Man, Woman, Bridges, and Boundaries: A Review Essay of Gregg Allison’s Complementarity: Dignity, Difference, and Interdependence

Gregg R. Allison. Complementarity: Dignity, Difference, and Interdependence. Brentwood, TN: B&H Academic, 2025.

Gregg Allison’s latest book, Complementarity: Dignity, Difference, and Interdependence, is a substantial examination of the Bible’s teaching on how men and women exist in the world as men and women. Despite the title, it is not intended to promote complementarianism. Rather, Complementarity’s goal is to demonstrate a basic biblical anthropology from which any and all applications should be derived, whether complementarian or egalitarian.

Allison’s thesis is that God has indeed created humanity after a sexually dimorphic order. This design underlies every human’s way of being, and it is necessary for collective flourishing. Every human is a fundamentally “gendered being,” even in their “consciousness” and “relationship with God” (7). Allison is clear that this gendered life is complementary. Men and women “fill out and mutually support one another.” This does not mean that individuals as such are in need of such completing (8). Instead, Allison is speaking corporately and societally. And this goes beyond the marital union. Human life in its entirety, as it is lived “familially, vocationally, and ecclesially” (6), should also be expressed in a sexually complementary fashion.

So far so complementarian. But Allison goes on to make clear that this framework for understanding does not entail complementarianism. It does not, by itself, answer questions about ministerial ordination or leadership in the family. Complementarity will even attempt to correct some aspects of the conventional form of complementarianism that has been expressed by the Council of Biblical Manhood and Womanhood (CBMW). In fact, Allison’s most strident criticisms will be leveled at what he calls the traditional position — “traditional sex polarity” — where sexual differentiation is largely defined by the conviction that men are superior to women (122). Allison is firmly convinced that the majority of the Christian tradition has been in serious error on this point. He even confesses a certain amount of “blindness” and “bias” on his own part, due to his “sex identity” and the “entrenched prejudice” of the tradition in which he was initially formed (10–11). He hopes that his proposal of complementarity (rather than complementarianism) will help build bridges between evangelicals, even as he rejects the possibility of a “third way” or “middle way” between complementarianism and egalitarianism (25). He repeatedly states that he will not be adjudicating between these two positions and even suggests that complementarity might be able to support either perspective. Complementarity, then, is a more basic way of understanding human existence itself. Applying any principles of that existence to its actual living is an exercise which the book largely leaves for the reader to decide.

Thesis and Framework

At the outset, Allison defines “complementarity” in the following way: “Complementarity is God’s design for his male and female image bearers to fill out and mutually support one another relationally, familially, vocationally, and ecclesially for their individual and corporate flourishing.” He gives this definition several times in close proximity (xiii, 1, 6, 20), giving it the feel of a sort of mission statement. It is a holistic definition, applying to both individuals and relational units, to the family, civil and economic society, and the church. He also emphasizes three controlling principles, “equal dignity, significant differentiation, and flourishing interdependence” (7). These principles could be summarized (by me) in the following elementary way: men and women are equal; men and women are different; and men and women need one another’s differences in order to reach humanity’s collective highest good. This is the basic thesis which Complementarity will defend and apply.

If applied to contemporary political controversies, Allison’s proposal will strike evangelical readers as typically complementarian. After all, he is arguing that men and women are not interchangeable and that their gendered existence is good and necessary. Their differences complement one another in God’s great design. But it quickly becomes apparent that Allison wishes to distinguish his own project from complementarianism. “Complementarity is neither complementarianism nor egalitarianism” (23). Allison also denies that he is offering “a third- or middle-way position between these two views” (25). Still, things are not so clean-cut. Allison also hopes to “extend a bridge across the chasm separating evangelical Christian from evangelical Christian and evangelical churches from evangelical churches” (8–9). The immediate context of this quote shows that he is referring to egalitarians and complementarians. And at least one of his book endorsers, D. A. Carson, asserts that Allison is “choosing a third option.” While Allison cannot be faulted for Carson’s summary, it does illustrate the likelihood of  potential confusion among readers. Is Complementarity a “third option,” distinct from egalitarianism and complementarianism, or not?

To clarify this question, we can point to the visual diagram offered on page 24. There, “complementarity” sits underneath both “complementarianism” and “egalitarianism,” with both potentially being able to draw from it. What Allison is picturing is the concept that complementarianism and egalitarianism are schools of thought or theological systems which can draw from his project, a biblical-theological explanation of how men and women exist in God’s world. Allison’s project is antecedent to any later systematic organization and application. He repeatedly states that he will “not adjudicate between” complementarianism and egalitarianism (xv, 21, 26). While readers might detect something like a “third option,” what is really going on is that Allison is attempting to demonstrate a set of biblical values and principles which will then create certain directives and boundaries for any later applications. This framework can include proponents of both complementarianism and egalitarianism. Notably, it will exclude proponents of what Allison calls “the traditional view” (6) as well as some more radical feminists and egalitarians. This is the “bridge” that can be built, as well as the common border wall.

Allison’s strongest criticisms are actually aimed at “the traditional view.” The equality of the sexes is one of his highest priorities, and he uses the language of moral denunciation and even visceral revulsion when discussing those who advocate male superiority (3, 11, 42). “I have felt deep disgust,” he writes, “at how far we have missed and even trampled upon what I consider to be God’s design for the two sexes he creates . . .” (11).

The Historical Survey

In order to show the distinctive nature of complementarity, Allison next moves to a lengthy historical section. He seeks to show the various ways that differences between the sexes have been explained. He organizes them according to a set of categories taken from Prudence Allen (29). As he works through Allen’s work, he also lists a taxonomy of the ways in which sexual difference has been explained. These are: 1) sex unity, 2) sex neutrality, 3) traditional sex polarity, where the male is set forth as superior, 4) reverse sex polarity, where the female is set forth as superior, and 5) sex complementarity. Allison claims the “integral” variety of sex complementarity for his own position (32). The third position, “traditional sex polarity,” is the position he is most concerned to rebut. This position maintains male superiority in a number of ways, especially by appeals to Aristotelian arguments about male and female reproductive development and the female sex’s supposed inability to possess proper wisdom and virtue (32–40). These Aristotelian hallmarks appear in champions of the Christian tradition like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Allison believes that these are mistaken and largely rejected by all contemporary theological writers. Since this is the case, he argues that appeals to the Christian tradition on matters of complementarity need to be more critically examined and, in some cases, greatly modified.

This historical section is impressive in scope as it seeks to survey the ancient pagan world and the full history of Christianity, from the early church to modernity. Such a project could be valuable as a standalone work. Unfortunately, this section is overly dependent upon the work of secondary sources, especially Prudence Allen’s The Concept of Woman. Over the course of 90 pages, 73 have footnotes directing the reader to Allen. More than once, she is footnoted on every page for a sequence of ten successive pages. Even when interacting with twentieth-century writers like Dietrich von Hildebrand and Jacques Maritain, Allison defers to the summary and interpretation of secondary sources, usually Allen. 

On a few occasions, the historical treatment contains significant errors. Commenting on the contribution of Martin Luther, Allison asserts that Luther “toppled the entrenched concept of human beings as divided into two categories according to different natures: men and women, and priests.” He then makes the surprising claim that, “both men and women alike can carry out priestly duties,” of which he includes, “teach and preach the Word of God” and “administer the Lord’s Supper” (96). Allison does add a caveat, “At the same time, Luther retained the office of ministry with traditional male leadership roles” (97). Still, on its face, this gives the impression that Luther was toppling traditional divisions between the sexes and that he allowed women to preach and even administer the sacrament, even while declining to formally ordain them. It is not obvious if Allison is making a historical claim or observing a potential contemporary application inspired from Luther’s theology. In a later part of the book, Allison returns to this part of Luther’s thought and also gives the impression that it could be used to allow for both women and men “preaching and/or administering the sacraments” (491). It is our “various ecclesial and denominational distinctives” which will give the “requirements for those who administer them,” again indicating a measure of distance between those distinctives and Luther’s toppling theology (491). The relevant footnotes here once again point to a secondary source. But when one goes directly to Luther, things look a bit different. The material in question comes from his treatise Concerning the Ministry. Luther does indeed state there that “all Christians are priests in equal degree,”^[1] and he also does list various offices which follow from this, including preaching and administering the sacraments. However, Luther is not really discussing the relationship between men and women. Instead, he is opposing the Roman Catholic notion of an ontological sacerdotal order, the indelible character imparted through the apostolic laying on of hands. When he gets to the matter of ordination, Luther explains that “the community” chooses representative leaders to perform the actions “in the name of all.”^[2] The various offices of the universal priesthood, actions like preaching and administering the sacraments, are “the common rights of Christians,” but, importantly, they are not actually carried out by each and every Christian. Instead, they are carried out by the clergy. And ordinarily speaking, they are only carried out by the clergy. This point was so important that it made its way into the Augsburg Confession. The universal priesthood does not do away with the reality of ministerial orders (Augsburg Confession, Article XIV, see also the Defense of the Augsburg Confession, Article XIV). For Luther, ordained ministry continued to be exclusively male. His justifications for this rule come from New Testament exegesis and his convictions about how men and women relate to one another in social organizations. When Luther mentions things like women being able to engage in priestly activities “in time of emergency,”^[3] he is not “toppling” any sort of traditional sex polarity. What’s actually going on is a sort of rhetorical appeal to an extreme in order to highlight a point. Luther is presuming a traditional sex polarity in order to humble the claims of Rome’s so-called spiritual estate. In cases of absolute necessity, absolutely anyone can perform priestly functions. Since this is possible, then no ecclesiastical body can appeal to its clergy as an essential conduit of salvation. In ordinary times, however, ordinary rules and considerations apply.

A second mistaken historical interaction appears immediately afterwards in a discussion on John Calvin. Allison gives the judgment that Calvin both emphasized the equality of women and men while also maintaining that women are “innately inferior to men.” He does not seek to explain how Calvin may have thought these two commitments to be consistent, or even how they may be a variety of complementarity, but rather leaves the reader with the impression that Calvin was something of a work in progress. “[T]heological anthropology lagged behind the five solas,” Allison writes, but “it may be argued that doctrines such as the priesthood of all believers and the clarity of Scripture provided a solid foundation for later developments . . .” (99). The metaphor of lagging behind a potential motion of development indicates an assumption of proper progress. Some elements of the Reformation moved appropriately forward, while others took a bit longer to catch up. This sort of argument brings with it a number of assumptions about what full equality must mean, as well as history’s final end.

Allison does give several direct statements from John Calvin, but one of them is highly questionable. He quotes Calvin as saying, “God did not create two ‘beings’ of equal standing, but added to man a lesser helpmeet” (98). The source is Calvin’s Commentary on 1 Timothy 2:13, and Allison even supplies the Latin text. But where Allison renders it “two ‘beings’ of equal standing,” the Latin shows “duo capita” and “aequa potestate.” Capita is not usually translated as “being” but rather “head.” And potestas typically carried something of a political connotation. Calvin is not here denying that man and woman are equal “beings” but rather that they are equal “heads.” And the “standing” in view is not one of essence but of socio-political power. Allison introduces this quote as being an occasion where Calvin “more clearly” stated his view, but the translation obscures matters considerably. Why did Allison choose to translate Calvin in such a peculiar way?

There are several relevant and interesting sources from church history which do not appear in the historical survey. Andrew Willet and Gisbertus Voetius both directly criticized Aristotle’s sex polarity (see Willet Hexapla in Genesin & Exodum, 232–33, and Voetius, “Concerning Women” in Ecclesiastical Politics, vol 3, 181–82). Bishop John Aylmer’s response to John Knox, entitled A Harbor for Faithful and True Subjects Against the Late-Blown Blast, also contains important arguments about the “regiment of women,” and how it does not contradict the domestic headship of the husband or the practice of only ordaining men in the church. Althusius, in his important work Politica, also grants women the right to participate in political governance (Politica, chapt. 7). While each of these sources retain a hierarchical understanding of men and women, they do not rely upon peculiarly Aristotelian assumptions about natural philosophy, human physiology, or virtue. And they do exhibit features of complementarity. They are also figures within the mainstream of the Protestant and Reformed tradition, thus making them to be of interest for modern evangelicals.

Allison’s historical survey then presents several provocative and controversial claims which need stronger substantiation. The constant use of modern historians may be exerting undue influence on his understanding of Christian history, perhaps even his understanding of the “traditional” position. The sixteenth and seventeenth-century Protestant theologians especially deserve to be studied further. I believe that a close attention to traditional theologians will show that the various “basic theories of sex identity” are not mutually exclusive of one another. The majority Christian tradition actually combined elements of what is called “traditional sex polarity” with complementarity, and it did not always rely upon the more questionable (and objectionable) elements of Aristotle which often loom large in these debates. This is particularly true of the English and Dutch Reformation theologians.

Biblical Theology

 The strongest section of Complementarity is certainly the fourth, “Biblical Considerations.” Allison demonstrates a laudable familiarity with and understanding of the state of biblical scholarship as he works through nearly every relevant Scriptural section having to do with the relationship of men and women. At 330 pages, this section makes the book an important reference work for anyone interested in the state of exegetical discussion and debate around topics of sex and gender. I discovered that there were several passages of Scripture, particularly in the Old Testament, whose relevance I had not fully appreciated. Arguments for all sides will be considerably sharpened and improved after consulting with Allison’s work. Pastors especially will find this material of interest.

Allison opens this section with a discussion on hermeneutics and the various “frameworks” which are employed in order to interpret the biblical text and to prioritize certain texts over others. He gives an opening caveat that he does not want this use of interpretative constructs to give the impression that Scripture is unclear (172). But at the same time, he does approvingly quote Alice Mathews who says, “The biblical text one chooses for one’s starting point in the study of a doctrine or issue in Scripture becomes the lens through which one looks at all other texts” (222). This means that a few key biblical passages and theological convictions will prove decisive in interpreting the other large amount of biblical material.

For Allison, the most important sources of biblical material are the opening chapters of Genesis (190–222). Genesis 1–3 are commonly acknowledged to be foundational sources for the biblical perspective on men and women. Allison’s particular argument is that the order and priority we give to either chapter 1 or chapter 2 will dramatically influence our understanding of God’s intent for men and women. For Allison, Genesis 1 is the great biblical source for the doctrine of human equality, as both men and women are created in the image of God and both are given the cultural mandate (200–201). He insists that this is “true of male and female human beings qua male and female human beings and not of male human beings qua husbands and female human beings qua wives” (201).

This is key for Allison’s biblical-theological argument. Men and women should first and foremost be understood and addressed as individual human beings. This is their basic identity. Allison decisively states, “Husband/wife is a role, not an identity” (201). Genesis 2 is the chapter concerned with roles and marriage. For the overarching thesis of Complementarity, Genesis 1 must take a certain priority over Genesis 2.

I was not persuaded at this crucial point, however. The Apostle Paul very much seems to “start with” Genesis 2, even when discussing topics that go beyond the boundaries of the marital arrangement. For Paul, the details of Genesis 2 can determine questions of public decorum in the religious assembly (1 Cor 11:7–12), as well as ordination and teaching authority in the church (1 Tim 2:13). These are passages which Allison discusses in their own place, but he does not clearly explain how they do or do not support his own “framework.” In fact, his discussion of those passages seems to move away from a full and direct exegesis and demonstration of the proper meaning, offering instead commentary on other commentators and interpretive frameworks without demonstrating a singular “correct” reading. As reasonable as “starting with” Genesis 1 may seem, the apostolic appeal to and application of Genesis 2 surely holds greater weight.

Another reason I was unsatisfied with what appears to be Allison’s controlling paradigm is that the categories of essence and function, or identity and role, are inseparable. An essence will lead to or at least dramatically effect a function, and many roles are indeed identities. (After all, there was never a time when God the Father was not a father.) Allison stresses that humans are always gendered, that they have a male way of being and a female way of being. But he wishes to keep this gendered essence separate, at least theoretically, from questions of reproduction and the marriage relationship. But is this really possible? For humans, “gender” is entirely bound up with “sex.” A male is a male precisely because he possesses male reproductive organs. And any “female essence” is surely connected to the physiological effects of her reproductive cycle, as well as her intensely physical and intimate relationship to her children, particularly in their youngest years. Allison acknowledges this reality later on in the book, stating that “the ground for the distinction between these two types is biological” (462). But he does not connect this biology to the necessarily sexual relationship and its impact on human relationships and identity. In fact, fully distinct terms like “husband” and “wife” are relatively recent constructs of the English language. Ancient languages simply used “man” and “woman.” This was even true for English not so long ago.^[4] Men and women are not automatically husbands and wives, but their gendered existence is nevertheless defined by a potential to perform the functions of a husband or a wife.

After all, when God says “It is not good for man to be alone,” He is talking about the individual Adam, the man created in the image of God and not yet in a marriage relationship. He was not yet a husband. And it was “not good” for him to be alone. And when the Apostle Paul unveils the “great mystery” of human redemption, he appeals to marriage, the bond between Christ and the Church. Marriage is not simply one optional function or role among many. It is the chief biblical symbol for both creation and redemption, humanity’s beginning and end. Marriage also appears in a spiritual capacity in Psalm 45, in the Song of Solomon, and in the closing chapters of Revelation. Conspicuously absent among the biblical passages treated by Allison are precisely those three.

Noting this prominent role for marriage in the Scriptures does not mean that single and celibate individuals are deficient in their humanity. They may be either tragic or heroic exceptions to the overall norm, depending on the specifics of their situation and calling. But in Christ, they will all of them, male and female, single and married, be both individually “sons” of God and collectively the “bride” of Christ. While these will be spiritual relationships, and will thus not manifest in precisely the same way as earthly ones, the parallel connection between essence and function remains, and the New Testament does appeal to them in order to influence the relationships among Christians in this life. Wives are only to submit to their own husbands, but Paul still uses the language of a collective genus when speaking generally. He does so because he is employing rhetorically-symbolic archetypes.

It seems that Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 are not really in any sort of competition, not even hypothetically or theoretically. Neither has to take a governing priority over the other. Rather, they can be read consistently with one another. Men and women are equal in one respect and hierarchically arranged in another respect. Allison acknowledges that in the complementarian reading of 1 Corinthians 11:3–7, “Paul establishes a hierarchy among men/women or husbands/their wives” (389). I was unable to determine whether Allison believes that this reading of Paul is correct or incorrect. Both men and women are created in the image of God and given the cultural mandate, and yet Man and Woman were created in a certain order and with a particular end — an end that is realized, either naturally or supernaturally, in marriage.

So, while Allison’s exegetical work is substantial and valuable, many of the most challenging individual passages are ultimately decided by his “framework.” And his framework is underdeveloped in some important ways.

Theology and Application  

Complementarity concludes with several theological considerations and final points of application. Allison explains that his theory secures equality between men and women — “Banished are any and all notions of superiority and inferiority, advantage and disadvantage, dominance and subservience, and the like” (465) — while also encouraging men and women to use their common capacities and properties in gendered ways (464). We could summarize this sort of directive as “complementarity without hierarchy.” Allison insists that men and women do have different contributions to make to overall human flourishing and that this difference is importantly gendered. He criticizes transgenderism, as well as any view that men and women are interchangeable. But Allison appears to deny the complementarian conviction that the male-gendered existence brings with it a natural fittingness towards leadership or authority. (He explicitly rejects this sort of argument on page 360.) He argues strongly that both men and women should be able to pursue vocations, and he seems to understand this as additional and external to the domestic vocation (505), even at one point describing vocation as “work” and “jobs” (506). Allison maintains that most, perhaps all, kinds of jobs can be appropriate for both men and women and that this question should be left to the individual to decide (506–7).

Complementarity attempts to avoid directly resolving the debate between complementarianism and egalitarianism. But at one point, Allison does tip his hand. He favors the interpretation of the New Testament which “supports both male and female deacons” (369). He does not make such an explicit statement when discussing elders, indicating that there is a difference in the Biblical text when it comes to the offices of deacons and elders. The passage dealing with deacons has features which show that the office is open to individuals from both sexes. The passages dealing with elders do not have these features. Thus, there is something that limits the higher governing ecclesiastical office to men. At the end of the day, Allison will still be seen as  a sort of complementarian.

Conclusion

Complementarity is an important book for how it collects the key areas of biblical and scholarly material that discuss human sexuality and the relationship between the sexes. If viewed as a reference book meant to help the pastor or teacher understand the full lay of the land, then it is very helpful. The Scripture index alone is worth the price of the book. But Complementarity is also important for the way it illustrates certain contemporary trends and attitudes, what is often referred to as “soft” or “narrow” complementarianism. Again and again, the great villain of Allison’s book is “traditional sex polarity,” the position which he believes is indeed the traditional position of the Christian Church. Quite unlike the manner in which he interacts with egalitarian scholarship, Allison feels free to criticize the traditional view in explicit and impassioned terms. Other important asymmetries also appear. Egalitarianism is not ruled out by Complementarity, but patriarchy is. A male-only presbyterate is not defended explicitly, but a diaconate open to men and women is. 

I do not believe Allison is arguing for a third way between complementarianism and egalitarianism. That is not his goal. He largely does succeed in maintaining an objective posture towards both schools of thought without conflating or dismissing their various concerns. He really does believe that his biblical framework can be employed by advocates of either perspective. But one still wonders if he thinks that “complementarity” should properly lead to one view or the other. If it truly need not imply either view, then is it actually the biblical perspective? Does it sufficiently explain the divine design and intention for domestic and ecclesiastical relations? Or does it teach us that the debate between complementarians and egalitarians is actually over a thing indifferent?

We should also think more deeply about what it means to build a bridge between complementarians and egalitarians while excluding traditional and hierarchical views. Should softer complementarians understand themselves to have more in common with egalitarians than they do with those complementarians who still maintain a sort of hierarchical view? And how “non-traditional” should complementarians wish to be? These can be uncomfortable questions, particularly in the church. But they are important questions, all the same. Allison’s Complementarity has raised them effectively.

^[1]Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, Vol. 40: Church and Ministry II, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1999), 21.

^[2]Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, 40:34.

^[3]Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, 40:34.

^[4] In the early modern English marriage rite, the minister pronounces the couple “man and wife.” The Old English wif was simply the generic term for woman.