of other acts. If Mrs. Peacock ran a red light and Colonel Mustard struck her car in the intersection, he would have killed Mrs. Peacock and rendered Mr. Peacock a widower, but this would be an accident wherein the fault is rightly attributed to Mrs. Peacock. Further, Colonel Mustard could bring about this same subsequent effect in an act of self-defense if Mrs. Peacock sought to kill him in the kitchen with the dagger. Using a different analogy, stealing fifty-thousand dollars is still stealing whether it’s against Elon Musk or someone who only has fifty-thousand dollars. Musk may not even notice that he lost the money but someone else may be rendered penniless. The effect upon each person is different though the act remains the same. For this reason, the effects may not come under the intention of the one who acts or serve as a reason. Colonel Mustard may not even be aware of the fact that Mrs. Peacock has children.
[22] For a helpful treatment of circumstances, see, John A. Oesterle, Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1957), 71-74; Vernon Bourke, Ethics: A Textbook in Moral Philosophy (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1955), 94-98.
[23] This may be a physical circumstance, but it is not a moral circumstance. See, Oesterle, Ethics, 103-104.
[24] The powers involved in this act are the reproductive powers and it is the only act that tends toward the creation of life. This is true for humans, dogs, and chimps. This is similar to saying that ears are for hearing. Yes, we can say more about the things heard and all the other purposes of the ear, such as serving as a place to hang jewelry and hearing your spouse communicate their love for you, but this does not change the fact that the ear is ordered toward hearing and it is the only part of the body suited to this end.
[25] The language of “object” need not imply “objectification.” A wife can be the object of her husband’s affection without being objectified. Likewise, the husband can be the object of his wife’s love without being objectified. The language of “object” simply refers to that which receives the action. Throughout this paper, I will use the term “object” to refer to one who is a subject or person so as not to confuse the one who acts (subject) with the one who receives the act (object).
[26] These are typically differentiated as circa quid and materia circa quam.
[27] Being Uriah’s wife would be a mere circumstance that has no bearing on the nature of the act itself if David acted upon her as a doctor who sought to bring healing.
[28] A man having his father’s wife is an act of adultery by reason of her belonging to her husband and her husband, rather than his son, belonging to her. It is no mere woman, but a married woman with whom the man in 1 Corinthians 5 has sexual relations. Yet, it is no mere married woman, but his father’s wife. The circumstances directly bearing upon the matter acted upon make it an act of adultery. The circumstances that do not bear directly upon the act of adultery make the act more heinous and add further deformity to the act, making it so heinous that not even the Gentiles do it (1 Cor 5:1).
[29] If a woman committed adultery on her husband because she wanted to engage in sexual relations with a man who had green eyes, this would not be a mere circumstance of the act but her remote end. Insofar as she sought to have relations with a green-eyed man, she would pursue fitting material (a green-eyed man) for the act of adultery. This would no longer be a traditional circumstance that did not bear upon the nature of the act, but a remote end of the woman. The sin would still be adultery and the remote end of pursuing a green-eyed man would add the sinful deformity of vanity to her adultery. If she committed adultery with a green-eyed man but not on account of his green eyes, it would simply be a mere circumstance that has no bearing on the morality of the act.
[30] Some of these accidents may be passed on to offspring in the sexual act as the parents pass down their DNA. However, these accidents do not affect the powers of reproduction and so do not affect the act. Likewise, morality only asks if the one with these accidents is the spouse since these features in no way shape the morality of the act.
[31] The nature of the act is important. A private handshake and a public handshake have no real difference insofar as handshakes are understood in isolation. However, one could conceive of a handshake as a means of binding a contract. This would need to be public because of the nature of a contract and the necessity of witnesses for legal purposes.
[32] This just is what makes pedophilia worse than homosexuality. The subject in question cannot volitionally enter into the act. In the case of adult homosexual relations, two persons have used their intellect and will to perform an evil deed.
[33] Some might object that married couples are not always able to procreate. Here, we must make a few distinctions. First, we must distinguish between those who can engage in the sexual act by virtue of their sex. A male and a female are the only combination that can. No other combination of persons works.
Second, we must distinguish between impotency and infertility. Impotent persons are those who cannot enter into the sexual act or render due benevolence due deformity pertaining to genitalia. Jesus classifies these persons as those who were born eunuchs or made eunuchs by man (Matt 19:12). Because these persons cannot perform the sexual act, Christians in the Puritan tradition have said that they should not marry, but remain single. See William Perkins, “Christian Oeconomie,” in The Works of William Perkins, vol 10, eds. Joseph A. Pipa and J. Stephen Yuille (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2020), 42; William Gouge, Building a Godly Home Volume 2: A Holy Vision for a Happy Family, eds. Scott Brown and Joel R. Beeke (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2013), 3–4. In what follows, I summarize their arguments. Impotency differs from barrenness in many respects. Impotency is discerned in the body whereas infertility is hidden within the body. Impotent persons cannot perform due benevolence whereas infertile persons can. Impotency is known prior to (a priori) entering into the sexual act because these deformities manifest themselves. However, infertility is known after (a posteriori) repeated sexual acts. Impotent persons cannot become one-flesh with another because they cannot engage in the sexual act whereas infertile persons can become one flesh even if they are unable to receive the fruit of the union. I agree with those like Perkins and Gouge who argue that impotent persons should not enter into marriage based on the nature of the union and the teaching of the Lord (Matt 19:12). However, this does not mean that those who are rendered impotent after marriage can be divorced. They have already promised to remain with each other for better and for worse until death. They joined themselves in a one flesh union, meaning that they cannot leave their spouse anymore than they could leave their own flesh when it is injured.
The third and final distinction lies in comparing infertile persons and same-sex unions. Same-sex couples are not necessarily infertile. There is no deformity hidden in their body that prevents them from having children. Rather, they are not an object that is able to receive the sexual act. Infertile persons are the proper subjects of the marriage union and can be one flesh even if the fruit of the union does not follow. Heterosexual couples have the potential to receive children but are unable to do so by virtue of a defect or privation. Same-sex couples have the potential to receive children but are unable to do so, not because of their bodies per se, but because they perform disordered acts. If they forsake their same-sex union and join themselves to a person of the opposite sex, they could, in theory, enter into and receive the fruit of a one-flesh union. However, homosexual acts are not unitive and therefore cannot produce children. This shifts the framing of the question from the effect of the sexual act to the nature of the sexual act that tends toward a particular effect. Same-sex couples are not fit for marriage because they cannot produce the effect by virtue of their inability to engage in the sexual act on account of incompatibility as persons of the same sex. Infertile couples can enter into the sexual act but fail to bring about the effect that follows the act due to a privation. Thus, the comparison between same-sex couples and infertile persons fails.
[34] It is appropriate to refer to same-sex marriage as a nominal marriage since it is not real marriage but one in name only. Identifying it as a nominal marriage allows us to demonstrate the heinous nature of desecrating the marriage union while retaining an essential definition of marriage that demonstrates why homosexual marriages are not actual marriages. This is how the Bible talks about other “gods.” They are so-called gods or gods in name only (1 Cor 8:5).
[35] Marriage is more than the one-flesh union, but it is not less than this union. Any component that is more than the one-flesh union necessarily flows from the one-flesh union. When one vows to remain with another through sickness, they vow to remain with the one they have joined themselves to in a one-flesh union. This union is the foundation for all the other goods promised and received in marriage.
[36] This has not always been the case. Readers will find the language of habit throughout the Reformed tradition. A small sampling includes authors like Peter Martyr Vermigli, Theodore Beza, William Ames, Thomas Goodwin, Francis Turretin, John Owen, and Petrus van Mastricht. Wojciech Giertych asserts that the notion of habit as that which explains internal change is absent in the Reformed tradition [“Foreword” by Wojciech Giertych, OP, in Ezra Sullivan, Habits and Holiness: Ethics, Theology, and Biopsychology (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2021), xiii]. However, the Reformed theologians mentioned in this note employ the language of habit to explain regeneration, sanctification, cardinal virtues, theological virtues, and the human nature of Christ. Giertych’s claim may be true of Reformed theologians in the 20–21st Century, but it fails to account for classic Reformed theology as it developed during the Reformation.
[37] The man born blind in John 9 cannot habituate his eyes to do anything. He was blind from birth. Job, on the other hand, made a covenant with his eyes not to look lustfully upon a virgin (Job 31:1). The man born blind could not govern his eyes by reason since his eyes were deformed as to its natural act. Job employed his sound moral reason to direct his eyes away from that which was evil.
[38] “Naturally,” as used here, refers to the powers involved in the act insofar as they are abstracted from morality.
[39] This should not be read subjectively as if a particular man, Solomon, is oriented toward multiple women all with names and faces. Rather, this is to be understood abstractly. Solomon, as he is a male, is oriented to the female sex rather than to particular females or every female.
[40] People of the same sex can do all sorts of things together, one of which is enjoy friendship. The problem is not the same sex, but the form introduced by reason. Two individuals of the same sex, the same matter, can enjoy virtuous friendship, the pleasantries of life, and work together. The problem begins when the sexual relation is introduced. A male can receive friendship from another male but a male cannot receive a sexual act from another male because of what the sexual act is.
[41] For example, a good knife is still a good knife even if it is really bad at hammering. It is good in itself and in relation to the ends that complete it. A good knife cuts well and is able to slice a brisket. This same good knife may also be used slash a man’s throat in an act of murder. For it to be considered an act of murder, the knife must be a good knife. A good murderer uses a good knife which makes him a bad person. Bad murderers use bad knives which make them bad murderers and bad persons. The sexual act is similar. A male is a good object of the sexual act for the female as the act is considered in itself apart from moral considerations. However, this act cannot be considered in isolation from morality.
[42] With Goodwin, “I will therefore, first, shew that the word lust is largely taken, and so to be understood here for the habitual inclinations, and that of all the faculties, understanding also; and so therefore inadequately to express the positive corruption of the whole man.” Goodwin, An Unregenerate Man’s Guiltiness before God, 284.
[43] Here, “kill” has been abstracted from its moral species and refers to a mere natural act.
[44] With Goodwin, “For that which in beasts and dead things we call an inclination or instinct, in man, being a reasonable creature, we call lust.” Goodwin, An Unregenerate Man’s Guiltiness before God, 286.
[45] Turretin, IET, IX.ii.2, 9.
[46] Turretin, IET, XI.xxi.10.
[47] This desire need not be characterized as a desire for a particular person. It can be understood broadly as attraction to those of the same sex as desirable.
[48] These desires are what Turretin calls “broadly” voluntary. They may be rightly labeled voluntary “because it affects the will and inheres in it.” Turretin, IET, XI.xxi.12. One typically associates voluntariness with what Turretin identifies as “strict” voluntariness, an actual movement of the will (either elicited or imperate [Turretin, IET, IX.ii.2, X.ii.12]). Turretin explicates this point by discussing nolition, which is a kind of involuntariness or not-willing. This occurs in two ways. The first is a positive nolition whereby one wills to not perform a certain action. If an act is involuntary in the strict sense by a “positive nolition,” then the act is not and cannot be morally culpable. The second is a negative nolition. Here, the agent wills not to act when the agent should have acted. For example, imagine an adult watching an toddler drown in a bathtub. The adult would be morally culpable for their inaction, or negative nolition. See Turretin, IET, IX.ii.2-3. A positive nolition is an act of the will to “nill” or refuse something whereas a negative nolition is simply not refusing. Sins of negative nolition are not voluntary in the strict sense but can be morally culpable.
[49] Commenting on the “willings of the flesh” in Ephesians 2:3, Goodwin writes, “To shew that the desires, the lustings of the hearts of men, are not merely brutish, they have a tincture of will and reason in them; and though oftentimes they are involuntary, for there are many motions arise before the will is put forth, yet because they are in a creature that hath will and reason, which will and reason should be too strong for the risings of such lusts, and keep them down, hence they are called ‘wills.’ You shall see the same kind of lusts in beasts as in men. You shall see pride in a horse, you shall see revenge in an elephant, &c. But yet these very lusts that are the same in men with those that are in beasts, because they are in a creature that hath a will and reason to keep them down, the fault therefore of all these lusts is laid upon the will, and they are called ‘the wills of the flesh and of the mind.’ Take now a natural fool, between whom and a beast there is but a nice distinction in appearance; yet these lusts in him are sins, not in the other, because he hath a will and reason.” Thomas Goodwin, Exposition of Ephesians 2, vol 2 of The Works of Thomas Goodwin (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2021), 93.
[50] Turretin, IET, XI.xxi.9. Turretin is explaining James 1:15 in this section of his Institutes.
[51] See, Goodwin, Thomas Goodwin, An Unregenerate Man’s Guiltiness before God, 59.
[52] On the ordering of goodness in the life of upright man, see Goodwin, An Unregenerate Man’s Guiltiness before God, 287.
[53] The Christological commitments of SC are unclear. I will operate from a classic Chalcedonian Christology since it is correct, orthodox, and does not undermine the arguments listed by SC. One oddity in their piece was the regular mention of “fully” God and “fully” man. This quantitative method of reasoning about natures serves as one more instance of unstated, unwarranted, or unargued philosophical assumptions. Maybe this is why they refer to the Trinity and the Incarnation as paradoxes (10). It could simply be that SC are unaware of that which they speak.
[54] I am grateful for conversations with Daniel Scheiderer where he reminded me that Christ not only displayed wisdom and power but was ministered to by angels.
[55] If the remote end is love or intimacy, this is not a bad end considered in itself. However, given the object of the act, the end is mired in its pursuit of an illicit object (Rom 3:8).
[56] Since there is one divine will, one cannot ask if the Son could will contrary to the Father according to his divinity. Divine simplicity renders the question nonsensical. The questions here assume a human will since will most properly belongs to natures and the Son is acting according to his humanity in this text. The arguments here assume the orthodox commitment of dyothelitism. This assumption is warranted since the text in question has been historically used to argue for two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human. For a helpful treatment of these issues and an argument for volitional-non-contrariety, see Randall K. Johnson, The Christological Case for Compatibilism (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2026).
[57] Contra SC, when they write, “The mere fact that his instinctive desire differs from his Father’s desire for him is not itself a sin” (23). The square of opposition as taught in classic logic texts would be of great use here as one seeks to understand the difference between contrariety and contradiction. One can also read William Perkins, who writes of the “combat of diverse desires,” saying, “upon sundry respects drawing man to and fro. This may be in man’s nature without fault, and was in Christ in whom the desire of doing His Father’s will, striving and struggling with another desire whereby nature seeks to preserve itself, caused Him to pray in this manner.” William Perkins, “Exposition of the Creed,” in The Works of William Perkins, vol 5, ed. Ryan Hurd (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017), 148.
[58] Because the Son wills a greater good, his willing of lesser goods need not be understood as contrariety or contradiction.
[59] Perkins distinguishes between three combats, two of which are sinful. There is the struggle between reason and appetite and between flesh and spirit. Christ did not engage in these combats. Rather, he engaged in the combat of diverse desires. Perkins, “Exposition of the Creed,” 148.
[60] Here, I use the term philosophically rather than theologically.
[61] Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1998), 124.
[62] The will’s role may be explicit consent or a negative nolition or not refusing.
[63] SC are known to speak of the role of adjectives and their relationship to identity. They often use the language of “American Christian” to show that certain identities can compete with their Christian identify (Sean McDowell, “Full DIALOGUE: LGBTQ Issues Dividing the Church – Preston Sprinkle,” YouTube video, posted January 2025, 47:03, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGuxjNtHW5A&t=2823s; Greg Coles, “What Does ‘Gay Christian’ Actually Mean? Greg Coles, Part 2,” Theology in the Raw, YouTube video, accessed August 10, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xD2qH3-3eag). While this is true, they are confused in several respects.
First, Gregory Coles will speak about how adjectives sometimes do or do not transform substances. He uses the example of yellow cheese and toe cheese. While he seems to be playful, it is helpful to point out that adjectives are accidents that inhere in but do not “fundamentally alter” the nature of substances, as Coles seems to suggest. Yellow cheese and toe cheese are not the same substance. One is called cheese equivocally. I didn’t think this needed to be said but Coles has used this analogy for years (James White and Gregory Coles, “Road Trip: Debate – Is ‘Gay Christian’ a Biblically Acceptable Identity for Members of Christ’s Church?,” Mid-Atlantic Reformation Society, The Future of Christendom 2023: The Gospel at War, Spooky Nook Sports, Manheim, PA, September 16, 2023, YouTube video, posted by Future of Christendom, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZqD2Yp2Ons). Second, some cheeses that are spoken about are species of cheeses as indicated by their color, which is an accident known as a quality. It would be helpful if SC articulated whether Gay Christian is a species of Christian. Third, “American Christian” can merely pick out the place wherein someone resides. This is another accident that modifies the substance in question as it concerns its place. Fourth, “American” can compete with “Christian” insofar as one speaks of allegiance to the two cities in which they dwell. However, patriotism is an integral part of the virtue of justice. While one can disorder their patriotism, placing love of people and place over love of God, the problem does not reside in the virtue itself, but the disordered love. SSA, as I have argued in this article, always takes an improper object. The problem is not ordering loves but whether someone is materially suited to receive love in a sexual form. If one describes himself as an “American Christian” to highlight his desire to fulfill his debt of love to his country (Rom 13:8), then one has also emphasized a quality that is virtuous as manifested in love of neighbor. The kind of confusion that comes from SC can be explained by the fact that they have intentionally avoided classic philosophical and theological language in favor of jargon that has either imbibed contemporary philosophical commitments or is simply whimsical. The same is true of terms such as Side A, B, X, and Y. They are incapable of carrying the necessary weight for meaningful discourse. It is as if intentional obfuscation is the goal. Running in circles that employ these terms cheapens ethical discourse, allowing you to speak of yellow cheese and toe cheese as if an actual point is being made.
[64] Death terminates the covenant. This affirmation does not exclude acts that may break the bond of the marriage union, such as adultery and abandonment. See John Owen, “Of Marrying After Divorce In Case of Adultery,” in The Works of John Owen, vol 16, ed. William H. Goold (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 2009), 256.
[65] Technically speaking, this would be the matter of the object of the act. Although I think this is the correct way to think about the sexual act, I find it lacking the necessary romance. “Roses are red, and violets are blue. Suitable matter of the conjugal act are you.” While true, it lacks the beauty of the Song of Solomon.
[66] It may be helpful to distinguish between image and memory as well as add a further example to differentiate image and concept. If you are told to think of a white horse, you will image a white horse in your mind. If the image of the white horse is not just a mere image, but a particular white horse you encountered once, then it is a memory because the image of the white horse is from your past experience. If you relay this past experience to a friend, you will tell them about the white horse you encountered and they will image a white horse in their mind. The image won’t be the same as your memory because that memory properly belongs to you. The concept of the horse differs from the image and memory of a horse. The concept is a universal. As such, it allows you to rightly identify whether any thing in particular is in fact a horse, whether white or brown, Clydesdale or thoroughbred, mare or stallion. The image or memory will always be of a particular horse whereas a concept excludes particularities.
Applying this to the case at hand, one can conceive of entering into a marriage covenant, which is a sexual covenant, without imagining what it would be like to have sexual relations with a particular person. If one has had sexual relations with that particular person (or any other for that matter) outside of the marriage covenant, then recalling images associated with the memory is also wrong. However, one can remember that they had immoral sexual relations with a particular one during confession of sin without imaging in their mind what that particular sin was like. David serves as an example of this in Psalm 51. Similarly, you can conceive of David’s sin with Bathsheba without having the memory or imaging what that relation looked like. If one can recall past sin without imaging it in their mind in a way that allows for godly repentance, then surely one can anticipate a God-honoring covenant relation that is essentially sexual with a particular person in a godly manner without imaging in their mind what it would be like to be with that one. Admittedly, difficulties attend both instances. These categories allow us to think rightly about the desire of one to enter a sexual union and affirm that this desire is a God-given good fulfillment of our appetite that should be pursued, though not imaged.
[67] Fantasizing in this way would be immorally employing the imaginative sense.
[68] For a helpful contemporary treatment of concupiscence, see Steven Wedgeworth, “The Heart Wants What It Wants: A Protestant Assessment of the Doctrine of Concupiscence,” in Ruined Sinners to Reclaim: Sin and Depravity in Historical, Biblical, Theological, and Pastoral Perspective, ed. David Gibson and Jonathan Gibson, The Doctrines of Grace (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2024), 633–667.Wedgeworth helpfully connects the debates over concupiscence to the doctrine of justification, the material principle of the Reformation. SC’s view doesn’t align with the Roman Catholic view completely though it bears several similarities. Rome condemns SSA among the unbaptized but denies that concupiscence is a sin among the baptized because original sin, its damnable fount, has been washed away in baptism.
[69] Although it is not customary to dedicate articles, it is fitting that I dedicate this piece to the members of Trinity Reformed Baptist Church, past and present. They were faithful to Christ when a previous minister sought to lead the church astray over the topics addressed in this article. He eventually and regrettably made shipwreck of his faith (1 Tim 1:19). Nevertheless, the saints of God stood fast. They did not waiver but removed him from their midst. Years later, I accepted a call to serve as their pastor, and it has been one of the greatest joys of my life. I rejoice in their faithfulness. I praise God for guarding the flock and preserving them from danger. In particular, I wish to express gratitude to Daniel and Rebekah Garrison. They served as pillars of our congregation during that difficult time and remain faithful servants to this day.
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