Optimizing How We Defend the Sanctity of Human Life in the Public Policy Arena

Christians understand the need to apply Scripture’s teaching on the sanctity of human life, but should we assume non-Christians share the same understanding? The sacred value of human life applies universally, whether Christian or not. So, if the sanctity of human life is universal, and not just for Christians, can there be a way of defending it that does not get dismissed by non-Christians as faith-dependent and thus irrelevant to secular law and public policy? Evangelicals have been doing this by appealing to a common sense of human dignity that obligates respect for the personhood of all humans. But, defending the sanctity of human life by relying on the notion of personhood — without a shared faith in the God Christians worship — is almost never effective, because it is impossible to change the way non-Christians view personhood when they are deeply committed to justifying abortion. Non-Christians today cling to developmentalist thinking because it justifies the outcome they desire. For this reason, relying on personhood alone to advance the sanctity of human life in law and public policy usually ends in a draw with no one changing his or her mind.

But there is a more effective way to advance the sanctity of human life in faith-neutral terms, and that is by doing it the way God does in the Bible: without directly mentioning personhood at all. Ironically, defending the sanctity of human life without explicitly mentioning personhood is both biblically faithful and potentially more effective with non-Christians. I do not hereby deny the essentialist nature of personhood, and I think we should keep using personhood arguments where others accept that approach. Rather, from a prudential perspective, I am saying that there is a better chance of changing how non-Christians in secular society view the value of human life if we instead focus on social obligation to protect innocent human life. Below, I look at what makes this way of arguing for the sanctity of human life consistent with Scripture and follow up by explaining what makes it more effective with non-Christians outside the Christian community.

In today’s culture, everyone, whether pro-life or pro-choice, agrees we should value and protect the lives of innocent persons, and everyone agrees that murdering persons is wrong. So, it seems reasonable to put the sanctity of life ethic in non-Christian secular terms by saying abortions are wrong because murdering people is wrong and violates human dignity. But, while true, this way of promoting the pro-life position hardly ever works with non-Christians, because they do not agree with how we define “personhood.” Debating abortion in non-Christian, secular terms comes to a standstill, not over whether murder is wrong, but over whether abortion kills persons. If it does, abortions are wrong because murder is wrong. But, if not, abortions are permissible, and the only relevant issue is a woman’s right to choose.

Those arguing the pro-life position take what I call an essentialist view of personhood, meaning we say personhood is something essential to being human. An essential feature is one without which a thing does not exist. It is not marginal or optional. An essential feature does not develop, does not change, and does not grow or diminish. For example, it is possible for acorns to exist without becoming oak trees. But no acorn exists without being material because there are no immaterial acorns. Similarly, the essentialist view of personhood says that a human is a person because humans do not exist otherwise. That is, no humans exist as non-persons. On account of this argument, the essentialist view holds that all humans are persons from conception and that the extrajudicial killing of a human is murder. Because of this, wrongly killing a newly conceived human zygote is the same as wrongly killing a fully grown human.

By contrast, those arguing the pro-choice position take what I call a developmentalist view of personhood, meaning they believe it is a quality that develops over time, in the sense of evolving or atrophying depending on the degree to which a human life manifests non-essential functional criteria such as consciousness, ability to distinguish self from non-self, rationality, mobility, ability to sense pain and pleasure, or ability to communicate.^[1] As such, it is thought that even though many humans become persons, some never do, some fail to become full persons, and some who may have been persons can lose personhood (as those features which make them persons diminish). This view treats human personhood the same as acorns becoming oak trees. An acorn is not an oak tree until it grows up. Some acorns become oak trees, but others never do. And some start growing but never get past the seedling stage. Similarly, the developmentalist view of personhood thinks no human life starts as a person and only achieves personhood as it develops various criteria. By such thinking, not all humans are persons, not all who are persons are full persons, and those who do become full persons can lose personhood. Along with thinking all humans start as non-persons, many think no one even starts becoming a person until after he or she is born. Because of this, it is argued that abortions do not kill persons and there is nothing wrong with aborting humans before they become persons.

What makes using the personhood argument in public policy debates so very difficult is that it is impossible to change how secular-thinking non-Christians view the meaning of personhood when it goes against the outcome they strongly desire. Everyone knows what adopting either an essentialist or developmentalist view of personhood implies, and those wanting to justify abortion will never call it murder. But there is another, potentially more effective way to get non-Christians to accept the sanctity of human life, and it turns out to be the way God does it in the Bible.

Conveying the sanctity of human life without reference to the question of personhood focuses instead on the social obligation to protect innocent human life. In Scripture, violating the sanctity of human life is put in terms of “shedding innocent blood.” In Exodus, God says, “Do not kill the innocent and the just, because I will not justify the guilty” (Exod 23:7). In Deuteronomy, cities of refuge must be established “lest innocent blood be shed in your land” (Deut 19:10). Deuteronomy also says murderers must be executed to purge the land from “the guilt of shedding innocent blood” (Deut 19:13). And there is a curse on “anyone who takes a bribe to shed innocent blood” (Deut 27:25, ESV). In 1 Samuel, David challenges Saul by asking “why will you sin against innocent blood by killing [me] David for no reason?” (1 Sam 19:5). In Psalms, a wicked man is one who “kills the innocent” (Ps 10:8). In Proverbs, we are told God hates “hands that shed innocent blood” (Prov 6:17); and, in Isaiah, God judges those who rush “to shed innocent blood” (Isa 59:7). In Jeremiah, God condemns the people of Jerusalem for filling the city “with the blood of the innocent” (Jer 19:4). And God warns King Zedekiah not to “shed innocent blood” (Jer 22:3).

The thing to see in all this is how the Bible conveys the sanctity of human life ethic in terms of social obligation to protect human life regardless of functional capacities, maturity, or development.

In addition to being a biblically-faithful method, focusing on social obligation to value innocent human life also turns out to be a better strategy for advancing the pro-life position in public policy where one is dealing in secular terms with non-Christians outside the Christian community. And that is because it is very hard for anyone seeking public office to openly oppose the idea that society must protect innocent human lives. Without quoting Bible verses or discussing faith convictions, it is possible, when dealing with non-Christians about valuing life in law or public policy, simply to affirm that the most important principle distinguishing a civilized from an uncivilized society is whether or not a society protects innocent human life. One that protects innocent human life is by definition civilized no matter how primitive it otherwise might be, and one that ceases to protect innocent human life is by definition no longer civilized no matter how advanced it otherwise might be.

When debating the pro-life position in public policy, moving the discussion away from particular notions of personhood and towards social obligation to protect innocent human life shifts the advantage strongly in favor of valuing the sanctity of human life over freedom to choose death. In today’s culture, using personhood arguments in secular terms has often led to stalemates with no one changing his or her mind, while relying on social obligation to protect innocent human life holds the likelihood to change minds and votes even among non-Christians. That is because no one can deny that what humans conceive is alive and not dead, no one can deny that what humans conceive is human because like conceives like, no one can deny that what humans conceive is actual and not merely potential, no one can deny that what humans conceive is distinct from the father and mother, no one can deny that what humans conceive is unique and no mere copy of something else, and no one can deny that what humans conceive is innocent in the sense of not having done anything worthy of execution.

These scientific facts are not disputable. And they all apply from the moment of conception until natural death. It is a matter of existence, not of development, and the obligation incurred applies to everyone regardless of condition — leaving no room to justify elective abortions except to save a mother’s life. Candidates running for office are under pressure to agree, and candidates who do not agree are not likely to be elected. Debating the sanctity of human life this way is not only a biblically faithful alternative, but may prove more effective than relying first and foremost on personhood arguments when conversing with non-Christians. And that is because it bases moral judgment on something indisputable, and that is something personhood arguments do not do.

[1] Although proponents of this view think various functional criteria must be met to be a person, there is no standard list for what these criteria should be. Some propose appointing a committee of experts for getting this done. But then we would want to know what kind of expertise qualifies anyone to render such decisions? And we would want to know as well who can be trusted with power as vast as deciding the ethical value of everyone else in the world?

Ben: pull quote