# Table of Contents

1. The Surrendered Christ: The Christological Confusion of Evangelical Feminism
   Russell D. Moore

4. Relationships and Roles in the New Creation
   Mark David Walton

20. Are the Daughters of Philip Among the Prophets of Acts?
    Jeffrey T. Riddle

30. Causal Gar in 1 Timothy 2:13
    David K. Huttar

34. A Journey to the Interior of the Family: The Family’s Core
    Paige Patterson

44. A Semantic Study of αὐθέντης and its Derivatives
    Albert Wolters

66. Blue Like Sad: Father Longing in Don Miller’s To Own a Dragon
    Robert E. Sagers

70. Annotated Bibliography for Gender Related Articles in 2005
    Oren Martin
For too long complementarian Christians have assumed that the gender debate is simply one more important but intramural discussion among likeminded evangelicals—similar to the differences between Calvinists and Arminians, or between paedobaptists and Baptists. It is increasingly apparent that evangelical feminism is a far more serious development. As demonstrated at the 2005 annual meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) meeting, the gender debate ultimately boils down to Christology.

We often use the cliché, “I could hardly believe my ears,” but at one ETS session, I literally found myself turning to those around me and asking, “Did he say what I think he just said?” Alan Padgett, egalitarian theologian at Luther Seminary, presented a paper seeking to reconcile evangelical feminism with Ephesians chapter 5.

Ephesians 5 has always been difficult for egalitarians since the apostle Paul clearly grounds the submission of a wife to her husband and the headship of a man for his wife in the archetypal structure of the Christ/church relationship. The “mutual submission” gambit of egalitarians has never proven all that persuasive, even to feminist-minded people, since Paul outlines what the various aspects...
precludes a mutual submission between husband and wife since Paul suggests that the husband loves “as Christ loves the church” and the wife submits “as the church submits to Christ.” Are we to suggest that Christ submits to the church? Some have advocated this, but no one so publicly and forcefully until now.

Padgett argued in his paper that mutual submission doesn’t just exist between husband and wife but also between Christ and the church. Using passages such as that of Jesus giving himself for the church in Eph 5 and pouring himself out in Phil 2, Padgett argued that sometimes Jesus submits himself to his church. When a perceptive listener wondered when the church ever doesn’t submit to Christ, Padgett’s answer was stunning. In the eschaton, he said. Then, he said, “the church will be ‘knocked up a bit’” and will therefore no longer submit to Jesus as Lord but instead serve alongside him as friends.

This would be easy to ignore if Alan Padgett were a loose cannon theologian. But he is one of the most cited members of the egalitarian corps, writing for Christians for Biblical Equality (CBE) and debating the position around the country. Likewise, it would not be so problematic if Padgett didn’t arrive at his conclusions by consistently applying the same hermeneutic that evangelical feminism has been touting for years.

This proposal wrongly assumes that service means submission. In fact, the church did not send Jesus on the redemptive mission; the Father did. Jesus everywhere notes that he is freely offering his life in obedience to the Father’s mission. Moreover, Jesus in his love for the church refuses to submit to the foundation stones of his church, when they demand that he will never be delivered over to the Romans. Instead, he sets his face like flint toward Jerusalem. That is servant leadership, and that is headship.

But, even more importantly, the proposal openly does what egalitarian proposals have always done subtly: it tears at the fabric of the Christ/church mystery embedded in human gender roles. This is precisely why the prophets and apostles insist on a biblical ordering of husband-wife relationships; not just because it makes for happier marriages (although it does) but because it points us to something that is even more glorious and even more beautiful—the headship of Christ and the submission of his church.

Last year’s ETS was significant in that egalitarianism’s Christological confusion is now out in the open. And it is a scary sight. The Padgett proposal is sub-Christian at best; Canaanite at worst. If this is where evangelical feminism is going, it is even clearer that the movement is more self-consciously feminist than evangelical; more egalitarian than Christian.
In an earlier article, I set out to answer the question of whether resurrected saints will be distinguished as male and female in the new creation.1 The weight of evidence, both biblical and logical, convincingly suggests that gender is central to our personal identity and shall remain an integral characteristic of our lives for eternity—a conclusion that is scarcely controversial. (Most of us, after all, are quite comfortable with our gender, and would regard the prospect of change in that department as . . . well . . . unsettling.)

Considerably more controversial, however, than the question of “what we shall be” in the new creation is the question of “what we shall do.” Given that gender identity will remain, is there evidence that functional distinctions will likewise remain in the new creation? Will resurrected saints as male and female have gender-specific roles? How will we relate to one another? Will male headship apply? Initial responses will likely depend on whether such questions are approached from a complementarian or egalitarian perspective. Complementarians, who view male headship and gender-specific roles as part of God’s original plan for creation (and for the present age as well) are more likely to answer these questions in the affirmative.2 Functional distinctions will remain. Egalitarians, on the other hand, who view male headship and functional distinctions as a result of the edenic fall—and therefore as being inappropriate to mature Christendom—are likely to reject such a notion as inconsistent with the Kingdom ideal of equality for all. Which view is correct? Does it matter?

It does indeed. Though few if any would presume to suggest that their eschatology might actually influence the manner of our Lord’s return, or somehow alter “the times or epochs which the Father has fixed by his own authority” (Acts 1:7 NASB),3 our concept of life in the new creation is profoundly important for several reasons. It is important, first, because our view of the life to come in the new creation is a vision of the ideal
that shapes our worldview. To an extent probably unrealized by most of us, our attitudes, actions, and decisions in this life are profoundly influenced by our concept of life—or lack thereof—after death.

It matters, second, because how one understands life in the new creation guides our present-day preparations for the life to come. Randy Alcorn observes that Jonathan Edwards understood this principle and encouraged others to follow it: “It becomes us to spend this life only as a journey toward heaven . . . to which we should subordinate all other concerns of life. Why should we labor for or set our hearts on anything else, but that which is our proper end and true happiness.”

It may indeed be true, as C. S. Lewis has suggested, “that the joys of Heaven are . . . ‘an acquired taste’—and certain ways of life may render the taste impossible of acquisition.” None of this is to suggest, of course, that Christians should abandon clear biblical guidelines for life in the present age in pursuit of eschatological ideals—an error Wayne Grudem refers to as “over-realized eschatology.” But, if Lewis is correct, we would do well to begin now ordering our lives in such a way as to acquire a “taste” for things to come.

It matters, finally, and perhaps most significantly, because the answer to the question of functional distinctions in the new creation is—to use an analogy from football—like the three-hundred-pound lineman that everyone wants on their team. Evangelical complementarians and egalitarians alike should very much like to find in the doctrine of the new creation a strong defense of their respective positions, though, as we shall see, the “new creation defense” disproportionately favors the complementarian view. Allow me to explain. There are some egalitarian interpreters who agree that the writers of the New Testament epistles, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, taught male headship and gender-based differentiation of roles for the original recipients of those epistles, indicating that complementarity is divinely sanctioned, at least under certain circumstances. If it can be demonstrated successfully that complementarity also will characterize the new creation, then the case for complementarity in the present age is disproportionately strengthened. Complementarity is not just an accommodation to the less-than-perfect conditions that prevailed during the first century. Rather, it is a divine principle weaved into the fabric of God’s order for the universe. The burden of proof rests on the shoulders of the proponents of egalitarianism.

The paragraphs that follow will offer evidence for complementarity among resurrected saints by examining the evidence for functional distinctions in two aspects of life in the new creation: relationships and gender-based distinctions of roles. Before turning to the positive evidence for functional distinction in the new creation, however, it is necessary to engage some of the flawed assumptions that influence the debate.

**Flawed Egalitarian Assumptions about the New Creation**

Just beneath the surface of many of the arguments presented in support of the egalitarian agenda is the tacit assumption that life in the new creation will feature a perfect actualization of egalitarian ideals. Although traces of the assumption can be found in many egalitarian positions, it is readily discerned in three basic arguments offered by evangelical feminists.
Biblical Equality Requires an Egalitarian New Creation

At the very heart of the feminist movement is the conviction that there can be no true equality as long as gender-based differentiation of roles or responsibility remains. With only slight modification, evangelical feminists are of the same mind as their secular counterparts on this point. As long as there are positions within the home, church, or society that exclude women on the basis of gender, they maintain, inequality remains. Only where there is functional equivalence between the sexes does equality exist. At the same time, there is virtually universal agreement within evangelicalism that in the new creation, fairness and equality will at long last obtain. It would seem to follow, then, that gender-based differentiation of role or responsibility will have no place in the new creation. We might express this view in the form of a syllogism as follows:

(1) Functional equivalence is necessary to equality
and,
(2) Equality is necessary to the new creation
therefore,
(3) Functional equivalence is necessary to the new creation.

If premises (1) and (2) are true, then it must follow that there will be functional equivalence in the new creation. Gender-based differentiation of roles and responsibilities will have no place in the new creation.

There is a problem, however, with the syllogism. The first premise is false because functional equivalence cannot be necessary to genuine equality. A biblical worldview understands that the locus of worth of a human life does not reside in any physical, emotional, or intellectual attribute or possession. Neither is it to be found in the individual’s functionality or potential for productivity. The worth of each person is based upon the truth that he or she bears the imago dei, the image of God. To place the locus of human worth in any other attribute of our humanity is to deny the very thing that makes us unique among created beings. It is to deny the very thing that makes us human. We are equal because, male and female alike, we bear the image of God.

Feminists, both secular and evangelical, define equality in terms of functionality rather than ontologically—on the basis of being. They err by effectively reducing equality to “sameness,” and in so doing embrace one of liberalism’s foundational concepts, namely, that parity is the social ideal. We can be certain, however, that the new creation will be characterized, not by sameness but by incredible diversity—diversity of abilities, diversity of gifts, and diversity of rewards. Alcorn, addressing the question of equality in the new creation, merits inclusion here:

All people are equal in worth, but they differ in gifting and performance. . . . Because God promises to reward people differently according to their differing levels of faithfulness in this life, we should not expect equality of possessions and positions. . . . There’s no reason to believe we’ll all be equally tall or strong or that we’ll have the same gifts, talents, or intellectual capacities. If we all had the same gifts, they wouldn’t be special. If you can
do some things better than I can, and I than you, then we'll have something to offer each other. . . . diversity—not conformity—characterizes a perfect world.  

The new creation will, indeed, be a place where equality reigns—but not as feminists define the term. It will be equality as biblically defined, equality that has its basis in divinely established human worth.

The End of Marriage Means the End of Headship

When Jesus informed the Saducees that in the resurrection, “they neither marry nor are given in marriage” (Matt 22:30; Mark 12:25; Luke 20:35), there is rather broad agreement that in so doing he declared earthly marriage to be temporal—a blessing and necessity for the present age, but one that will be needed no longer in the new creation. Many feminists, evangelical and otherwise, share in this consensus. However, in a rather bold extrapolation from the text, they find in Jesus’ words here an end to male headship. Caroline Vander Stichele, for example, after citing the views of prominent feminist interpreters, summarizes their position by saying that “feminist interpreters stress that patriarchal marriage, not sexuality, is declared ‘no more’ in the afterlife.” Here, patriarchal marriage is seen as an icon of the whole oppressive, patriarchal system that is held to be responsible for much of the cruelty and repression of women across the centuries. The end of patriarchal marriage in the new creation means that women at long last will break free of the bonds of “male dominance” and gain the equal standing they deserve. It is not the prospect of gender in the new creation that many feminists and egalitarians would necessarily find troubling. It is rather the possibility that masculinity and femininity in some way might constitute a basis for headship and subordination in the context of new creation relationships that is simply inconceivable to the egalitarian mind.

The problem here is not the desire to be free of the cruelty and repression that undeniably has plagued countless women through the ages as a perversion of the divine order for man-woman relationships. Rather, the problem is that the feminist view confuses loving male headship with abusive male dominance. Clearly, there will be no place for abuse or dominance among the citizens of the heavenly Kingdom. But to deny the very concept of male headship in the new creation on the false assumption that it is incompatible with creation ideals is, at best, reckless theology. Of even greater concern, however, is the hermeneutic that must be employed in the interpretation of the biblical texts in order to justify such conclusions.

The New Creation in the Hermeneutics of Egalitarianism

Feminists’ views on the nature of equality and the concept of male headship are foreign to the plain sense of Scripture as traditionally interpreted. This, however, presents egalitarians (who claim to have a high view of Scripture) with a chronic conundrum, namely, how to reconcile passages that, at first glance, admit of an egalitarian interpretation with those that are plainly inconsistent with an egalitarian worldview. The answer, for many, is found in a hermeneutic that subordinates standard grammatico-historical exegesis to a variety of hermeneutical tech-
techniques that more easily accommodate egalitarian interpretations. One such technique, which Paul Felix refers to as “the principle of an interpretive center,” selects a text or theme from Scripture as the starting point for all subsequent interpretation. The “interpretive center” thus becomes a sort of lens through which all other passages are measured, or, to change metaphors, a sort of key that is used to “unlock” the meaning of the text.

Galatians 3:28, which declares that “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus,” often is used by feminists as an interpretative center that treats all other passages as subordinate. Employing this technique, passages like 1 Cor 11:3, which plainly present a hierarchy of headship, could not possibly mean that “man is the head of woman” because such an interpretation is not consonant with the chosen interpretive center.

Another hermeneutical technique employed by egalitarians, one especially germane to this discussion, is the “hermeneutic of cultural analysis” proposed and developed by William J. Webb. Webb finds within Scripture a “redemptive movement” that he views as the “most crucial component” for making contemporary application of the text “beyond its original-application framing.” This redemptive movement in Scripture begins with what he terms “original creation patterns” and culminates in “new creation patterns” that can be seen in outline in key “in Christ” passages in the New Testament. According to Webb, the moral and social standards of the New Testament do not necessarily present a mature Christian ethic that transcends cultural relativism; rather, they present an intermediate Christian ethic that accommodates cultural inequities.

Therefore, the moral and social ethic that should guide the lives of Christians today is not that of the New Testament; it is a higher, more mature ethic that observes the trend of the redemptive movement and extrapolates that trend forward to the present day. According to Webb, it is this forward extrapolation to “new-creation patterns” that should guide Christians until Christ returns. Webb asserts that, although “our lives are obviously rooted in the original creation in certain respects, it is ultimately the new understanding of community in Christ that should guide us to the eschaton.”

With qualifications, I agree. New-creation patterns certainly should point the way to genuine community in Christ. But here is where my agreement with Webb ends. New-creation patterns must not be taken as the ultimate authority on ethical and social matters—even those that pertain exclusively to the Christian home and community. To regard necessarily subjective conclusions about the new creation as in any sense normative or authoritative virtually eliminates biblical authority in any practical sense, and substitutes culturally-conditioned, subjective judgments for the objective truth of God’s written word.

I also must disagree with Webb on the content of that “new understanding of community in Christ.”

[N]ew-creation theology transforms the status of all its participants—whether slaves, Greeks, Scythians or barbarians—into one of equality. Along these same lines, it calls for equality and relational renewal between men and women and as such heavily favors an egalitarian position. At the very least,
the equality of new creation patterns encourages redemptive movement toward a profoundly reconfigured type of patriarchy—an ultra-soft patriarchy that retains only symbolic components of honor differential . . . . However, for those who find patriarchy and its primogeniture-type logic as culturally bound, the winds of equality carry the application one step further.²¹

Thus, Webb envisions a new creation that is thoroughly egalitarian. But is his vision built on careful study of the biblical revelation concerning the new creation, or is it an extrapolation into the eschaton of egalitarian ideals? The better approach seems to be to consider evidence that speaks directly to life in the new creation, and to develop conclusions on the basis of that evidence.

Evidence for Complementarity in the New Creation

Although Scripture does not speak directly to the question of the effect gender will have on the lives of resurrected believers in the new creation, it does offer sufficient evidence to affirm that gender will continue to be a significant aspect of our lives in the eschaton. As noted above, our investigation will consider the evidence to that end along two lines: relationships and roles in the new creation. However, before it is possible to meaningfully address the question of functional distinctions in the new creation, it is necessary to identify some biblical principles to guide our interpretation of the evidence.

Historically, philosophy has exerted considerable influence on the way westerners have viewed life beyond the grave.²² The syncretism of Platonic dualism and Christian spirituality in the early centuries of Christianity gave rise to an asceticism that found the idea of a bodily resurrection and a material new creation unthinkable. Such thinking is reflected in the writings of the early second-century apologist, Justin Martyr, who wrote to defend the doctrine of the literal, bodily resurrection against its detractors. He describes their error as follows:

They who maintain the wrong opinion say that there is no resurrection of the flesh; giving as their reason that it is impossible that what is corrupted and dissolved should be restored to the same as it had been. And besides the impossibility, they say that the salvation of the flesh is disadvantageous; and they abuse the flesh, adducing its infirmities, and declare that it only is the cause of our sins, so that if the flesh, say they, rise again, our infirmities also rise with it. And such sophistical reasons as the following they elaborate: If the flesh rise again, it must rise either entire and possessed of all its parts, or imperfect. But its rising imperfect argues a want of power on God’s part, if some parts could be saved, and others not; but if all the parts are saved, the body will manifestly have all its members. But is it not absurd to say that these members will exist after the resurrection from the dead, since the Sav-
ior said, “They neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but shall be as the angels in heaven?” And the angels, say they, have neither flesh, nor do they eat, nor have sexual intercourse; therefore there shall be no resurrection of the flesh. By these and such like arguments, they attempt to distract men from the faith. And there are some who maintain that even Jesus himself appeared only as spiritual, and not in flesh, but presented merely the appearance of flesh: these persons seek to rob the flesh of promise.

Somewhat later, similar sentiments can be found in the apocryphal writings of John the Theologian:

And again I said: Lord, they die male and female, and some old, and some young, and some infants. In the resurrection what like shall they arise? And I heard a voice saying to me: Hear, righteous John. Just as the bees are, and differ not one from another, but are all of one appearance and one size, so also shall every man be in the resurrection. There is neither fair, nor ruddy, nor black, neither Ethiopian nor different countenances; but they shall all arise of one appearance and one stature. All the human race shall arise without bodies, as I told you that in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God.

Thus, John the Theologian, like the heretics against whom Justin wrote, effectively denied the bodily resurrection of believers, and envisioned a rather homogenized, immaterial resurrection life. The basis for this denial of literal bodily resurrection, and the functions appropriate to a real body, ultimately is to be found in the depreciation of all that is material or “natural” as evil. Scripture, however, paints a very different portrait of the natural world as originally created, for God declared that it was good, very good (Gen 1:31). Contrary to the popular conception that resurrection life is more akin to a boring, ethereal existence, the opposite is true. The new creation will reveal that, as C. S. Lewis puts it, “it is the present life which is the diminution, the symbol, the etiolated, the (as it were) ‘vegetarian’ substitute. If flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom, that is not because they are too solid, too gross, to distinct, too ‘illustrious with being.’ They are too flimsy, too transitory, too phantasmal.”

The new creation, far from being nebulous and illusory, will be quite tangible and real. But what of its character? Where does one turn to gain some sense as to what the new creation will be like? The starting point for understanding the nature of the new creation is the original creation. Whatever else might be said of the new creation, it is fundamentally a return to and restoration of the conditions that prevailed prior to the fall of man and the consequent curse (Gen 3:17). The means whereby that restoration is effected is nothing less than the redemption accomplished by Jesus Christ. Redemption in Christ
comprises far more than the means for
the redemption of man; redemption's
effect reaches to the whole of creation.
Al Wolters, in his classic presentation
of a "reformational worldview," describes
this cosmic dimension of redemption
as "the recovery of creational goodness
through the annulment of sin and the
effort toward the progressive removal
of its effects everywhere. We return to
creation through the cross, because only
the atonement deals with sin and evil
effectively at their root."\(^{26}\) Just as sin's
effect touches all of creation, so too does
Christ's finished work of redemption
(Rom 8:19–22). The new creation is, in
essence, creation redeemed.

Wolters continues, noting that
"what was formed in creation has been
historically deformed by sin and must be
reformed in Christ."\(^{27}\) But what is the
nature of this "re-forming" of creation?
Wolters suggests that reformation, here,
is perhaps best understood in contrast
with political revolution:

Revolution . . . is characterized by the following features,
among others: (1) necessary violence, (2) the complete
removal of every aspect of the established system, and
(3) the construction of an entirely different societal order
according to a theoretical ideal. The biblical principle of
"reformation" opposes each of these three points. In the first
place, reformation stresses the necessity of avoiding violence both in the ordinary
sense of harming individuals with physical or psychological
force and in the historical sense of wrenching and dislocating the social fabric.

No matter how dramatic the
new life in Jesus Christ may be, it does not seek to tear
the fabric of a given historical situation. In the second
place—and this is of particular importance—it recognizes
that no given societal order is absolutely corrupt; thus, no
societal order need ever be totally condemned. And in the
third place, it does not place its confidence in blueprints
and conceptions of the ideal society that have been arrived
at by scientific speculation. Instead, it takes the given
historical situation as its point of departure, mindful
of the apostolic injunction to "test everything [and] hold
fast to what is good" (1 Thess 5:21).\(^{28}\)

In discussing the question of where
new-creation patterns are leading, Webb
reaches conclusions remarkably consonant with those of Wolters. Webb observes,

Renewal does not mean that
humanity becomes something other than what it was in its essential essence
and its categories of being. It is humanity itself that is renewed, not created de novo
again . . . Essential aspects of the original creation such as race and gender are in [sic]
not obliterated in the new creation community. They remain and are transfigured,
sanctified and celebrated.\(^{29}\)

Thus, there is support from both comple-
mentarians and egalitarians that the new creation preserves, at least to a considerable extent, the patterns of the original creation. Far from representing the utter abandonment of the original creational blueprint, the new creation is instead a perfect reconstruction, rebuilt according to the original divine plan. The original creation, however, is surpassed by the new, for the difference between the old and the new is not merely that all destructive elements, both actual and potential, have been eliminated. The difference is that in the new creation, the redeemed from among humanity have been transformed, body and soul. The ramifications of such total transformation are myriad and far-reaching, but we would do well at this point to take note of two that are especially significant for the discussion at hand.

First, the transformation of the body is, in fact, a glorification of the body, whereby it is changed from a corruptible, mortal body to one that is incorruptible and immortal (1 Cor 15:53–54). “As we have borne the image of the earthy [man], we shall also bear the image of the heavenly [man]” (1 Cor 15:49), who will transform the body of our humble state into conformity with the body of His glory, by the exertion of the power that He has even to subject all things to Himself” (Phil 3:21). The significance of this bodily transformation for the question at hand is that our transformed bodies in the new creation will be no longer instruments of unrighteousness (Rom 6:13), no longer subject to fleshly passions and desires (Gal 5:24). In the original creation, the flesh, both subject to and the object of temptation, was complicit in rebellion against the Holy One. In the new creation, our resurrected bodies at last will be fully transformed into instruments of righteousness, to the glory of God. Contrary to the thinking of John the Theologian (mentioned above), somatic differences will remain in the new creation. There is no reason to suppose that we all shall have the same stature, strength, and skill in the new creation. However, we can be certain, however, that such differences will be used to the edification and benefit of fellow citizens of the Kingdom, never to their detriment.

The second ramification significant to the purpose at hand concerns the transformation of the soul, the immaterial dimension of human beings. Although Scripture has less to say directly about the nature of the resurrected soul than the resurrected body, indirectly it speaks volumes. Indeed, it is a transformation so thorough that those who are “in Christ” are said to be “new creatures,” for “the old things passed away; behold, new things have come” (2 Cor 5:17). The pattern for the transformation is no less than Christ himself (Rom 8:29), and though as yet imperfect, completion of the transformation into his image is assured (Phil 1:6). Given, then, the thoroughness of the soul’s transformation, and the assurance of its completion, man’s sinful nature is no more. All that reeks of the curse is gone. The redeemed emerge from the furnace of life in the old creation with not so much as the lingering smell of smoke on their garments. In the new creation, all that might be objectionable is eliminated in the redeemed, resurrected children of God.

To summarize, there are three foundational biblical principles that must guide our interpretation of the evidence for functional distinctions in the new creation. The first is simply that the new creation is tangible and real. Resurrected saints will enjoy real life in real bodies in a real place. The second principle is that the new creation is, in essence, creation
redeemed. All of creation deformed and marred by sin will be reformed as part of the completed work of Christ in redemption. Third, in the new creation, resurrected believers are perfected, confirmed in righteousness, and the image of God within them has been fully restored. With these fundamental principles in mind it is possible to consider the evidence for gender-based distinctions in the new creation.

Gender and Relationships in the New Creation

The question sometimes surfaces—especially at funerals, “Will we know one another in the new creation?” The virtually unanimous response of evangelical theologians and thinkers (and even of many who would demur to be thus labeled) is a resounding “yes”! However, the question, as C. S. Lewis puts it, of whether “the particular love-relations worked out on earth would... continue to have any significance,”32 goes more to the heart of the concern. Believers want to know whether they will recognize their loved ones, and whether they will continue the relationships they had begun with them in the present age. The biblical and theological evidence overwhelmingly affirms that, for those in Christ, relationships in some fashion will remain.33 “It is clear,” Nancey Murphy notes, “that a great deal of what lasts in the post resurrection kingdom must be those relationships within the body of Christ that now make us the people we are.”34

Some undoubtedly will object to the idea of continuity of relations among resurrected saints on the grounds that the focus of their attention will be upon the Lord alone. However, the divine declaration that it was “not good for the man to be alone” (Gen 2:18) is sufficient to dispel this well-intentioned misapprehension. The text reveals that God and the man enjoyed a genuine, interactive relationship in the pristine environment of the garden (Gen 2:15–19, 17; 3:8–9), but God had created man as a relational being—a being with capacity for a relationship with God, as well as a capacity, indeed, need for relationship with others like himself.35 The Lord taught Adam that he, like the animals God had made, was formed to enjoy a relationship with others of his kind. God then met Adam’s need and created for the man a being “corresponding to him” (Gen 2:18) —woman. This divinely-created need for companionship and relationship was part of the original creation to which the new creation returns. Granted, after man’s lapse into sin in the garden, the need for relationship in humanity was seriously marred and deformed. But, in keeping with the second principle, above, that which has been marred by sin in the new creation shall be reformed. Relationships between the saints most assuredly will have a significant place in the lives of resurrected believers in the new creation. They will carry forward into the eschaton, but they will change.36

What, then, of marriage? Although the common assumption that there will be no marriage in heaven may be in error,37 it is most unlikely that marriage will continue in the new creation in its present covenantal and conjugal aspects. The covenant of which marriage is a type will be replaced in the new creation by the archetype, the marriage between Christ and his church (Eph 5:31–32). Likewise, conjugal relations as we now know them will end. Yet when it is remembered that the intimate relations between the first man and woman were part of God’s original-creation plan, we realize that it is not so much that such relations will alto-
gether cease, as that they will be replaced, transformed into something befitting the new creation. Lewis’s classic treatment of the subject illustrates the point well:

The letter and spirit of scripture, and all of Christianity, forbid us to suppose that life in the New Creation will be a sexual life; and this reduces our imagination to the withering alternative either of bodies which are hardly recognizable as human bodies at all or else of a perpetual fast. As regards the fast, I think our present outlook might be like that of a small boy who, on being told that the sexual act was the highest bodily pleasure, should immediately ask whether you ate chocolates at the same time. On receiving the answer “No,” he might regard absence of chocolates as the chief characteristic of sexuality. In vain would you tell him that the reason that lovers in their carnal raptures don’t bother about chocolates is that they have something better to think of. The boy knows chocolate: he does not know the positive thing that excludes it. We are in the same position. We know the sexual life; we do not know, except in glimpses, the other thing which, in Heaven, will leave no room for it. Hence where fullness awaits us we anticipate fasting. In denying that sexual life, as we now understand it, makes any part of the final beatitude, it is not of course necessary to suppose that the distinction of sexes will disappear. What is no longer needed for biological purposes may be expected to survive fore splendour. Sexuality is the instrument both of virginity and of conjugal virtue; neither men nor women will be asked to throw away weapons they have used victoriously. It is the beaten and the fugitives who throw away their swords. The conquerors sheathe theirs and retain them.38

Indeed, our relationships with those with whom we have spent so great a part of our earthly lives are very much a part of who we are. As Alcorn observes, we should not assume that those married in the present age will grow more distant in the new creation.39 Certainly, there are conditions that apply, but we should expect that the relationships most dear to us in the present life in the new creation will be enhanced.40

Given, then, that relationships between those married on earth will in some sense remain in the new creation, it remains for us to inquire regarding the nature of those relationships. To put it more directly, will husbandly headship and wifely submission still obtain in the new creation? The egalitarian response, of course, is that all traces of headship and submission will have been removed. The evidence, however, argues to the contrary.

First, consider the argument concerning man and woman as originally created. There is virtually universal agreement that man and woman are ontologically equal, equal in essence and worth, because both were created in the image of God. In the ordering of his creation,
however, God formed the man first and gave him responsibility and authority as the head of the human race. This headship, far from being a result of the fall—feminist and egalitarian claims notwithstanding—is a central feature of the divine created order. Because the new creation is, fundamentally, a return to the divine order that prevailed before the fall, it follows that male headship will remain in the new creation.

Second, consider that subsequent to the fall (and not as a consequence of it), the principle of headship and submission in male-female relations is clearly affirmed in the New Testament. Furthermore, nowhere in Scripture is this principle replaced or rescinded. Surely within the context of biblical teaching on the church there would be an unambiguous repeal of the principle of male headship if, in fact, its end reflected the divine ideal. Such is simply not found. There is every reason to believe, then, that male headship will continue as the divine order for male-female relationships.

Finally, consider that in the new creation, those who were husbands in the former dispensation will, at last, be unencumbered by the flesh. They will be able, as never before, to genuinely love “as Christ also loved the church” (Eph 5:25). They will, as never before, have the capacity to relate to those they love “in an understanding way, as with someone weaker, since she is a woman; and show her honor as a fellow heir of the grace of life” (1 Pet 3:7). Consider, moreover, that in the new creation those who were wives in the former dispensation, will have the mind of Christ, “who, although he existed in the form of God, did not regard equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a bond-servant, and . . . humbled himself” (Phil 2:6–8). They will see in the example of Christ, as never before, the beauty and glory that inheres in gracious, selfless submission. With both man and woman thus perfected and transformed, are we to suppose that the new creation will abandon the order established in God’s original creation? I think not. Rather, such relations will bring to each true joy, and to God, more glory than before.

Gender and Distinctions of Roles in the New Creation

In addition to the more intimate relationships already established, resurrected saints will enjoy a broader social life in the new creation. We should not, as Günter Thomas has observed, “imagine the eschatological transition as leading to a steady state, changeless duration, and eternal rest without mutual social enrichment in distinct forms of social life. . . . The social life that marks the church will last.” How, then, are we to imagine social life in the new creation to be? C. S. Lewis suggests that “the New Testament, without going into details, gives us a pretty clear hint of what a fully Christian society would be like.” He continues,

It tells us that . . . [every] one is to work with his own hands, and what is more, everyone’s work is to produce something good . . . there is to be no ‘swank’ or ‘side’, no putting on airs . . . . On the other hand, it is always insisting on obedience—obedience (and outward marks of respect) from all of us to properly appointed magistrates, from children to parents, and (I am afraid this is going to be very unpopular) from wives to husbands. Thirdly, it is to
be a cheerful society: full of singing and rejoicing, and regarding worry or anxiety as wrong.\textsuperscript{46}

This picture of a fully actualized Christian society is, at least in outline, a picture of society in the new creation. New creation society may be \textit{more} multi-dimensional than the present ideal, but it scarcely would be \textit{less}. Yet, even as outlined here, it is apparent that society implies organization and order. It implies \textit{structure}. Because society is structural in nature, it follows that the members comprised by it contribute functionally to its overall purpose. In theory, it may be possible for social structure to be non-hierarchical, though in practice this is unlikely. It is not possible, however, for structure to exist unless the members it comprises have \textit{place}. Lewis explains this concept in somewhat different terms in his address entitled “Membership,” where he describes the difference between true membership and inclusion in a collective:

How true membership in a body differs from inclusion in a collective may be seen in the structure of a family. The grandfather, the parents, the grown-up son, the child, the dog, and the cat are true members (in the organic sense), precisely because they are not members of a homogeneous class. They are not interchangeable. Each person is almost a species in himself. The mother is not simply a different person from the daughter; she is a different kind of person. The grown-up brother is not simply one unit in the class children; he is a separate estate of the realm. The father and grandfather are almost as different as the cat and the dog. If you subtract any one member, you have not simply reduced the family in number; you have inflicted an injury on its structure. Its unity is a unity of unlikes, almost of incommensurables.\textsuperscript{47}

Genuine society, then, is not merely a collective of “equals” as egalitarians typically define the term. It is rather more like a building or body, wherein each member has its place, its function, its unique contribution to make to the whole. To employ Lewis’s model, the “grown-up brother” has a different place in the social structure than would a young boy, and the father and grandfather contribute to the family in distinctly different ways. Why, then, should distinctions on the basis of gender be excluded?

Functional distinctions of roles are not, as some suppose, restrictive or limiting in nature. They are rather the key to the fulfillment of our purpose as beings created for the glory of God. By serving him in different roles, we come to know him in different ways and thus are enabled to worship him in distinct, yet harmonious tones. “If all experienced God in the same way,” Lewis observes, “and returned Him an identical worship, the song of the Church triumphant would have no symphony, it would be like an orchestra in which all the instruments played the same note.”\textsuperscript{48} Our unique contribution to the glory of God, in the new creation as well as in the old, is offered by playing the part our divine Composer has assigned.

In our present-day thinking, how-
ever, we seem to have lost appreciation for the symphony, preferring the “solo” instead. Whether this focus on individuality has arisen out of the neo-humanism that permeates society today, or whether it arises out of something even less noble, namely, our fallen nature, is difficult to say. Either way, the effect is the same when it comes to the question of the roles we shall have in the life to come. We tend to view God, says Lewis, “as a kind of employment committee whose business it is to find suitable careers for souls, square holes for square pegs . . . a place in the temple which will do justice to his inherent value and give scope to his natural idiosyncrasy.” In reality, Lewis continues, “The place was there first. The man was created for it. He will not be himself till he is there.”

It follows, then, that the fullest actualization of who we are in Christ is to be found not in the pursuit of our individuality, but of our personality in Christ. Again, Lewis notes,

True personality . . . will come to us when we occupy those places in the structure of the eternal cosmos for which we were designed or invented. As a colour first reveals its true quality when placed by an excellent artist in its pre-elected spot between certain others, as a spice reveals its true flavour when inserted just where and when a good cook wishes among the other ingredients, as the dog becomes really doggy only when he has taken his place in the household of man, so we shall then first be true persons when we have suffered ourselves to be fitted into our places.

True personality and freedom—will be found, not in its pursuit, but in personal submission to the Creator.

There is so much that we cannot yet know about life in the new creation. We can be confident, though, that “God must have some very profound eternal purpose for manhood and womanhood.” There is every reason to believe that gender-based distinction of roles will remain. The social fabric of gender-based distinctions of roles was weaved in a pattern that accords with the prelapsarian decree of the Creator. In the new creation, that fabric will not be discarded or destroyed. The stains will be removed and rips mended. The fabric will be cleaned and pressed. But the pattern established in God’s “very good” creation will remain.


2 This is not to say, however, that all complementarians affirm that there will be functional distinctions between the genders in the new creation. For example, H. A. Ironside, a prominent evangelical and complementarian from an earlier generation, commenting on “the veiled woman” in 1 Cor 11, encouraged his readers to “bear in mind that [Paul] is not speaking, as he does elsewhere, of a woman’s place in the new creation. In the new creation, as already intimated, there are no distinctions.” Addresses on the First Epistle to the Corinthians: Expository Sermons Preached in the Moody Memorial Church, Chicago, Ill. (Neptune, NJ: Loizeaux Brothers, 1938), 328.

3 As with all questions concerning the eschaton, our opinions will not change the outcome. For instance, we may be premillennial, postmillennial, or amillennial in our eschatology, yet the return of Christ will occur at the time the Father has determined, no matter how passionately we may hold to one view or the other. Such things stand decided in the hidden counsels of the Godhead. They will unfold according to the divine plan. The same is true concerning functional distinctions in the eschaton. Insofar as the outcome is concerned, it matters little what our view may be, or how passionately we hold it. It will be as God has determined.

4 Jonathan Edwards, as cited by Randy C. Alcorn, Heaven (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 2004), 5.
There are, of course, those who disagree here, arguing that the apostles taught male headship and gender-based distinctions of roles in the home and church of the first century is a fact affirmed by some egalitarians. With few exceptions, the plain sense of the text of Scripture is unambiguous; even in cases where the meaning of the text has been disputed (e.g., the meaning of kephalē in 1 Cor 11:3, et al.) the weight of historical and grammatical evidence, as well as the most recent research, overwhelmingly favors a complementarian reading. The debate revolves not around what the text said or meant to the original recipients of the apostolic epistles. Rather, it revolves around what the text means for today. As egalitarian William J. Webb observes in the first paragraph of his introduction to Slaves, Women & Homosexuals: Exploring the Hermeneutics of Cultural Analysis (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001), “[The] task is one of applying the ancient text in its modern context.” Given that it is egalitarianism that advocates a departure from the plain sense of Scripture, it is egalitarianism that bears the burden of proof, despite the fact that the contemporary culture of political correctness insists quite the opposite.

Although I am unaware of any evangelical writer who makes the case for a egalitarian new creation for the express purpose of supporting the egalitarian agenda, the assumption of just such a new creation figures prominently in several egalitarian claims. See also, Grudem, Evangelical Feminism, 168.

Some evangelical feminists hold a slightly softened view, and are more likely to embrace role distinctions related to child rearing, for example, than radical secular feminists.

Alcorn, Heaven, 354.

Liberalism rests on five foundational ideals that I refer to as the “Five Pillars of Liberalism.” They are as follows: (1) human beings are essentially good; (2) God (if such a being exists) cannot be known; (3) the best for the most is the greatest good; (4) tolerance is the greatest virtue; (5) parity (“sameness”) is the social ideal.

Alcorn, Heaven, 354–55.

To be precise, Jesus did not explicitly declare that there would be no marriage of resurrected saints in the new creation. Rather, he said that there would be new marriages between resurrected saints, though the context of his words certainly seems to indicate that marriage no longer obtains. A stronger case for the end of marriage can be made theologically when scriptural prohibitions against polygamy (Lev 18:18; Mal 2:14–15; Matt 19:4–5; Mark 10:28; 1 Tim 2:3, 3:12; Titus 1:6; Deut 17:17) are considered together with the Pauline declaration that the death of a spouse frees the surviving spouse to remarry (Rom 7:3).


For a comprehensive overview and critique of these techniques and principles, see, Paul W. Felix, Sr., “The Hermeneutics of Evangelical Feminism,” The Journal for Biblical Manhood & Womanhood, 8, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 35–46. For a comparison between the hermeneutics of complementarians and egalitarians, written from an egalitarian perspective, see Willard M. Swartley, Slavery, Sabbath, War, and Women: Case Issues in Biblical Interpretation (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1983).


Ibid., 152. Emphasis added.


Webb, Slaves, Women & Homosexuals, 152.

For a brief, non-technical overview of the influence of Platonism on Christian ideas about the new creation, see “Christoplatonism’s False Assumptions” in Alcorn, Heaven, 459–66.


Revelation of John (ANF 8:582)


Ibid., 91.

Ibid., 92–93. We should note, here, that the context for Wolters observation is contemporary rather than eschatological. The reformation of which he speaks has to do with the redeemed living in the present created order in a manner consistent with a biblical, reformational worldview. The principles, however, apply equally to the new creation.

Webb, Slaves, Women & Homosexuals, 149.

See, Alcorn, Heaven, 354–55.
to be significant to the Brunner, have identified the capacity for relationality

certain Pauline affirmations (e.g., 1 Cor 13:12; 1 Thes
(e.g., Matt 17:1–4; Mark 9:2–5; Luke 16:19–31); and
1:10–18); the transfiguration and teachings of Jesus
22:14,18; 23:11; 26:16; 1 Cor 9:1; 15:5–8; Rev
1:10–18); the transfiguration and teachings of Jesus
personality only in so far as they have allowed themselves
night comes when no man can work." C. S. Lewis,
The Four Loves, 136–37.
It is neither necessary nor practical to show that male
headship is a prelapsarian construct, for this has been
thoroughly established, both exegetically and theo-
logically, by complementarian writers. For an excellent
overview of the case for prelapsarian male headship,
see Grudem, Evangelical Feminism, 29–45.
As Grudem notes, the notion that male headship is a
result of the fall "is a fundamental claim of every
egalitarian writer I know" (ibid., 108).
Of course, most egalitarians contest this point,
arguing that Gal 3:28 effectively eliminates all non-
obiological distinctions between males and females.
Unbiased exegesis, however, recognizes that this
passage is soteriological in nature, and speaks to
the matter of one's standing in Christ. They argue,
moreover, that instances of female leadership in
Scripture (e.g., Deborah in the Old Testament and
Phoebe in the New) amount to tacit approval of
egalitarianism. Following such logic, one could as
easily claim tacit approval for polygamy, since there are
many instances of the practice in Scripture that
apparently escape divine censure. In many respects,
polygamy is refuted on precisely the same grounds
as egalitarianism—original creation patterns, coupled
with New Testament teaching. Moreover, virtually
all of these instances of female leadership are either
ambiguous or anomalous.
Günter Thomas, “Resurrection to New Life:
Pneumatological Implications of the Eschato-
logical Transition,” in Resurrection: Theological and
Scientific Assessments (ed. Ted Peters, Robert John
Russell, Michael Welker; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
Some, including theologians Karl Barth and Emil
Brunner, have identified the capacity for relationality
to be significant to the image dei in humanity. Al-
though each disagreed somewhat with the particulars
of the other's respective views, Barth and Brunner
were in general agreement that human beings are
created with both the need and capacity for relation-
ship with other human beings.
Nancy Murphy, “The Resurrection Body and
Personal Identity: Possibilities and Limits of Es-
chatological Knowledge,” in Resurrection: Theological
and Scientific Assessments (ed. Ted Peters, Robert John
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were in general agreement that human beings are
created with both the need and capacity for relation-
ship with other human beings.
Cf., Webb, Slaves, Homosexuals & Women, 149. Webb
holds that in addition to a perfecting of old-creation
relationships, there will be a re-ordering as well.
See n. 14, above.
C. S. Lewis, “Miracles,” in The Best of C. S. Lewis
(Christianity Today Edition; Washington, D. C.: Chan-
Alcorn, Heaven, 336–37.
We may hope that the resurrection of the body
means also the resurrection of what may be called
our ‘greater body’; the general fabric of our earthly
life with its affections and relationships. But only on
a condition; not a condition arbitrarily laid down by
God, but one necessarily inherent in the character
of Heaven; nothing can enter there which cannot
become heavenly. 'Flesh and blood,' mere nature,
cannot inherit that Kingdom. Man can ascend to
Heaven only because the Christ, who did and as-
cended to Heaven, is 'formed in him.' Must we not
suppose that the same is true of a man's loves? Only
those into which Love Himself has entered will as-
cend to Love Himself. And these can be raised with
Him only if they have, in some degree and fashion,
shared His death; if the natural element in them has
submitted—year after year, or in some sudden agony,
to transmutation. . . . Natural loves can hope for eter-
nity only in so far as they have allowed themselves
to be taken into the eternity of Charity; have at least
allowed the process to begin here on earth, before the

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Are the Daughters of Philip Among the Prophets of Acts?

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The mention in Acts 21:9 of the four virgin daughters of Philip at Caesarea who prophesy has long intrigued interpreters of the Acts of the Apostles. Who were these women and what role did they play within the early Christian movement? What is Luke’s view of these women? Does his brief mention of them highlight or obfuscate their role within the early Christian movement? As we shall see, some have pointed to these women as evidence of Luke’s progressive, egalitarian views on the role of women within early Christianity. These interpreters have seen Luke as presenting an approving picture of these women as prophetesses in the biblical tradition of Deborah, Huldah, the wife of Isaiah, and Anna. Others, however, have seen a very different picture. For these, it appears that Luke desires to subordinate the role of women within the church of his day; therefore, he downplays the significance of Philip’s daughters within Acts. This study is an attempt to understand Luke’s presentation of the daughters of Philip and to determine if he does, indeed, view them as being among the prophets of Acts.

Prophets in Acts

In order to answer the question as to whether or not the daughters of Philip are, indeed, among the prophets of Acts, we must first examine Luke’s presentation of prophets and prophetic activity in general within Acts. Who are the prophets in Acts and what do they do? Some have chosen such broad definitions that nearly every primary character in Acts is said to be a prophet. In his commentary on Luke, Luke Timothy Johnson, for example, argues that Luke’s use of “proof from prophecy” is “his most important literary device” in the Luke–Acts narrative. Johnson then argues that Luke presents nearly all the major Christian figures in Acts as acting like prophets. In describing his profile of the prophetic figure in Acts, Johnson says that each leading character in Acts is “filled with the Holy Spirit,” is “bold”
in proclamation of the “Good News” or “the word of God,” is a “witness,” works “signs and wonders,” and preaches and performs wonders “among the people.” He concludes, “Taken together, these characteristics point unmistakingly to one image in the biblical tradition, that of the prophet.” Another contemporary work, Roger Stronstad’s *The Prophethood of All Believers*, commendably recognizes the importance of the prophetic in Acts, but also too broadly identifies the major characters in Acts as prophets. Indeed, Stronstad argues for the early church depicted in Acts as continuing the prophetic ministry of Jesus in its establishment of a “community of prophets.” For Stronstad all the believers are prophets (hence, “the prophethood of all believers”).

Such characterizations, however, are too broad. If everyone is a prophet in Acts, then what real significance is there when Luke distinctly labels certain characters within the narrative as prophets or chooses not to label them as prophets? Correspondingly, what does this say about Luke’s view of the foundational role of prophet within early Christianity? This essay argues, contrary to Johnson and Stronstad, that Luke uses the term “prophet” (*prophētēs*) in Acts judiciously and particularly. Whom, then, does Luke specifically designate as a prophet within the Acts narrative?

First, there are several Old Testament figures who are distinctly identified as “prophets” in Acts. They are Moses (3:22), Samuel (3:24; 13:20), David (2:30), and Isaiah (8:28, 30, 34; 28:25). In addition, Jesus himself is clearly presented in Acts as the prophet like Moses (3:22; 7:37; cf. Deut 18:15–18).

As for first century Christian prophets in Acts, beyond Jesus, there are only eight individuals who receive the explicit designation “prophet” in the narrative. The first of these is the peripatetic Agabus who stands out among “the prophets who came down from Jerusalem into Antioch” (11:27; cf. 21:10). Agabus is a prophet in the classic Old Testament tradition. He predicts future events, including the Judean famine (11:28) and Paul’s arrest (21:11). He also engages in symbolic action, binding his hands and feet with Paul’s belt, in order to symbolize how Paul will be given “into the hands of the Gentiles” (21:11). Most telling, Agabus pronounces, “Thus says the Holy Spirit” (21:11), echoing the classic Septuagintal expression *tade legei*.

Next, in Acts 13:1 Luke introduces the five “prophets and teachers” of Antioch: Barnabas, Simeon Niger, Loukios, Manaen, and Saul (Paul). Of these, Barnabas, the “son of exhortation” (*huios paraklēseōs*) (4:36), and Paul stand out. I have argued elsewhere that part of Luke’s intention in Acts is to present Paul as a prophetic figure. We also find a literary pattern in Acts in which Luke introduces a group of persons who play a particular leadership role in the Christian community. He then has one figure, or sometimes two figures, emerge as the primary focus. We see this when Peter emerges from the eleven apostles (1:13–15), Stephen (and later, Philip) from the seven ministers (6:5), and Agabus from the Jerusalem prophets (11:27–28). Finally, we see this pattern when Paul emerges from the five prophets and teachers of Antioch to become the dominant character in Acts from 13:1 to the end of the narrative.

The final characters to be distinctly named as prophets in Acts are Judas and Silas: “Now Judas and Silas, themselves being prophets also, exhorted and strengthened the brethren with many words” (15:32). They are described as “leading men among the brothers” (15:22) who are chosen to aid in delivery of the

We now see that eight figures are explicitly described in Acts as “prophets.” Notably absent from this number are the daughters of Philip. They are not called “prophets” or “prophetesses.” They are, instead, merely said, “to prophesy.” Does this mean that they are prophets? Do all prophets prophesy? Are all who prophesy prophets? To answer this question, we must now turn our attention to the use of the verb “to prophesy” in Acts.

**The Verb “to prophesy” in Acts**
The verb “to prophesy” (prophēteuō) occurs only four times in Acts (2:17–18; 19:6; 21:9). Two occurrences of the verb “to prophesy” come in Peter’s Pentecost sermon as he quotes Joel:

> And in the last days it shall be, God declares, I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams; even on my male servants and female servants in those days I will pour out my Spirit, and they shall prophesy (Acts 2:17–18).

One might expect, with such a bold pronouncement, an immediate fulfillment of this prediction within the narrative. Yet this is not exactly the result. In fact, only much later in the narrative and in only two instances after Peter’s Pentecost sermon are believers said “to prophesy,” and none of the eight identified prophets are ever described as “prophesying.”

The first explicit mention of anyone “prophesying” in Acts is found in Acts 19:6. The setting is Paul’s encounter with the twelve disciples in Ephesus who knew only the baptism of John. After baptism “in the name of the Lord Jesus” (v. 5) and the imposition of Paul’s hands, Luke says, “the Holy Spirit came upon them, and they spoke with tongues and prophesied [ephasis]” (v. 6). Luke explicitly notes in v. 7 that the twelve are men (andres).

The second use of the verb “to prophesy” is found in reference to Philip’s daughters in 21:9. Here the setting is Paul’s arrival in Caesarea on his journey to Jerusalem. Luke notes that Paul entered “the house of Philip the evangelist, who was one of the seven” (21:8). Luke then adds the intriguing information of v. 9: “Now this man had four virgin daughters who prophesied” (toutō de ēsan thugateres tessares parthenoi prophēteuousai). It is hard to overlook the “proof from prophecy” motif at work in these passages (Acts 19:6 and 21:9). In fulfillment of Peter’s words at Pentecost in 2:17–18 borrowed from the prophet Joel, sons (the twelve Ephesian men) and daughters (Philip’s daughters) are prophesying. This is a double fulfillment. The prophetic prediction of Joel and the apostolic prediction of Peter are simultaneously fulfilled.

What stands out in this survey of Luke’s use of the verb “to prophesy” in Acts is the paucity of references to it as an activity in which members of the Christian community were actively engaged. Luke identifies eight first century “prophets,” beyond Jesus, but none of them are said, “to prophesy.” Instead, Luke most often describes the work of those designated as prophets as exhorting (parakaleō) and strengthening (epistērizo) the disciples. It would appear, then, to
be inappropriate to assume that one is a prophet in Acts, merely because he or she prophesies.

Three Views on the Daughters of Philip

What have contemporary critical scholars made of the daughters of Philip? We can group the various views into three categories: naïve egalitarian, subordination, and liberation.

The first category is a naïve egalitarian view. This perspective sees Luke as holding a progressive view on the participation of women in leadership roles within early Christianity and sees the daughters of Philip unapologetically depicted by Luke as among the prophets of both the Acts narrative and the early Christian community. We see this view represented in Lesly F. Massey’s *Women and the New Testament*, as she offers these comments on the daughters of Philip:

The first clear mention of female prophetism in the history of the early church is the case of the four daughters of Philip. . . . It could be argued that Philip’s daughters and Agabus were remnants of Old Testament prophetism, as probably was Anna, or that they were called to some special prophetic ministry such as that of John the Baptist. But evidence concerning New Testament prophecy in general makes it reasonably certain that the daughters of Philip had received the imposition of apostolic hands and were now functioning in the church as inspired proclaimers of the word of God. And the general tone of 1 Corinthians 14 is such that prophets spoke primarily for the edification of the Christian assembly."

The conclusion that the daughters of Philip were functioning as ordained, local assembly prophets is quite a leap from the slim reference to these women in Acts 21:9.

A desire to find progressive models of women in public ministry in Luke fuels the engine of this view and drives its adherents beyond Luke’s depiction of Philip’s daughters as women who prophesy (the most literal meaning) to add the interpretation that Luke presents them as “prophets” or “prophetesses.” Even the NASB, which otherwise follows a literal rendering of the Greek text, translates Acts 21:9, “Now this man had four virgin daughters who were prophetesses.” Clearly, to call these women “prophetesses” is to go beyond the literal meaning to an interpretation of Luke’s words.

The second category is subordination. This view, in contrast to that of the naïve egalitarian perspective, sees Luke not as an egalitarian progressive but, quite the contrary, as one who desires to subordinate and deny the significance of the participation of women, in general, and the daughters of Philip, in particular, within early Christianity. This view has been championed by Jacob Jervell who argues against a naïve assumption that Luke indicates approval for women in leadership roles within the early church merely because women appear within the narratives of Luke and Acts. For Jervell, the women of Acts are Jewish women, daughters of Abraham, who, along with Jewish men, have their proper place within the new Israel. These women, nevertheless, play a subordinate role. Jervell even detects a lesser role for
women within Acts as compared to Luke: “After reading the gospel we are struck by the fact that in Acts women retreat to the background. . . . The women obviously make up the community but do not exercise any leading function.” Jervell sees Acts as subtly affirming a perspective on the role of women in the church found in what he perceives to be later New Testament writings: “Luke says nothing at all of subordination. What we find in Paul in 1 Corinthians 14, in the Deutero-Paulines, the Catholic and Pastoral Epistles of women’s subordination does not appear at all in Luke. But it is quite clear that the women in Acts are subordinate, as may be seen from many aspects. Is this accepted by Luke as self-evident, or has he consciously given it shape?”

The question Jervell asks is crucial. Do women fail to play key leadership roles in Acts because this was the self-evident situation in the church that Luke knew or does Luke shape the narrative to avoid casting women in leadership roles?

Jervell concludes that Luke has indeed subtly shaped the material to reflect an implicitly subordinate role for women: “Without stating it in so many words, the woman is subordinate.” He argues that no women appear as leaders in Acts. Of Philip’s daughters in Acts 21:9, Jervell comments,

The prophets or persons who appear as prophets in Acts are clearly all men; of the women named in Acts, no prophetic activity is reported. The four daughters in Acts 21:9 thus furnish the exception. And of course this does not mean that they are less than daughters of Abraham. First of all, their prophetic activity as such is in accordance with Scripture (Acts 2:17). Second, Luke was probably also aware of Old Testament models, that is, of prophetic women. But in this respect also women are subordinate.

Jervell concludes that Acts represents a “retrograde movement” in its attitude toward women: “Luke is not aware of an equal status of women in the church, though he does not at all contest it. What he says of women in the gospel has its continuation in Acts: women constitute the community together with the men. But they have no leading or definite role; they are subordinate.”

According to Jervell, therefore, it would be incorrect, on the basis of 21:9, to conjecture that Luke knew or approved of women serving as prophets in the early church. Quite the contrary, it may well be that Luke expresses tacit disapproval of women inappropriately serving in the prophetic role. Jervell’s subordination view has found support among some contemporary feminist biblical scholars. Gail R. O’Day makes just such an argument in her Acts commentary in *The Women’s Bible Commentary*:

This notice [21:9] is the only comment Luke makes on these women and their ministry. . . . The prophetic activity of both men and women is a sign of the Spirit at work in the church (Acts 2:17–18), but in telling his story of the church, Luke almost completely ignores women’s prophetic ministry. No additional women prophets are named in Acts, even though other New Testament writings attest to women’s pro-
phetic activity (1 Cor. 11:5). These four virgin daughters, children of a well-known church leader, may have been so renowned in the tradition that Luke could not avoid mentioning them when he discussed the church at Caesarea. The reality of women’s prophetic activities in the church may have constrained Luke from suppressing all mention of it, but he did succeed in keeping this ministry at the margins of his story of the church.¹⁹

O’Day also points to Paul’s silencing of the slave girl in 16:18 as a reflection of “Luke’s discomfort with the prophetic voices of women in the church. The scene can be read as emblematic of Luke’s silencing of women prophets throughout Acts.”²⁰

It should also be noted that some have claimed that there is a bias against women in public leadership roles specifically in the Western textual tradition of Acts.²¹ In his commentary on Acts, Justo L. Gonzalez states that “this Western text has a clear anti-feminine prejudice and seems to reflect the general anti-feminine reaction that took place in the Church toward the end of the first century and early in the second.”²² To illustrate this supposed tendency, Gonzalez says, “For instance, while the Egyptian text, except in one case where the grammar requires it, speaks of ‘Priscilla and Aquila,’ the Western text invariably calls them ‘Aquila and Priscilla.’ In 17:12 the Western text changes the words, so that the qualifier ‘of high standing’ does not apply specifically to women, as it does in the Egyptian text. In 17:34 it completely omits Damaris.”²³ There are, however, no major textual variations in Acts 21:9.

The third category is that of the liberationist perspective. This view is a sophisticated modification of both the naïve egalitarian and subordination perspectives. The liberationist view, though acknowledging Luke’s apparent marginalization of women in Acts, nevertheless, argues that Luke is actually subverting the patriarchal understandings of the role of women in early Christianity by his presentation of women in Acts. Ivoni Richter Reimer concludes her extensive study of the women of Acts:

The Acts of the Apostles reflects no particular tendency to keep women at home and subject to men, i.e., to their own husbands. Even though it is silent about important women like Mary Magdalene, it is still far from what was written, at about the same time as its composition, in the Pastoral letters and similar works (e.g., Titus 2:5; 1 Pet. 3:1; Col. 3:18) regarding the subordination of women and slaves. The example of Sapphira makes it clear that women should not simply function as cooperators and co-conspirators. The flip side of this story, in fact, shows that women were given an example of how they might break with patriarchal and hierarchical structures and, together with others, attempt to build a life dedicated to the preservation of all life.²⁴

Richter Reimer describes the daughters of Philip as “the four prophetic
women of Caesarea” and as “the four virgin prophets.”

Though conceding that “the information about them is very sparse,” she speculates, “It is possible that they were so well known that Luke could not avoid mentioning them.”

She also notes that she finds “no trace” in Acts 21:8–9 of “the struggle against prophetic women,” that “reached a climax in the third century.”

As for the mention of Agabus’s arrival in 21:10, Richter Reimer finds, “It is not a case of competition between the two prophetic parties.”

Turid Karlsen Seim argues that Luke-Acts “cannot be reduced either to a feminist treasure chamber or to a chamber of horrors for women’s theology.”

Seim recognizes a tension in Luke’s narrative between both “strong traditions about women on the one hand, and . . . social and ideological controls that brought women to silence and promoted male dominance in positions of leadership on the other.”

According to Seim, then, “the Lukan construction contains a double, mixed message.”

**A Complementarian View**

In response to these three perspectives on the daughters of Philip, I would suggest a fourth: a complementarian view. This view would reject the assumption of naïve egalitarians that Luke intends to present the daughters of Philip as prophets—that is, as being in a defined leadership role within early Christianity. It would not, however, as with the subordinationist view, assume that Luke desires to suppress, obfuscate, or deny the activity of prophesying engaged in by the daughters of Philip. It would distinguish, as Luke does, between the role or office of prophet (which is limited to men) and the activity of prophesying (which is open to any believer who is directed into this behavior by the Holy Spirit).

This view would first acknowledge that the daughters of Philip are not presented in Acts as prophets. From Luke’s perspective, the role of “prophet” is a leadership office in the early church that is held only by certain men. Luke is careful and clear to identify only eight figures within Acts who are labeled as prophets. Both men (the Ephesian twelve) and women (the Caesanian four) may prophesy, but this does not mean that they are prophets. In fact, Luke presents the prophesying of both men and women as the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy! For Luke, the primary task of prophets is not prophesying, per se, but exhorting and strengthening the disciples.

Women are not absent from the Acts narrative. Among the notable women believers mentioned in Acts are Mary, the mother of Jesus (1:14); Sapphira (5:1–11); Tabitha (9:36–3); Mary, the mother of John Mark (12:12); Rhoda (12:13–17); Lydia (16:14–15, 40); the slave girl of Philippi (16:16–19); Damaris (17:34); Priscilla (18:1, 26); and Philip’s daughters (21:9). From the beginning, the apostles gather in Jerusalem and “with one mind were continually devoting themselves to prayer, along with the women, and Mary the mother of Jesus, and with His brothers” (1:14). Those who come to believe in Jesus include “multitudes of both men and women” (πληθε ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν) (5:14). Widows play an important part in the early church (see Acts 6:1; 9:39). In Acts 9:36 Tabitha (Dorcas) is described as a μαθήτρια, a woman disciple. Saul imprisons and persecutes both men and women who are followers of the Way (8:3; 9:2; 22:4). Luke notes that both men and women responded to the gospel as proclaimed by Philip and were baptized: “But when they believed Philip preaching the good
news about the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ, they were being baptized, men and women alike” (8:12). In Philippi, Paul and Barnabas go to the place of prayer on the Sabbath and speak “to the women who had assembled” (16:13), and Lydia is converted (v. 14).

Women, as well as men, can also deny the gospel, as did Ananias and Sapphira (5:1–11). Both women and men may be stirred up to oppose the preaching of Jesus, as did “the devout women of prominence and the leading men of the city” in Pisidian Antioch (13:50). On the other hand, they may also be persuaded as were “a great multitude of the devout Greeks, and not a few of the leading women” in Thessalonica (17:4) and Berea: “Therefore many of them believed, along with a number of prominent Greek women and men” (17:12). At the end of Paul's Areopagus speech in Acts 17, Luke mentions the response of both a man named Dionysius and “a woman named Damaris” (v. 34). For Luke, women are equal in essence to men as participants in the Christian movement, and yet they serve in distinctly different roles or functions within that movement.

It must be acknowledged, for example, that Luke does not depict women as serving in leadership roles in which they exercise doctrinal or teaching authority over men. Women do not teach or preach in Acts. Like Dorcas, they are known for being “full of good works and almsgiving” (9:36) which might have included skillful sewing for the widows (9:39). Luke presents women who open their homes for the meetings of the church, as did Mary, the mother of John Mark (12:12). Like Lydia, they extend hospitality to the itinerant prophets (16:15, 40). It is true that Priscilla “explained” to Apollos the “way of God more accurately” (18:26), but only along-side her husband Aquila. It should likewise be noted that the four prophesying daughters are clearly “in the household of Philip” (eis ton oikon Philippou) (21:8). The implication is that they exercise this ministry under their father’s authority. It is difficult to find any liberationist models of women overtly engaged in leadership within the Christian movement in Acts. Richter Reimer’s effort to find a redeeming feminist message within the Ananias and Sapphira story (Acts 5) or in the brief mention of the daughters of Philip reveals how difficult, and indeed futile, the search is. Yet this need not mean that Luke represents a “retrograde movement” in early Christianity with respect to the place of women in early Christianity. The most satisfying conclusion that one may draw upon reviewing Luke’s depiction of women in Acts is the complementarian perspective. Luke affirms women as equal participants in the Christian movement and yet he also clearly affirms that certain offices, like that of prophet, are limited to men only. As for the daughters of Philip, once again, Luke can affirm the fact that they prophesy, this does not mean that they serve as prophets.

What impact might this perspective have on understanding Luke and his portrait of Paul in relationship to the Paul of the epistles? Modern critical scholarship has found it fashionable to drive a wedge between the Paul of Luke and the Paul of the epistles. This contemporary distrust of Luke’s Paul is rooted in the denial of traditional authorship claims. Many no longer believe that Acts was written by a certain Luke, who was a companion of Paul (cf. Col 4:14; Phlm 23–24; 2 Tim 4:11). Our study of Acts 21:9, however, may serve as a countercurrent to this trend, if we are able to find continuity between Luke and Paul’s views on prophesying women.
First, it will be helpful to examine Paul’s writings for information on the activity of “prophesying” and the participation of women in that activity. In 1 Cor 11, Paul discourages a woman from praying or prophesying with her head uncovered (v. 5). Later, he insists that a woman ought to have “a symbol of authority [exousian]” (v. 10) on her head. In 1 Cor 14:33b-35, however, Paul admonishes that women should remain silent in the churches. Many have been puzzled by what appears to be a contradiction in Paul’s thought. How can he encourage a woman to pray or prophesy in chapter 11, albeit with the proviso that her head be properly covered, and then seemingly reverse himself in chapter 14 by urging women to remain silent in the churches? Some have even resorted to the argument that 1 Cor 14:33b-35 is a later addition to the text and have literally removed it from consideration. This is untenable.

More acceptable is Wayne Grudem’s suggestion that Paul is not offering a blanket prohibition on the speaking of women in the assembly in 1 Cor14:33b-35; rather, he is admonishing that women be silent during the judging or weighing of prophecies by the prophets. Paul tells the Corinthians that the prophets are to regulate their fellow prophets. In 1 Cor 14:29, Paul sets these guidelines to maintain order: “Let two or three prophets speak, and let the others pass judgement” (propētai de duo e treis laleitōsan kai hoi alloi diakpinetōsan). In 14:32 he says, “And the spirits of prophets are subject to prophets (kai pneumata prophetōn prophētās huptassetai). Any believer might prophesy, if he or she has that particular gift (see 1 Cor 14:31). However, not all who prophesy are necessarily prophets. The following dictum might be fairly applied to Paul’s thought: “All prophets might prophesy; not all who prophesy are prophets.” The prophets have the distinct duty of weighing what is prophesied. Women may prophesy in the church, and, indeed, the fact that they do so is a fulfillment of scripture (Acts 2:17–18). They do not, however, fill the role or office of prophet within the early church, since this role requires the authoritative teaching and regulation of doctrine (see 1 Tim 2:11–12). Both the essential equality of men and women and the distinctions in their roles are rooted in the created order (see 1 Cor 11:7–12; 1 Tim 2:13–15). Far from being inconsistent, Paul’s thought is imminently coherent.

We can also see how Luke follows Paul’s model. Acts reflects this pattern exactly. Luke, like Paul, sees prophesying as an activity that may be done by both men and women, as they are led by the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, only men serve in the role or office of prophet. This points to continuity between Luke and Paul and argues both for the traditional assertion that Luke is a protégé of Paul and that Luke’s portrait of Paul is valid.

2 Ibid., 18.
3 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 71-84.
6 A role referred to in 1 Cor 12:28-29; Eph 2:20; 3:5; 4:11. Like the foundational role of apostle, which it accompanies in the above citations, it apparently has a terminal duration.
8 Barnabas exhorts the Antioch believers (11:23); Paul and Barnabas strengthen and exhort the new disciples of Lystra (14:22); Judas and Silas exhort and strengthen the Antioch believers (15:32); Paul and Silas strengthen the churches of Syria and Cilicia (15:41); Paul and Barnabas exhort the brothers at Philippi (16:40); Paul strengthens the disciples in Galatia and Phrygia; Paul exhorts the Ephesian disciples (20:1); and Paul exhorts the Macedonians while...
traveling to Jerusalem (20:2). The only exception in Acts is the apostle Peter in 2:40 who "exhorts" but is not identified as a prophet. Otherwise, this activity is limited to the prophets.

It should be noted that we also find a joining of the verbs "to exhort" and "to strengthen" in the Pauline corpus (see Rom 1:11-12; 1 Thess 3:2; and 2 Thess 2:17).


11 Emphasis added.

12 Those who take this position often point to the memory of the daughters of Philip recorded in Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History (3.11; 3.39; 5.24). If the influence of these women was significant enough to have these traditions persist to the time of Eusebius, why does Luke give them such passing treatment in Acts?


14 Ibid., 150.

15 Ibid., 151.

16 Ibid., 152.

17 Ibid., 155.

18 Ibid., 157.


20 Ibid., 310-11.


23 Ibid., 12, n. 19. Cf. also W. A. Strange, The Problem of the Text of Acts (MSSNTS 71; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 156-67. Here Strange points to the Western textual variation at Acts 24:27 where it is said that Felix kept Paul not only to placate the Jews but also "because of Drusilla" (dia Drousillan).


25 Ibid., 248.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 249.

28 Ibid.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 The complementarian perspective is described in John Piper and Wayne Grudem, eds., Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood: A Response to Evangelical Feminism (Wheaton: Crossway, 1991).

33 See, for example, Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians (Interpretation; Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1987). Hays comments on this passage, "One of the strongest reasons for regarding these verses as an interpolation is that their demand for women to remain silent in the assembly stands in glaring contradiction to 11:2-16, in which Paul teaches that women may in fact pray and prophesy in church as long as they keep their heads appropriately covered. It is hard to imagine how Paul could have written those instructions and then, just a few paragraphs later, have written that 'it is shameful for a woman to speak in church' (14:35b)" (246).


35 Wayne Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy in the New Testament and Today (rev. ed.; Wheaton: Crossway, 2000), 183-192. Grudem counters charges of inconsistency in Paul's thought: "Is this passage, then, consistent with the rest of the New Testament teaching on men and women? It appears to be so. In this passage, though it has specific application to the judging of prophecies in the church service, Paul is arguing from a larger conviction about an abiding distinction between the roles appropriate for males and those appropriate to females in the Christian church. As in 1 Timothy 2:11-15, this distinction comes to the focus in the prohibition of women from exercising doctrinal and ethical governance, even from time to time, over the congregation. Therefore, 1 Corinthians 14:33b-35 fits well with a consistent Pauline advocacy of women's participation without governing authority in the assembled church" (191).
This brief article seeks to refute a point made by Linda L. Belleville in her recent book *Women Leaders and the Church.* It is in no way intended to be a comprehensive treatment of the many complex exegetical issues involved in this thorny subject. However, it will serve an acceptable purpose if it can demonstrate the fallacy of one of the arguments Belleville uses in her discussion.

Certainly no discussion of the Bible’s teaching on the role of women in the church can afford to bypass 1 Tim 2:9–15. One of the particularly important facets of the interpretation of this passage is in regard to the significance of the postpositive conjunction *gar* that logically introduces verse 13. Should it be taken in a causal sense or not? Belleville argues against the causal sense and her discussion is as follows:

Some take *for* as causal (rather than as explanatory) and see it as introducing a creation order dictum. Women must not teach men *because* men in the created order are first and women by nature are prone to deception. This is problematic on a number of grounds. For one, the principal causal conjunction in Greek is *hoti,* not *gar* (Blass, Debrunner, Funk, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament,* §456). Paul could be using *gar* in this way, but there is nothing in the context that would support it. In fact, verse 15 is against it. (It is nonsense to say women must not teach men *because* Eve was deceived but will be saved through childbearing.) Second, although some are quick to assume a creation and fall ordering in verses 13–14, virtually all stop short of including “women will be saved [or kept safe] through childbearing” (v. 15). To do so, though, is to lack hermeneu-
tical integrity. Either all three statements are normative or all three are not. Finally, to see verses 13–14 as normative is to fly in the face of clear biblical teaching elsewhere in Scripture.2

It is the claim that gar is not the principal causal conjunction in Greek, especially in relation to hoti, that needs additional comment. The truth is that the claim is simply incorrect. In the Pastoral Epistles (excluding for the moment the passage in question) there are at least twenty-nine examples of causal gar and only seven (possibly nine) of causal hoti.3

There is no reason to suspect that the frequencies of the two conjunctions would change if we broadened the corpus to include all of the Pauline Epistles. Although a definitive counting of examples would be somewhat laborious, a cursory review reveals that (apart from the Pastorals, which have already been considered) causal hoti occurs some sixty-three times in Paul’s writings. By contrast, gar occurs more than twice that many times in the book of Romans alone. Even if some of these occurrences of gar in Romans are not causal, it is apparent that gar far outstrips hoti in introducing causal clauses in the writings of Paul.

With this incontrovertible evidence in mind, we are left to wonder about Belleville’s citation of the grammar by Blass-Debrunner-Funk (BDF)4 in support of the claim that hoti is the predominant causal conjunction in Greek. Two possibilities suggest themselves: either this standard and reputable authority is in error, or Belleville has misunderstood the statement found therein. The latter alternative seems more likely.

In fact, we are probably to understand the statement in BDF (“the principal conjunction is hoti”) to be restricted to the conjunctions immediately under discussion: “subordinating” causal conjunctions, such as hoti, dioti, epei, epeedê, epeedêper, hopou, and kathoti. Of those conjunctions it is certainly true that hoti is the preferred one for introducing a causal clause. But a fuller look at BDF’s discussion will clarify that this comment about the prevalence of hoti is made in reference to a restricted group of conjunctions.

BDF discusses conjunctions under two main headings: coordinating conjunctions5 and subordinating conjunctions.6 The correctness of this division is not really the issue; it simply is the way the conjunctions are classified in BDF. As we have seen, the statement about hoti being the principal causal conjunction applies only to subordinating conjunctions. On the other hand, the conjunction gar is treated under coordinating conjunctions, where we find the following under the sub-heading “Causal coordinating conjunctions”: “Gar is one of the most common particles in the NT.”7 Within this section the detailed discussion centers on “exceptional” usages for gar, clearly leaving the impression that gar is normally causal and very frequent. In light of this broader view of the discussion in BDF, it seems that Belleville has simply misunderstood and therefore misused her citation.

We must also challenge Belleville’s insistence on placing the three clausal ideas in verses 13–15 (Adam was formed first, then Eve; it was the woman who was deceived and became a sinner; women will be saved through childbirth) on the same level, in such a way that either they must all three be taken as normative or that none of them is normative. After all, there is this difference—that the verbs in the first two clauses are past tense (“was
formed,” “being deceived,” “became”), while the verb in the third clause is future tense (“will be saved”).

Furthermore, Belleville has, perhaps unconsciously, linked the causal meaning of *gar* with the normative nature of the content of the *gar*-clause. But other ways of construing the text are possible. It would make perfectly good sense, at least grammatically and contextually, to hold that the first clause (“Adam was formed first”) points to a normative condition—a part of the order of things as they were created—and that the second clause (“the woman, being deceived, became a transgressor”) points to a separate “normative” condition—a part of the order of things as they were established by the fall but not as they were established by creation. The point, then, would be not that women are by nature more open to deception than men, but that Eve fell into transgression through being deceived.

Understood this way, Paul is saying that there are two reasons why he does not permit women to perform certain activities. One reason is rooted in the divine ordering of things at the time of the creation of mankind, demonstrated by Adam’s priority in creation. The other reason is rooted in the historical fact of Eve’s transgression through being deceived. In the one case, the prohibition against women doing certain activities is “by nature.” But in the other case, it is more-or-less a consequence for her disobedience to God’s command—a disobedience that took place before the physical act of partaking of the forbidden fruit, but began at least as early as the point of allowing herself to be deceived by the Tempter.

Perhaps a word should also be said concerning the wording of verse 14. Although on the surface it says that Adam was not deceived, this is open to different possible interpretations. It may, of course, be taken at face value and imply that Adam sinned “with his eyes open,” and not in any way under deception. Alternatively, however, it may be a case of a Hebraic statement of relatives or comparatives as if they were absolutes. This is a well-known phenomenon and is classically illustrated by God’s statement in Hosea, “I desire mercy, not sacrifice.” Inasmuch as it was God himself who commanded the laws of sacrifice, it is commonplace to understand these words in a comparative sense—that God desires mercy more than sacrifice. Likewise, Paul’s point may be that in the historical circumstance surrounding the fall Eve’s deception was greater than Adam’s.

One other point in Belleville’s analysis needs comment. Her statement, “it is nonsense to say that women must not teach men because Eve was deceived but will be saved through childbearing,” is not a sensible reading of Paul’s argument. Paul does not actually say that women may not engage in a certain activity because Eve was deceived. Rather, what he says is that women may not do this activity because Eve sinned [or came into transgression], under the circumstances of being deceived. Why is it then nonsense to think that a restriction was put in place by God as a result of Eve’s fall into sin? Of course, if the perceived nonsense is seen in the idea that women are placed under a prohibition because they will be saved through childbearing, that really does appear to be a non sequitur. But then again, we have tried above to show that the clause about women being saved through childbearing does not stand in as close a relationship to the prohibition as do the other clauses in verses 13–14.

Belleville’s arguments to support a non-causal meaning for *gar* in 1 Tim 2:13 need considerable refinement in
order to be effective.

2 Ibid., 178-179.
3 There are thirty-three occurrences of *gar* in the Pastoral Epistles. Excluding the passage at hand (i.e., 1 Tim 2:13), three passages are unclear as to whether the *gar* is causal (cf. 2 Tim 2:11; 4:15; Titus 1:7). The remaining twenty-nine are all clearly causal in nature (cf. 1 Tim 2:5; 3:13; 4:5, 8, 16; 5:4, 11, 15, 18; 6:7, 10; 2 Tim 1:7, 12; 2:7, 13, 16; 3:2, 6, 9; 4:3, 6, 10, 11; Titus 1:10; 2:11; 3:3, 9, 12). There are twenty occurrences of *hōti* in the Pastorals; seven of which are clearly causal (cf. 1 Tim 1:13; 4:4, 10; 5:12; 6:2, 2; 2 Tim 1:16), two of which are uncertain (cf. 1 Tim 1:12; 6:7 [variously interpreted, but probably not causal]), and eleven of which are non-causal (cf. 1 Tim 1:8, 9, 15; 4:1; 2 Tim 1:5, 12, 15; 2:23; 3:1, 15; Titus 3:11).
5 Ibid., §§442-452.
6 Ibid., §§453-457.
7 Ibid., §452.
A profound honor is mine today to address this noble assembly when so many of you are more eminently qualified than I to address the subject, “The Family's Core.” I accept the assignment out of the matrix of my own life and ministry as an evangelical follower of Christ, a Christian. My presupposition and, doubtless, my remarks will at times expose that commitment, but I trust that such inevitabilities will not obscure the broader scope of my remarks, which I believe to be generally applicable to all religious concerns and ethnic diversity. Above all I pray that I shall be offensive to none.

To speak of the “core” of the family is to speak of that which is foundational. One might, therefore, imagine a Mexico City skyscraper as an analogy for the family and address the question of the foundations that support that edifice. But buildings are static. They have no life, they are entirely predictable, so the organizers of this congress have wisely suggested a different metaphor—that of the core of the family.

Golf balls, baseballs, soccer balls, and basketballs have cores. Golf balls and baseballs used professionally or collegiately must meet standards, or else someone will gain unfair advantage over another. A few years ago a well-known Major League Baseball player lost credibility when his bat broke in two revealing an illegal core. Imagine attempting a rousing game of soccer or hoops with a ball that had no air—the essential core ingredient for such round balls.

My purpose then is to suggest five essential ingredients that constitute the core of the family, which in turn serves as the core of every social order in the world. These five ingredients are to the home like hydrogen and oxygen to life on earth. They are not the whole story, earth’s substance consisting of multiplied other elements, but they do appear to be absolutely essential. So, I believe, are the five aspects of the family on which we focus now.
(1) The Home is the Plan of God

An atheist or an agnostic can have a family, even a happy family. However, there can never for them be a mandate, a heavenly mandate ordaining and ordering the family. For them the family is just “social convention” in the parlance of postmodern philosophy. If the family unit ceases to be perceived as beneficial, or some other connivance seems preferable, the family can be cast aside. As divorce rates escalate globally even among theists, one can observe this “practical atheism” at work. The covenant with the family is no longer a convenient commitment. Consequently, many simply jettison the family for some other “arrangement.”

But thoughtful theists comprehend that God is the Creator of all the natural order, having endowed human beings with his own image. Whatever else may be involved in this “image of God” in each of us, at the very least we are more than protoplasm. We are like God, spiritual beings also. If God is the creator of all that exists excepting himself, then surely he ought to be heard regarding his purpose in creation. Listen to God’s voice from the Hebrew Bible:

Then God said, “Let Us make man in Our image, according to Our likeness; let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.” So God created man in His own image; in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. Then God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the earth” (Gen 1:26–28).

And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being (Gen 2:7).

And the Lord God said, “It is not good that man should be alone. I will make him a helper comparable to him.” Out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them. And whatever Adam called each living creature, that was its name. So Adam gave names to all cattle, to the birds of the air, and to every beast of the field. But for Adam there was not found a helper comparable to him. And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall on Adam, and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh in its place. Then the rib which the Lord God had taken from man He made into a woman, and He brought her to the man. And Adam said: “This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because
she was taken out of Man.” Therefore a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and they shall become one flesh (Gen 2:18–24).

And Adam called his wife’s name Eve, because she was the mother of all living (Gen 3:20).

The concluding declaration has breath-taking ramifications. We are not in the eyes of God Latinos, Asians, Arabs, Bantus, Anglos, Jews, or Indians. We are all Eve’s offspring, all family members of the human tribe created by God in his image. Can you imagine what effect universal recognition of that fact would have on violence, war, abortion, and every other evil of our cosmos? And not only is Eve the mother of all living but also she is the female wife of Adam specially created by God and instructed, along with her male husband, to be fruitful, bear children and nurture those children so that human life might multiply on the earth through their own families.

The Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute released in 1999 the good news first mentioned in the Second World Congress of Families that “sixty-three percent of the world’s population believe that ‘the family’ is central to an ideal society and that eighty-one percent believe the definition of marriage is between ‘one man and one woman.’” Yet, the Heritage Foundation reports that in the United States only 12 out of every 100 children born entered a broken family in 1950. By 1992 that number had skyrocketed to 58 out of every 100.

The plan and purpose of God could not be more lucid: one man for one woman for life, birthing and nurturing children to become themselves responsible husbands and wives. Recognition of this plan and purpose of God is a core essential for global harmony, peace, and productivity. Today, I call again upon the United Nations and all sovereign states not only to recognize the divine origin of the family as the basic unit of all social order but also to lend every conceivable support through both education and legal expedients to maintain the family as the plan and purpose of God in all the earth.

(2) The Home is also the Essential School

As an educator, I believe in the importance of schools. My children are honors graduates from their respective universities, I hold a research doctorate, and I am embarrassed but proud to report that my wife has two such doctorates. I serve as president of one of the world’s largest post-graduate institutions for training ministers. But candor and integrity compel me to confess that nothing accomplished in any level of formal education holds a candle to the potential of the home for educational achievement.

In 1405 B.C. the children of Israel surveyed from the pinnacles of the eastern mountains of the great Middle Eastern Rift Valley the fertile plain of the Jordan River with the Judean hills rising to the west. To the south was the Arabah and the Sinai, which would be only a memory and the grist for the “milling” of many a story for future generations. Moses the Incomparable “cast a wishful eye to Canaan’s fair and happy land” from Nebo. However, he would not place a foot in the river, parade around Jericho, or sound a blast on his shophar. Here in some secluded crevice, one whose eye was yet undimmed, even at centenarian status plus twenty, would mysteriously
slip out into eternity unobserved; and his body be interred in an unmarked grave. But before his departure, he had a concluding postscript to his life, and that is found in part in Deut 6. With the people gathered in a natural amphitheater and with Joshua, the commander-designee, standing by in awe, the voice of one who had once complained that he could not speak now resonated with undiminished vigor. He left this admonition for parents of all generations.

Now this is the commandment, and these are the statutes and judgments which the Lord your God has commanded to teach you, that you may observe them in the land which you are crossing over to possess, that you may fear the Lord your God, to keep all His statutes and His commandments which I command you, you and your son and your grandson, all the days of your life, and that your days may be prolonged. Therefore hear, O Israel, and be careful to observe it, that it may be well with you, and that you may multiply greatly as the Lord God of your fathers has promised you—"a land flowing with milk and honey." Hear, O Israel; The Lord our God, the Lord is one! You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your strength. And these words which I command you today shall be in your heart. You shall teach them diligently to your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in your house, when you walk by the way, when you lie down, and when you rise up. You shall bind them as a sign on your hand, and they shall be as frontlets between your eyes. You shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates. So it shall be, when the Lord your God brings you into the land of which He swore to your fathers, to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give you large and beautiful cities, which you did not build, houses full of all good things, which you did not fill, hewn-out wells which you did not dig, vineyards and olive trees which you did not plant—when you have eaten and are full—then beware, lest you forget the Lord who brought you out of the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage. You shall fear the Lord your God and serve Him, and shall take oaths in His name. You shall not go after other gods, the gods of the people who are all around you (for the Lord your God is a jealous God among you), lest the anger of the Lord your God be aroused against you and destroy you from the face of the earth. You shall not tempt the Lord your God as you tempted Him in Massah. You shall diligently keep the commandments of the Lord your God, His testimonies, and His statutes which He has commanded you (Deut 6:1–17).

What captures my attention in this
passage begins with the simple observation that there is no mention of priest, prophet, temple, or synagogue in the teaching assignment. The primary task of spiritual guidance and instruction is assigned to fathers and grandfathers—to the home! Further, the statutes, commandments, and judgments are to be taught out of the natural circumstances of life, a more compelling theater than the traditional classroom. Consequently, methods vary according to circumstances, but one cannot teach what he does not know and embrace. So the commandments must first be in the heart of the parent. This metaphor implies knowledge, acquiescence, and devotion to the commandments of God. Promises of both joy and longevity are associated with the mastery of this curriculum.

My wife is named Dorothy—“gift of God” in Greek. And that she certainly is. She took Deut 6 seriously with our family. She stitched a beautiful wall-hanging for our son, Armour. As you might guess, it was Eph 6, “put on the whole armour of God.” For our daughter, Carmen, Prov 31, the woman whose price is greater than rubies adorned her bedroom wall. And for her husband? He was periodically under a bit of fire, so Matt 5:11–12, “Blessed are you when they revile and persecute you, and say all kinds of evil against you falsely for My sake. Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven, for so they persecuted the prophets who were before you,” was in a kairotic moment prepared. But how could she make her husband deal with the text. Well, she found a way. There in the smallest room of the house, positioned unavoidably, the text could not be evaded.

Seize the opportunity and the initiative not only to teach God’s ways in the home but also to apply them to life’s hills and valleys. The home remains forever the chief seat of instruction in a society of hope.

(3) The Home is the World’s Finest Court of Justice and Mercy

Endemic to any successful rule of law in any society is a system of justice which wisely adjudicates the disputes and criminal acts of its citizens. But no judge, no attorney, no jury can ever have adequate time to study and know the character of those whom it seeks to judge. Neither is there much room in law for mercy. Justice is thematic for law.

Here again, the family is unique and quite superior to any system of jurisprudence when the home is functioning as the admirable mix of mercy and justice. Let me see if I can illustrate that truth.

When I was an impish, curious, adventuresome lad of about six years, I will confess that I not infrequently ran afoul of the reigning system of jurisprudence in my world (which at age six was essentially my home). My dad took seriously the admonition of Prov 13:24, “He who spares his rod hates his son, but he who loves him disciplines him promptly,” and Prov 22:15, “Foolishness is bound up in the heart of a child, but the rod will drive it from him.”

My dad’s favorite application of these passages involved sending his miscreant son out to select the “switch” used to drive out foolishness. Only later did I realize that the effect of this policy was to make me live agonizingly aware of a period extending beyond the discipline itself that justice and judgment were inevitable realities of rebellion.

However, my dad also administered mercy. For example, once I discovered a whole colony of small frogs in the forest behind our house. I needed for my new “pets” a “home” from which they could
not escape. In Dad’s closet I struck pay dirt! My dad’s tall-sided cowboy boots were the perfect high rise for my amphibious friends. How could I have known that Dad intended to wear them that very night? I happened into his bedroom just in time to see the horror, which registered first in his face—then in mine, as he plunged his foot into the right boot. In terror I wailed knowing that my “switch” would certainly be a whole pine tree. Instead, and to my profound relief, Dad observed my repentance, hugged me close, and told me how much he loved me.

This mix of justice and mercy needs to characterize the whole human family. I contend that it can only be taught in a family. One of the most important monographs written on this subject is George Gilder’s classic study Men and Marriage. In this volume, which I believe to be essential reading for advocates of the family, Gilder argues that men need marriage and the family to tame them. Gilder is making no effort to feminize men, a course of action that he considers disastrous. But he does demonstrate that marriage is essential, along with family responsibility, for taming the barbarian who inhabits most men’s souls. Gilder is able to demonstrate that, when men lack a good father-model and/or a wife, there is a definite connection between the absence of such taming qualities and a life of crime.

The same is apparently true even among social animals. Many have read of the incident that took place in Pilanesberg National Park in South Africa. Somehow, strictly protected rhinos were dying at an alarming rate. The deaths occurred mostly at waterholes, but there were no signs of poachers and no evidence of disease. The mystery was resolved by the use of hidden cameras that revealed a group of adolescent elephants, relocated to the park without the discipline imposed by more mature bulls, had turned into a teenage gang of killers. When older bulls were reintroduced, the roguish behavior ceased at once. Hardwired to Connect, a crucial study introduced from The Commission on Children at Risk, provides indisputable evidence that much of the social disarray of contemporary society may be attributed to the absence of strong male models (fathers) in the lives of many teenage boys. If we desire a society of justice and mercy, then the family must be salvaged and honored.

(4) The Home is the Only Appropriate Venue for Sexual Intimacy

Surely God’s major purpose in creating humans with the desire for and physical capacity for sexual union is the procreation of the race. Indeed, how very special this is. For while we cannot create a tree, a flower, or a cosmos, we have been blessed by the Creator with the ability to take hold of God’s hand and create together with him another human life. But as important as procreation may be, there is more to be said for sexual intimacy than producing the next generation.

As God planned the whole program, one man and one woman would share in an intimacy unknown to any other human who ever lived. The Hebrew Bible achieves both candor and poetic beauty when it remarks that Adam “knew” his wife Eve. We know precisely what he meant because the next phrase reads, “and she conceived and bore a son.” Adam knew Eve in an intimacy that no other man or woman could ever experience with her. This unique union was God’s plan.

When that plan is not honored, the social order is corrupted; families
are fractured; and, as we have seen too often, even ecclesiastical societies are humiliated. From the virtual enslavement of young women in a worldwide sex trade, to the world’s most devastating addiction—pornography—to the misappropriation of nature in homosexuality, humans continue to demonstrate an innate selfishness and a diabolical disregard for divine purpose that threatens world civilization and peace more than all of the international conflicts, terrorism, and disease combined.

Sociologist Carle Zimmerman wrote as early as 1947, comparing the disintegration of various cultures with the parallel decline of the family in those cultures. Eight specific patterns of domestic behavior typified the downward spiral of these cultures:

(1) Marriage loses its sacredness . . . is frequently broken by divorce.
(2) Traditional meaning of the marriage ceremony is lost.
(3) Feminist movements abound.
(4) Increased public disrespect for parents and authority in general.
(5) Acceleration of juvenile delinquency, promiscuity, and rebellion.
(6) Refusal of people with traditional marriages to accept family responsibilities.
(7) Growing desire for and acceptance of adultery.
(8) Increasing interest in and spread of sexual perversions and sex-related crimes.

In Men and Marriage, George Gilder notes that, “Sexual liberals often declare that their true end is sexual freedom for both men and women. But nothing is finally free, least of all sex, which is bound to our deepest sources of energy, identity, emotion, and aesthetic sense. Sex can be cheapened, as we know, but then inevitably, it becomes extremely costly to the society as a whole.”

Ladies and gentlemen, let us proclaim the sanctuary of the family as the only appropriate venue for sexual intimacy and that with a man and his female wife.

(5) The Home is the Triumphal Arch of Love

Every nation has its monument celebrating past courageous leaders who liberated the people from oppression. Sometimes they were constructed by the leaders without the enthusiasm of their subjects, but the monuments remain. The Triumphal Arch in every family is love. But how savagely our world has cheapened that term, love. What is love anyway?

Listen to the sage conclusions of Paul the Apostle who wrote,

Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I have become sounding brass or a clanging cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, but have not love, it profits me nothing. Love suffers long and is kind; love does not envy; love
does not parade itself, is not puffed up; does not behave rudely, does not seek its own, is not provoked, thinks no evil; does not rejoice in iniquity, but rejoices in the truth; bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never fails. But whether there are prophecies, they will fall; whether there are tongues, they will cease; whether there is knowledge, it will vanish away. For we know in part and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect has come, then that which is in part will be done away. When I was a child, I spoke as a child. I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know just as I also am known. And now abide faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love (1 Cor 13:1–13).

Here the profound theologian portrays even noble acts as of limited value without love. Then he follows with a list of behavioral characteristics. If he cannot quite define love, he can at least describe how it acts. Love suffers almost anything for almost any duration. Love is innately kind, not proud, and never behaves rudely. Unselfish to the core, love thinks no evil toward the object of its affection. Love bears all things, believes the best about all things, and hopes always for the next sweet moment with those beloved. With the magnitude of faith and hope, it is love that surpasses all.

Solomon, the wise king of Israel, wrote nearly 3000 years ago of his affections for a country girl:

Set me as a seal upon your heart, as a seal upon your arm; for love is as strong as death, jealousy as cruel as the grave; its flames are flames of fire, a most vehement flame. Many waters cannot quench love, nor can the floods drown it. If a man would give for love all the wealth of his house, it would be utterly despised (Song 8:6–7).

Surely it is within the boundaries of the traditional family unit where love is most consistently practiced. In the matrix of the family, both immediate and extended, the opportunities present themselves to acquire responsibility for others regardless of circumstances. In the family, love not only accepts responsibility but also within the circumference of that tight-knit unit love extends itself most unselfishly in behalf of the objects of one’s affection. And from the family one senses the forgiving and affirming love, which most clearly imitates the love of God expressed in a Christian understanding and most poignantly in God’s gift of his Son Jesus to provide forgiveness to repentant sinners through his death on their behalf. And through this, the objects of that divine love are adopted into the family of God.

Conclusion
On February 8, 1989, an event occurred that affected the life of my family sufficiently so as to set it apart as a “holy place” in our lives. Until this day I have
spoken of it in public only once. That day we laid to rest the body of 19-year-old Luel Pantoja, son of Luis and Lee Pantoja—and the best friend of my son Armour. Every conceivable effort to treat the cancerous tumor that had wrapped itself like a strangling vine around the base of his brain had proved ineffective. Every fervent heartfelt cry to God had apparently been answered with a gentle “no.” Luel knew that he was dying and would probably never be able to fulfill God’s calling on his life to be a minister. He expressed the desire to see the Holy Land before he transferred his residence to heaven. Courageous parents agreed to try, and Luel got to see it, although desperately ill. Though by this time he was heavy with swelling, my 21-year-old son, Armour, often hoisted Luel on his back and carried him like a war-wounded brother over difficult terrain to be sure he missed nothing.

Now we stood at the graveside in Dallas. Luel’s father, Luis, had delivered an incredible eulogy in the service at First Baptist Church, Dallas, and I had attempted to preach a message of comfort. The last words had been offered at graveside, and people were shuffling slowly to their automobiles. My six foot, two inch son stood stoically, the lone remaining pallbearer beside the casket, restraining even the first tear in what he probably considered the “manly” thing to do. Suddenly all restraint vanished. Powerful legs buckled, and falling on his knees beside the casket of his best friend, his firmly muscled shoulders that had borne his friend shuddered and sagged and he wept—heart shattered and decimated with an overwhelming sense of loss and anger that he could not find a way to spare his noble friend. Kneeling beside him, I did all I could. I put my arm around him and wept with him. I knew well the war that was being waged that moment in his own soul. He was asking why, and I could not tell him. But, I knew this—if he lost that battle he would live a cynic. He would someday die bitter and out of fellowship with a God he had concluded he could not fully trust. If he won the battle, he would trust God and determine in his heart not to live for himself alone, but for Luel and for his Lord. And I knew that the experience would often call him back from the brink of a serious mistake.

How grateful I am for the assurance in that moment of grief and tragedy that Armour knew the experiences of a family where love and mercy ruled. When we as parents could say nothing, Armour won the victory that day in his own soul. He still does not understand. Neither do I. But, we do believe God and trust him in all things. Armour rose from his knees after about twelve minutes. Brushing tears from his face he cited King David, the monarch of Israel 3,000 years ago. Armour said, “Dad, let’s go home. Luel cannot come to us but we shall go to him.”

Ladies and gentlemen, let us this day commit ourselves anew to keep a home and a family to which we all can go in an hour of need. May we build our immediate and extended families, recognizing them to be God’s first and most basic institution. At the core of each family may we provide that essential character development and understanding that no other school can ever supply. May we labor to place at the core of each family the twin virtues of justice and mercy. God grant that at the core of our families there will be a sacred garden of sexual intimacy between wife and husband never violated by either partner or those from outside. And finally may these core ingredients be wrapped in the
mantle of genuine love as described by Paul. God grant that it may be so.

Today we have gathered in Mexico City to say to the United Nations and to the governments of our world: Maintain the sanctity of the home, a husband, a female wife, the children, grandchildren, aunts, uncles and cousins—the extended family. Recognize that this plan is no mere convention of society but rather a paradigm that is in fact the prescription of the Almighty God. Honor the home by recognizing the role it must play in primary instruction, as a court of justice and mercy, as the only acceptable and constructive venue for sexual intimacy, and as the exhibition center for the demonstration of genuine love. To all governments we say: protect the home as defined herein, value its crucial contribution to the social order, and acknowledge always that the handprint upon it is the hand of God.

1 This address was delivered to The Third World Congress of Families in Mexico City, Mexico, on March 29, 2004.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all Scripture quotations are taken from the New King James Version (NKJV).
5 George Gilder, Men and Marriage (Gretna: Pelican, 1987).
8 Reference is made here to the sorrows visited on the Catholic Church as a result of immoral priests in the North American Roman Catholic priesthood.

10 Gilder, Men and Marriage, x.
A SEMANTIC STUDY OF 
αὐθέντης AND ITS 
DERIVATIVES

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The word αὐθέντης and its derivatives have occasioned a great deal of scholarly discussion. An initial series of studies (1909–1962) focused especially on αὐθέντης itself, and was carried out by classical scholars, notably those by J. Psichari, L. Gernet, P. Kretschmer, W. Kamps, P. Chantraine, A. Dihle, and F. Zucker. More recently (1979–1995), New Testament scholars have begun to show an interest in this word and its derivatives, especially in connection with the verb αὐθέντεω, which occurs in the disputed verse 1 Tim. 2.12. Noteworthy contributions have been made by C. Kroeger, A.J. Panning, G.W. Knight III, L.E. Wilshire, A.C. Perriman, and H.S. Baldwin. The difficulty is that αὐθέντης appears to have three distinct senses in ancient Greek (‘murderer’, ‘master’, and ‘doer’), and it is a matter of dispute both how these senses are related among themselves, and how they influence the meaning of the derivatives of αὐθέντης. For New Testament scholars, the issue is whether αὐθέντεω in 1 Tim. 2.12 is based on the meaning ‘master’, thus yielding the traditional rendering ‘have authority over’ (possibly with the pejorative connotation of ‘domineering’), or whether it is semantically indebted to one or both of the other two senses of αὐθέντης.

In the present article, without focusing specifically on the one occurrence of αὐθέντεω in the New Testament, I propose to sketch the semantic contours of this word family from its earliest attestation in Attic drama to late antiquity. More specifically, I will survey most or all occurrences of both αὐθέντης and its cognates until the year AD 312 (the year of Constantine’s conversion), and make incidental observations about their use from 312 onward. It is possible to do a near-exhaustive survey of this time period with the help of the Thesaurus Lin-
The Noun αὐθέντης

I begin with the noun αὐθέντης (also occasionally written αὐτόεντης). As already noted, this word appears to have the three basic senses, ‘murderer’, ‘master’, and ‘doer’.16

The meaning ‘murderer’ is attested 24 times in the classical literature of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, almost all of them in Attic writers.17 As Gernet and others have pointed out, αὐθέντης in this literature has the specific meaning of ‘kin-murderer’, one who is guilty of the particularly heinous crime of slaying his or her own flesh and blood (comparable to the Latin parricida and the Irish fingal).18 After the Golden Age of ancient Greek literature, this meaning becomes relatively rare, occurring mainly in Atticistic writers.19 In fact, as Appendix A1 shows, in the seven centuries which separate its last occurrence in the early fourth century BC from AD 312, αὐθέντης ‘murderer’ is attested only 16 times. After this date it becomes even more sporadic.

αὐθέντης in the meaning ‘master’ has a very different history. It occurs once in a disputed passage of the Suppliants of Euripides (Suppl. 442),20 but does not surface again before the turn of the era, after which ‘master’ gradually becomes the dominant sense of the word, ultimately leading via the Modern Greek ἀφέντης to the Turkish word effendi, still meaning ‘master’.21 Its earliest attestations after Euripides are in two recently discovered inscriptions from Asia Minor dated to the first century AD,22 and in the Shepherd of Hermas (first or second century).23

I have identified some 30 examples of this meaning in the extant Greek literature which predate AD 312.24 It should be pointed out that in none of these cases is ‘master’ used in the pejorative sense of ‘autocrat’ or ‘despot’. In fact, it is used twice in Christian contexts to refer to the lordship of Jesus Christ.25 Furthermore, I have found no evidence to support Dihle’s contention that αὐθέντης in this sense refers primarily to a ‘boss’ in the workplace.26

The third sense of αὐθέντης is very rare. In fact, the meaning ‘doer’ is attested only three times (some would say four) before AD 312, and occurs only in conjunction with the genitive of a noun designating an activity. One example is found in Polybius (first century BC), and the other two in Diodorus Siculus (first century BC), all three designating the doer or perpetrator of an action.27 The meaning ‘doer’ is unattested in the first three centuries after Christ, and continues to be rare thereafter.28 It should be noted, however, that αὐθέντης in this sense regularly means ‘author’ or ‘initiator’ of an action, not of a person or object. Consequently, the translation ‘creator’, which is occasionally found, must be rejected.29

The rarity and lateness of αὐθέντης ‘doer’, as well as its exclusive association with the genitive of words denoting action, give reason to believe that this usage of the word is only seemingly distinct from that of αὐθέντης ‘master’. The doer or initiator of an action is conceived of as the master of that action, the one who is in charge of the action. There is a similar use of other Greek words meaning ‘master’ or ‘chief’, for examples, αἰνασσα and ἀρχηγός.30 There are also parallels in other languages, as in Latin auctor and princeps.31 In other words, as the lexicon of Liddell-Scott-Jones recognizes, the meanings ‘doer’ and ‘master’ for αὐθέντης belong under the same semantic head-
It is clear from the above that in reality the two basic senses of \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in ancient Greek were ‘murderer’ and ‘master’, and that the latter gradually eclipsed the former. In fact, there are many indications, beginning in the second century AD, that the ordinary meaning of \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in Hellenistic Greek was ‘master’, and that ‘murderer’ had become a poorly understood literary sense.

This point emerges clearly from a number of Atticistic lexical works, which warn their readers against using \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in the current sense ‘master’, but are unclear on the proper Attic meaning of the word. One of the earliest of these is the lexicon of Aelius Dionysius (early second century AD), which explains \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) as meaning ‘not the master, but the murderer by \( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \sigma \chi \epsilon \iota \alpha \)’.33 This is a correct definition of Attic usage if \( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \sigma \chi \epsilon \iota \alpha \) is understood to mean parricide or kin-murder, but subsequent Atticistic lexicographers appear to have misunderstood this term, so that they began to define classical \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) as properly meaning \( \alpha \upsilon \tau \omicron \chi \epsilon \iota \rho \), either as someone who murders with his own hands, or as someone who murders himself (that is, a suicide).34 The same confusion is found in a number of ancient scholia on \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in classical authors, which all agree that the current meaning ‘master’ does not apply, but disagree on the proper Attic meaning that does.35 As Gernet, Chantraine, and Zucker have pointed out, the definitions given in these lexica and scholia (which have continued to exercise their influence in modern lexicography) do not correspond to actual Greek usage.36 (The single exception to this rule in Dio Cassius will be dealt with separately below.) The lexica and scholia simply illustrate the fact that \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in the meaning ‘kin-murderer’ was no longer a living part of the language after the turn of the era.

The fact that \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) ‘murderer’ was no longer understood is clearly demonstrated by the ancient versions of Wis. 12.6. The author of this work (to be dated around the turn of the era)37 was sufficiently literate to be able to use \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in its correct Attic sense of ‘kin-murderer’—in this case referring specifically to Canaanite parents who killed their own offspring in child sacrifice. Although the context (which has been shown to draw heavily on the language of the Attic tragedians)38 makes it very clear that this is the meaning intended, none of the ancient versions understood it correctly. The Old Latin (originally done in the second century AD, and later incorporated into the Vulgate)39 has \( \alpha u t o r e r s \), probably meaning ‘progenitors’.40 The Peshitta fails to render the word altogether.41 The Armenian has ‘masters’,42 as does the Syro-Hexapla,43 while the Arabic has ‘suicides’.44 The last two renderings are clear examples of the influence, respectively, of current Hellenistic usage and the Atticistic lexica. It would be a great mistake to take any of these renderings as an indication of the true meaning of \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in this passage.45

The conclusion which can be drawn from the foregoing discussions is that the two main senses of \( \alpha \upsilon \theta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta \varsigma \) in post-classical Greek, namely ‘murderer’ and ‘master’, belong to two quite different registers of the language.46 The former is an Attic usage which was artificially kept alive by a few authors with literary pretensions, but which was no longer understood by the great majority of Greek-speakers. The latter is the meaning of common usage, which is first attested (after its isolated occurrence in Eurip-
ides) in non-literary sources. It is telling that the first occurrence of αὐθέντης ‘master’ in a Hellenistic literary work is found in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, a work whose language belongs to the lower Koine.\(^{47}\)

There thus seems to be ample confirmation of the view (first proposed by Thumb in 1901, and often repeated thereafter)\(^{48}\) that αὐθέντης with the meaning ‘master’ belonged to colloquial Greek (attested once in Euripides, but otherwise absent from literary sources until the *Shepherd of Hermas*), while αὐθέντης ‘murderer’ was at home only in the literary language of the classical period. By the first century AD, αὐθέντης in the living language meant ‘master’, and the meaning ‘murderer’ was largely forgotten.

**The Derivatives of αὐθέντης**

I turn now to the cognates of αὐθέντης, which are all chronologically later than αὐθέντης itself, and derived from it. The semantic picture here is much less complicated, since the senses of the derivatives, as Chantraine has pointed out, are all based on αὐθέντης in the meaning ‘master’.\(^{49}\) This is not surprising, because the derivatives do not begin to appear until well after the time that αὐθέντης ‘murderer’ was in common use, and because αὐθέντης ‘doer’, as we have seen, was itself dependent on the meaning ‘master’. It seems that αὐθέντης ‘master’, although it only appears once in extant literary texts before the first century AD, began to be productive in the formation of other words of similar meaning a century or two earlier.

We shall deal with the derivatives in the order of their first attestation.

1. **αὐθεντικός (Including the Adverbial Form αὐθεντικῶς)**

   The meaning of this adjective is basically ‘authoritative’, and in a secondary sense ‘original’. The meaning ‘authoritative’ (that is, ‘masterful’) is well-attested; it is found in the letters of Cicero (first century BC) and in the *Tetrabiblos* of Ptolemy (second century AD), as well as later patristic and astrological literature.\(^{50}\) We find a striking example of this sense in Origen (third century), where the adverb αὐθεντικῶς is contrasted with δουλικῶς to describe the sovereign operation of the Holy Spirit.\(^{51}\) Altogether, I have identified ten examples of this usage before AD 312.\(^{52}\)

   However, since the papyrological discoveries of the nineteenth century, the more commonly attested meaning of αὐθεντικός is the secondary sense ‘original’, especially as applied to legal documents. I have collected some 42 examples of this meaning in extant Greek writings dated before AD 312.\(^{53}\) Although this sense has often been related to the word αὐτόχειρ, which occurs in the Atticistic definitions of αὐθέντης ‘murderer’, so that αὐθεντικός applied to documents is said to mean ‘written in the author’s own hand’, and thus ‘original’,\(^{54}\) this semantic derivation is clearly mistaken. As a number of scholars have pointed out, αὐθεντικός meaning ‘original’ is based on the meaning ‘authoritative’.\(^{55}\) The original copy of a legal document is the only one that is legally binding, and is thus the only one properly called ‘authoritative’. Just as we speak in English of a ‘master copy’ to refer to an original from which copies are made, so the Greeks gave the name ‘masterful’ or ‘authoritative’ to the original of a contract or will. It is telling that the modern derivatives of αὐθεντικός, like English ‘authentic’, also
have this as their first meaning.

There are also two examples in our time period where the adverb αὐθεντικῶς is used as a synonym of κυρίως, meaning ‘in the proper sense of the word’, or ‘non-metaphorically’. The parallel with κυρίως makes it clear that here too the meaning is derived from αὐθέντης ‘master’.

The very earliest attestation of the adjective αὐθεντικός occurs in an inscription from Mylasa in Asia Minor, which is probably to be dated to the second (possibly the first) century BC. The word occurs twice in the combination εἰσφέρεσθαι αὐθεντικήν σπουδήν, ‘to demonstrate an αὐθεντικήν zeal’, but it is not clear from the partially broken context what the precise force of the adjective is. The most recent editor of the inscription, Dr. Wolfgang Blümel, has suggested to me in personal correspondence that one possibility (among others) is that it means herrscherlich, that is, ‘masterful’. Another possibility might be ‘princely’ or ‘aristocratic’. Standard lexica agree that its meaning here is likely to be related to αὐθέντης ‘master’.

2. αὐθεντέω

αὐθεντέω is clearly a denominative verb, related to αὐθέντης as ἐπιστατέω is related to ἐπιστάτης, or δεσπότεω to δεσπότης. It thus originally means ‘to be an αὐθέντης’. Like the other derivatives of this noun, the denominative verb is dependent for its meaning on αὐθέντης ‘master’. αὐθεντέω occurs at most only eight times before AD 312, although it becomes quite common thereafter. Since a number of these have been overlooked in previous discussions, I shall briefly review them in chronological order.

(1) Philodemus, Rhet. 2.133 Sudhaus (= P.Herc. 220), dated to the mid-first century BC. If Sudhaus’s restoration of the fragmentary text is correct, then the verb αὐθεντέω occurs here for the first time. He restores the text as follows:

...πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιφαν[εστάτους] ἐκάστοτε διαμάχονται καὶ “σὺν αὐθεντ[οῦσιν] ἀν[αξίων]”...

It is possible, however, that the text should read αὐθεντ[αῖσιν] instead of αὐθεντ[οῦσιν], in which case we have a form not of the verb αὐθεντέω, but of the noun αὐθέντης. If we do read the verb, then its meaning here, according to standard lexicographical reference works, is ‘rule’ or ‘have authority over’.

(2) The papyrus BGU 1208.38, dated to 27 BC, where we read the following: κάμιοι αὐθεντηκότος πρὸς αὐτὸν περιμόναι Καλαττύει τοῖς ναυτικῶι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῶι φόρω ἐν τῇ ὀραὶ ἐπεχώροσθεν. The verb occurs here with the preposition πρὸς, and is taken to mean ‘to have full power or authority over’ by Liddell–Scott–Jones. Other standard lexica agree.

(3) Aristonicus Alexandrinus, On the Signs of the Iliad, dated to the late first century BC. The comment on Il. 9.694 contains the sentence: τότε γὰρ εἶδον ἐπιφονεῖσθαι [scil. the Homeric phrase μὴθον ἀγασσάμενον], ὅταν ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου κατὰ πληκτικά τοια προενέγκηται. This passage, which has been overlooked in most previous discussions of αὐθεντέω, used the expression ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου in the sense of ‘speaker’, like the German Wortführer (cf. ὁ ἤγομενος τοῦ λόγου in Acts 14.12). What is interesting about this use of αὐθεντέω is that it corresponds semantically to αὐθέντης ‘doer’, with λόγος describing...
the action initiated by the doer.

(4) 1 Tim 2.12, dated to the first or second century AD: διδάσκειν δὲ γυναικὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω σοῦτες αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός, ἀλλὰ εἶναι ἐν ἃσχείᾳ. There is a widespread lexico-graphical consensus that αὐθεντεῖν here means ‘have authority over’ and/or ‘domineer’. 

(5) Ptolemy, Tetr. 3.13.10, dated to the second century AD: ὁ μὲν οὖν τοῦ Κρόνου ἀστήρ μόνος τὴν οἰκοδομεῖσαν τῆς ἐπικράτειας λαβὼν καὶ αὐθεστήσας τοῦ τε Ἑρμοῦ καὶ τοῦ τῆς Σελήνης...ποιεῖ φιλοσοφοῦσας. The verb αὐθεντεῖν here occurs in an astrological context as a synonym for οἰκοδομεῖσαν. Existing translations render it as ‘dominate’ or ‘control’. The precise technical meaning is given in the paraphrase of Tetrabiblos by Proclus (fifth century), which here substitutes the verb κατακρατεῖν ‘predominate’.

(6) Moeris Atticista, Lexicon Atticum, dated to the second century AD. The entry on αὐτοδίκη, according to the manuscript tradition, identifies this noun as the proper Attic equivalent of Hellenistic αὐθεντησια. However, it is agreed by most scholars that these two nouns are in fact a corruption (no doubt due to an itacistic pronunciation) of an original text which had the infinitives αὐτῶν δικεῖν and αὐθεντεῖν—a reading which is confirmed by later versions of the entry in Hesychius and Thomas Magister. Consequently, this passage (which is sometimes neglected in discussions of αὐθεντεῖν) tells us that αὐθεντεῖν was frowned upon by the Atticists (no doubt because it was a recent word based on colloquial usage), and was a synonym of αὐτοδίκη ‘to have independent jurisdiction’, that is, to be master in one’s own sphere.

(7) The papyrus, P.Tebt. 276.28, an astrological fragment dated to the late second or third century. In the restoration proposed by Grenfell and Hunt, the verb occurs in a fragmentary sentence containing the words περὶ[...]την ἐξελικτήριον καὶ [...]. The restored reading [αὐθεντήτη]σει] is uncertain, but seems probable in the light of the context (‘he will make acquisitions and rule’) and the parallel with other astrological texts, notably Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos. Previous discussions of the verb have missed this occurrence, since it is listed in neither the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae nor the Duke Data Bank of Documentary Papyri.

(8) Origen, Commentary on 1 Corinthians, dated to the third century. This is another passage which has often been overlooked, although it casts an instructive light on the interpretation of 1 Tim. 2.12. Origen here cites the words αὐθεντὴν ἀνδρός from that text, and goes on to paraphrase the apostolic prohibition as μὴ τὴν γυναῖκα ἡγεμόνα γίνεσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ‘that the woman is not to become leader of the man in [the ministry of] the word’. It is clear that all these examples illustrate the verb αὐθεντεῖν in the sense ‘to be an αὐθεντησια’, and are semantically dependent on the meaning ‘master’ (or its variant ‘doer’). However, there is no evidence in any of these cases (with the possible exception of the disputed verse 1 Tim. 2.12) that the verb is to be understood in a negative sense.

A search of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae turns up about a hundred further occurrences of αὐθεντεῖν in Greek literature after AD 312. With the single exception of a medieval scholion which I will discuss below, all of them derive their meaning from αὐθεντησια ‘master’, and have to do with the exercise of authority or sovereignty, almost always in
a non-pejorative sense. In seven cases the meaning corresponds to αὐθεντικός ‘doer’, and refers to the initiation of an action.

3. αὐθεντικός

The abstract noun αὐθεντικός (also spelled αὐθεντητικός) almost always refers to authority or sovereignty, and is thus also clearly based on αὐθεντής ‘master’.

3.1 αὐθεντητικός

The abstract noun αὐθεντητικός, almost always refers to authority or sovereignty, and is thus clearly based on αὐθεντής ‘master’. (The peculiar usage in Dio Cassius will be dealt with separately below.) It is first attested in 3 Macc. 2.29 (probably first century BC), where it refers to the (limited) legal autonomy of the Jews in Egypt, and it occurs frequently thereafter. I have collected 29 examples before AD 312, and many others can be found after that date. It is noteworthy that the word αὐθεντητικός played a prominent role in Gnosticism; for example it was the name of the supreme deity in the systems of the early Gnostics Cerinthus and Saturninus, and in the gnostic writing Poimandres (first and second centuries AD). As early as the mid-second century αὐθεντητικός was also used in a bilingual Roman inscription as the Greek equivalent of Latin auctoritas. It is used in patristic literature to describe the sovereignty of God or Christ, and in papyri and inscriptions to refer to the authority of Roman officials. To the best of my knowledge it is never used in a pejorative sense before AD 312, and very rarely thereafter.

4. Other Derivatives

There are a few other derivatives of αὐθεντής, but they are all either late, rare, or dubious. In the period before AD 312, we find only the two nouns αὐθεντητικός and αὐθεντηρια. The first is a hapax legomenon meaning ‘exercise of authority’, and the latter is the feminine equivalent of αὐθεντής ‘master’, and thus means ‘mistress’. The lexica also list an adverb αὑτοεντεί and a verb αὑτοεντέω, but both of these are probably ghost-words, arising in the one case from a scribal corruption of αὐτοεντής (a variant of αὐθεντής), and in the other from the occasional itacistic spelling of aorist or future forms of αὐθεντέω. In the Greek of late antiquity we also find αὐθεντητημα, listed in a glossary as meaning auctoramentum; αὐθεντεύω, a later synonym of αὐθεντέω; and the compound noun αὐθεντόπωλος, meaning ‘son (slave) of the master’. Clearly, all of these minor derivatives are also semantically based on αὐθεντής ‘master’. The same pattern persists in medieval Greek.

The result of our survey of the derivatives of αὐθεντής is that they are indeed all dependent for their meaning of αὐθεντής ‘master’. We thus find further confirmation of the earlier conclusion that it was only in the meaning ‘master’ that αὐθεντής was part of the living language after the classical period.

Ancient Translations and Loanwords

This conclusion finds further support in the evidence of ancient translations and loanwords based on the αὐθεντής family. Wherever ancient translations are available, they indicate that αὐθεντής and its derivatives were overwhelmingly understood to refer to mastery or authority, and wherever a member of this word-family was taken over as a loanword into another language, it carried with it a meaning related to αὐθεντής ‘master’.

Needless to say, the evidence of ancient translations needs to be handled with discretion. On the one hand, the translators’ grasp of the Greek they were translating was not infrequently inadequate, and they made mistakes. On the other hand, in some cases their command
of Greek was at least as good as that of the authors they were translating, and they had the advantage of being in touch with the living Greek of their own day. More often than not, where the original Greek is obscure to the modern reader, an ancient translation can help to clarify its meaning.

We have already seen how the ancient versions of Wis. 12.6 illustrate the confusion of translators when faced with auvqe,nthj in the unusual Attic sense of ‘kin-murderer’. But there is no such confusion when words of the auvqe,nthj group are used to convey the current meaning of mastery or authority. For example, the occurrence of auvqe,nthj ‘master’ in the Shepherd of Hermas is correctly translated dominus in both of the surviving ancient Latin translations of this work.

The derivatives of auvqe,nthj were rendered by ancient translators in similar ways. The Syriac version of 3 Macc. 2.29 renders auvqe,nthj as šûltān ‘power, authority, right’. An early Latin version of Irenaeus, who reports the use of auvqe,nthj as a gnostic divine name, regularly translates this term as principalitas, a word derived via principalis from the Latin princeps. This is a happy choice, because Latin principalitas, like Greek auvqe,nthj, is thus an abstract noun formed on the basis of a common noun designating someone in authority.

The same pattern is followed in ancient versions of auvqe,nthj in 1 Tim. 2.12. The Old Latin of this verse has a variety of renderings (dated to the third century and later), all of which are related to a Latin word designating someone in authority. The renderings in question are praepositam esse (related to praepositus), dominari and dominare (related to dominus), and principari (related to princeps). Of these, the Vulgate retains the rendering dominari. The Sahidic Coptic version uses a verb meaning ‘to be lord’, and the Bohairic another Coptic verb meaning ‘to be head’. The Gothic version of Ulfilas has a verb derived from the regular Gothic word for ‘lord’. Only the Peshitta seems to break this pattern, since the printed editions of 1 Tim. 2.12 all have the Aphel of the verb mraḥ, meaning ‘to venture’ or ‘be rash’, which does not seem to fit the Greek very well. However, if we read the third radical of the printed verbal form (lmamrāḥu) not as a ḫeth, but as medial nun (with which ḫeth is easily confused), then the form in question (lmamrānu) becomes a denominative verb based on màrā’, the standard Syriac word for ‘lord’ or ‘master’. Consequently, a good case can be made for the thesis that all these ancient versions (with the possible exception of the Peshitta) reflect an accurate understanding of auvqe,nthj in 1 Tim. 2.12 as a denominative verb based on auvqe,nthj ‘master’. Furthermore, it is to be noted that all these versions (with the same possible exception) understand the verb in a non-pejorative sense.

The virtually exclusive association of auvqe,nthj and its cognates with the notion of authority in ordinary post-Classical Greek is further confirmed by the evidence of loanwords drawn from this word-group. auvqe,nthj ‘master’ was the source of loanwords in Hebrew, Coptic, Syriac, Latin, and Turkish, and from Turkish spread to many other languages. The derivative auvqe,nthj, in the meaning ‘authoritative’ or ‘original’, was taken over into Syriac and Latin, and from Latin found its way into many other languages, including English. Likewise, auvqe,nthj meaning ‘authority’ was the source of loanwords in Hebrew, Coptic and Syriac. No doubt there are other derivatives and other languages which I have overlooked. To the best of
my knowledge all examples of loanwords drawn from the αὐθέντης family depend for their meaning on αὐθέντης ‘master’, and none has a pejorative sense. This is further evidence that, after the classical period, αὐθέντης ‘murderer’ had become archaic or obsolete, while αὐθέντης ‘master’ had become a productive part of the living language, giving rise not only to several new word- formations within Greek itself, but also to many loanwords outside of Greek.

The Evidence of the Paraphrasis of Proclus

For additional evidence of the overall pattern which we have discerned, I turn finally to Proclus’s Paraphrasis of Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos.

As we have seen, the gradual emergence of the semantic derivatives of αὐθέντης ‘master’ in literary (that is, non-documentary) contexts is especially clearly attested in the Tetrabiblos of Ptolemy. In this famous astrological handbook, written in the second half of the second century AD, we find one of the earliest and clearest examples of the verb αὐθεντέω, as well as five instances of the adjective αὐθεντικός meaning ‘authoritative’. In each case, the meaning is securely established by the context. Apparently Ptolemy had no qualms about using these colloquial words in a serious scholarly treatise.

Further light on both the meaning and the non-literary status of these two words in Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos is shed by the paraphrase of this work attributed to the fifth-century philosopher Proclus. His Paraphrasis, though often using a different Greek phraseology, follows the Tetrabiblos very closely, and is acknowledged by students of the latter to be quite accurate. It is therefore significant that the paraphrase, when it recasts the six passages in the Tetrabiblos which contain members of the αὐθέντης family, with one exception substitutes a more literary synonym. This is evident from the two columns in Table 1 (facing page), the first representing the wording of the Tetrabiblos, and the second that of the Paraphrasis.

In all cases but the last, Proclus replaces words derived from αὐθέντης ‘master’ with a synonym. Since the former were not any less clear than their substitutes, it is probable that Proclus wished to avoid them (as he does in his other writings) simply because they were considered to belong to a sub-literary register of the language. Furthermore, the synonyms which he chooses make unmistakably clear that he understood that the words which they replaced had to do with mastery and authority.

Exceptions to the Pattern

The broad picture which we have sketched of the semantic development of αὐθέντης and its derivatives in ancient Greek accounts for almost all the available linguistic data. However, there are two clearly defined phenomena which do not fit this picture, and need to be explained separately. These are the distinctive usage of Dio Cassius, and the single example of αὐθεντέω meaning ‘murder’ in a medieval scholion on Aeschylus. Unfortunately, these two exceptions have sometimes been given disproportionate weight in recent discussions of the semantics of αὐθέντης and its cognates.

Dio Cassius, the Roman historian of the third century AD, has his own way of using words from the αὐθέντης family. Not only does he prefer the unelided forms (αὐτοεντής and αὐτοεντία instead of αὐθέντης and αὐθεντία—a usage found elsewhere only in Sophocles),
but he uses them in senses which are found elsewhere only in the Atticistic lexica. Thus he twice uses αὐθέντης (αὔθέντης) to mean 'suicide', and three times uses αὐθεντικῶς to mean 'by one’s own hand'. (The ghost-word αὐτοκεντής is probably a corruption of one of these.) Since Dio was an Atticistic writer, we can safely conclude that he was influenced by the Atticistic handbooks to use αὐθέντης and αὐθεντικῶς in this unusual way. As we saw above, these handbooks themselves were influenced by the ambiguity of the Greek word αὐθεντήσια and its cognates, which could refer, not only to kin-murder, but also to suicide, as well as other actions ‘by one’s own hand’. The peculiar usage of Dio Cassius is thus based on an apparent misunderstanding of αὐθέντης ‘murderer’, and once more illustrates the fact that the classical meaning of this word was no longer understood in Hellenistic times.

The second exception is found in a scholion on the word στάζοντα, ‘dripping [with blood]’, in Aeschylus, Eum. 42. The scholion reads as follows: ‘by this [the author] vividly portrays the one who has just committed a murder (τὸν νεωστὶ ηὐθεντηκότα). The verb αὐθεντέω is here unmistakably used in the sense ‘to murder’, and clearly depends for its meaning on αὐθέντης ‘murderer’. How are we to account for this unprecedented meaning of the verb?

Since the scholion is found in a tenth-century scholarly manuscript, and there is no other example of this meaning of αὐθεντέω, it is best to take this unusual usage to be an Atticistic hypercorrection on the part of a Byzantine scholar. Seeking to write his scholia on Aeschylus in pure Attic Greek, and having learned that αὐθέντης in Attic meant ‘murderer’, he assumed that the corresponding verb in Attic must have meant ‘murder’, unaware that the verb is in fact not attested in Attic, and appears never to have carried this meaning in all of extant Greek literature. As a result, he used αὐθεντέω in an otherwise unattested sense.

This hypothesis of an Atticistic hypercorrection is confirmed by a
later version of the Aeschylus scholion, which adds the following explanation to the unusual ἡμίεντηκότα: ‘as it were the one who committed a homicide (τὸν φονεύσαντα). For the murderer is called an αὐθέντης.’ Apparent-ly this explanatory note was necessary to clarify the unusual use of αὐθεντέω in the original scholion. Even Byzantine scholars who read Aeschylus might have been puzzled by the use of αὐθεντέω to mean ‘murder’.

The exceptions which we have noted can thus all be explained as the result of Atticism, the artificial and often unsuccessful attempt on the part of many Hellenistic and Byzantine authors to write in a classical Attic Greek which was far removed from the current speech of their own day. Needless to say, it is a great mistake to take the definitions and usages of the Atticists as a reliable guide to the meaning of αὐθέντης and its derivatives in Hellenistic Greek.

Conclusions

The overall conclusion must be that there was a great semantic divide in ancient Greek between αὐθέντης ‘murderer’ and all other members of the αὐθέντης family (see Figure 1). On the one side of the divide is an Attic usage which was no longer alive in Hellenistic Greek, and which even the Atticists had largely ceased to understand. On the other hand we have αὐθέντης ‘master’ and its derivatives, which all convey the basic notion of mastery or authority. Whether or not this semantic divide is the result of separate etymological roots (a view that has often been proposed), there can be no doubt that the semantic domains of murder and authority were not only kept separate, but also belonged to different registers of the language.

With respect to the meaning of αὐθεντέω in 1 Tim. 2.12, my investigation leads to two further conclusions. First, the verb αὐθεντέω should not be interpreted in the light of αὐθέντης ‘murderer’, or the muddled definitions of it given in the Atticistic lexica. Instead, it should be understood, like all the other Hellenistic derivatives of αὐθέντης, in the light of the meaning which that word had in the living Greek of the day, namely ‘master’.

Secondly, there seems to be no basis for the claim that αὐθεντέω in 1 Tim. 2.12 has a pejorative connotation, as in ‘usurp authority’ or ‘domineer’. Although it is possible to identify isolated cases of a pejorative use for both αὐθεντέω and αὐθέντις, these are not found before the fourth century AD. Overwhelmingly, the authority to which αὐθέντης ‘master’ and all its derivatives refer is a positive or neutral concept.
Figure 1: Chronological Chart (500 BC–AD 312)

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* Conjectural emendation or restoration.
Appendix A1: Occurrences of 'murderer'

1. Aeschylus, Ag. 1573 (458 BC)
2. Aeschylus, Eum. 212 (458 BC)
3. Sophocles, El. 272. NB: αὐτοφόρνην is a widely accepted emendation of αὐτοφόρνην
4. Sophocles, Oed. tyr. 107 (ca. 430 BC)
5. Euripides, Andr. 172 (ca. 431 BC)
6. Euripides, Andr. 614
7. Euripides, Heracl. 839
8. Euripides, Heracl. 1359
9. Euripides, Tro. 660
10. Euripides, Phoen. 873 (ca. 410 BC)
11. Euripides, Iph. aul. 1190 (405 BC)
12. Euripides, Rhes. 873
13. Euripides, Frag. 1030 (Nauck)
14. Herodotus, Hist. 1.117.12
15. Antiphon, Caedes Her. 11.6
16. Ps.-Antiphon, II Tetr. 3.4
17. Ps.-Antiphon, II Tetr. 3.11.4
18. Ps.-Antiphon, II Tetr. 4.4.3
19. Ps.-Antiphon, II Tetr. 4.9.6
20. Ps.-Antiphon, II Tetr. 4.10.1
21. Thucydides, Hist. 3.58.5.4
22. Lysias, Isodemus, teste Harpocratian, Lexicon in decem Oratores Atticos 66.7 (= Frag. 63, Th.)
23. Lysias, Eratosthenes, teste Harpocratian, Lexicon in decem Oratores Atticos 66.7
24. Isocrates, teste Suidae Lexicon s.v. αὐθέντης
25. P. Cairo Zen. 4.59.532 (mid-3rd century BC)
26. Apollonius Rhodius, Argon. 2.754 (mid-3rd century BC)
27. Apollonius Rhodius, Argon. 4.479
28. Wisdom 12.6 (late 1st century BC/early 1st century AD)
29. Philo, Det., 78 (1st century AD)
30. Josephus, War 1.582 (AD 70s)
31. Josephus, War 2.240
32. Appian, Bell. Civ. 1.7§61.4 (mid-2nd century AD)
33. Appian, Bell. Civ. 1.13§115.17
34. Appian, Bell. Civ. 3.2§16.13
35. Appian, Bell. Civ. 4.17§134.40
36. Appian, Hist. Rom. 12.4 (§23)
37. Phrynichus, Eclogae Nominum et Verborum Atticorum, s.v. αὐθέντης (2nd century AD)
38. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 3.18.106 (ca. AD 200)
39. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.4.16.3
40. Dio Cassius, Roman History, Frag. 9.38 (early 3rd century AD). Spelt αὐτοφόρνης

Appendix A2: Occurrences of 'master'

1. Euripides, Suppl. 442 (mid-420s BC)
2. SEG 34.1260.25 (= I. Klaudiu polis 70.II.25) (1st century AD)
3. SEG 39.1180.109 (AD 62)
4. SEG 39.1180.123  
5. Hermas, Sim. 9.5.6 (1st/2nd century AD)  
6. P. Fam. Tebt. 15.1.15 (AD 114/15)  
7. P. Fam. Tebt. 15.1.31 (AD 114/15)  
8. P. Fam. Tebt. 15.2.33 (AD 114/15)  
9. P. Fam. Tebt. 15.2.48 (AD 114/15)  
10. P. Fam. Tebt. 15.6.141 (AD 114/15)  
11. P. Fam. Tebt. 15.6.142 (AD 114/15)  
12. P. Fam. Tebt. 24.1.21 (AD 124)  
13. P. Fam. Tebt. 24.3.69 (AD 124)  
14. P. Fam. Tebt. 24.3.78 (AD 124)  
15. P. Fam. Tebt. 24.4.87 (AD 124)  
16. P. Fam. Tebt. 24.4.102 (AD 124)  
17. SB 7404.2.31 (AD 117/38)  
18. SB 7404.2.37 (AD 117/38)  
19. SB 7404.2.45 (AD 117/38)  
20. SB 7404.3.64 (AD 117/38)  
21. P. Aberd. 20.11 (2nd century AD?)  
22. Alexander Rhetor 2.1.6 in Rhetores Graeci  
23. Alexander Rhetor 2.1.6  
24. Phrynichus, Ecolgae Nominum et Verborum  
   Atticorum s.v. αὐθέντης (2nd century AD)  
25. Ps.-Clement of Rome, Hom. 18.12.1.4 (2nd  
   century AD)  
26. Sib. Or. 7.69 (2nd century AD)  
27. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.8.38.3 (ca.  
   AD 200)  
28. Sib. Or. 8.309 (2nd/3rd century AD)  
29. SB 10205.21 (= P.Leit. 13.21) (mid-3rd  
   century AD)  
30. P. Oxy. 3813.60 (3rd/4th century AD)  

Appendix A3: Occurrences of  
αὐθέντης ‘doer’  
1. Polybius, Hist. 22.14.2.3 (140/120 BC)  
2. Diodorus Siculus, Bib. Hist. 16.61.1.3 (ca.  
   40 BC)  
3. Diodorus Siculus, Bib. Hist. 17.5.4.6  

Appendix B: Occurrences of  
αὐθεντικός  
and αὐθεντικός  
(an asterisk marks the meaning 'authoritative')  
1. I. Mylasa 134.2 (2nd century BC)  
2. I. Mylasa 134.6  
3. Cicero, Att. 9.14.2 (49 BC)*  
4. Cicero, Att. 10.9.1 (49 BC)*  
5. P. Oxy. 2836.18 (AD 50)  
6. P. Oxy. 260.20 (AD 59)  
7. PSI 871.29 (AD 66)  
8. P. Fam. Tebt. 4.1 (AD 94)  
9. P. Soter. 23.20 (AD 106)  
10. Kerygma Petri, Frag. 9 (AD 100–133)  
11. P. Meyer 6.24 (AD 125)
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<td>PSI 1236.13 (AD 128)</td>
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<td>2 Clem. 14.3 (ca. AD 120–140)</td>
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<td>SB 10500.39 (= SB 10756.39) (AD 133)</td>
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<td>O. Wilck. 1010.4 (30 BC/AD323)</td>
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<td>PFam.Tebt. 31.13 (2nd century AD)</td>
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<td>Chr.Wilck. 173.12 (AD 151)</td>
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<td>P.Col. vol. V, no. 1, verso; 4.3.57 (AD 160/180)</td>
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<td>P.Erl. 46B.27 (AD161–180)</td>
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<td>Ptolemy, Apotelesmatika (Tetr.) 4.3.6 (AD 152–178)*</td>
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<td>Ptolemy, Apotelesmatika (Tetr.) 4.4.11*</td>
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<td>Ptolemy, Apotelesmatika (Tetr.) 4.10.9*</td>
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<td>Vettius Valens, Anthologiae, Appendix I 381.21 (Pingree) (late 2nd century AD)*</td>
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<td>Chr.Mitt. 227.17 (AD 189)</td>
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<td>Chr.Mitt. 316.23 (= BGU 326.2.23) (AD 189/194)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 719.30 (AD 193)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 719.33 (AD 193)</td>
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<td>Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.7.38.6 (ca. AD 200)*</td>
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<td>Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.13.90.1 (a quotation from Valentinus)</td>
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<td>Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.6.47.3</td>
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<td>P.Oxy 1473.40 (AD 201)</td>
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<td>P.Hamb. 18.2.6 (AD 222)</td>
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<td>Origen, Frag. 116 in Lam. 4.20 (p. 277.7; PG XIII, col. 660B) (first half of 3rd century AD)*</td>
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<td>P.Laur. 4.14 (= P.Flor. 4.14) (AD 246)</td>
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<td>SB 9298.28 (= ChLA 486B.29) (AD 249)</td>
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<td>SEG 32.1220.23 (ca. AD 254)</td>
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<td>P.Mich. 614.42 (AD 256)</td>
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<td>P.Flor. 223.5 (AD 257)</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>P.Mich. 615.23 (ca. AD 259)</td>
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<td>K. Buresch, Aus Lydien (1898) (= Sussidia Epigraphica 8) 46.24 (ca. AD 250/270)</td>
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<td>Chr.Mitt. 75.4 (AD 265/66)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 1475.44 (AD 267)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 1562.4 (AD 276/282)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 1115.5 (AD 284)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 1115.7 (AD 284)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 1115.9 (AD 284)</td>
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<td>P.Oxy. 1115.18 (AD 284)</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>P.Oxy. 1208.5 (AD 291)</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>P.Charite 15.2.26 (before AD 312?)</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>Chr.Wilck. 466.18 (= P.Lond. 985.18) (4th century AD; before AD 312?)</td>
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Appendix C: Occurrences of \(\text{αὐθεντέω}\)

1. Philodemus, *Rh. et.* (P.Herc. 220) (1st century BC)
2. *BGU* 1208.38 (27 BC)
4. 1 Tim. 2.12 (1st or 2nd century AD)
5. Ptolemy, *Tetr.* 3.13.10 (late 2nd century AD)
6. Moeris Atticista, *Lexicon Atticum* s.v. \(\text{αὐτοδἰκὴν}\) (read \(\text{αὐτοδικεῖν}\)) (2nd century AD)
7. *P.Tebt.* 276.28 (late 2nd or 3rd century AD)
8. Origen, *Commentary on 1 Corinthians*; see C. Jenkins, ‘Origen on 1 Corinthians. IV’, *JTS* 10 (1909), p. 42 (3rd century AD)

Appendix D: Occurrences of \(\text{αὐθεντία}\)

1. 3 *Macc.* 2.29 (1st century BC)
2. *P.Babatha* 5, 2; A.12 (AD 110)
3. *SEG* 18.740.7 (AD 165/169)
4. Irenaeus, *Haer.* 1.24.1.9 (Saturninus) (late 2nd century AD)
5. Irenaeus, *Haer.* 1.26.1.3 (Cerinthus)
6. Irenaeus, *Haer.* 1.26.1.10 (Cerinthus)
7. *P.Mich.* 425.22 (AD 198)
8. *Corpus Hermeticum* 1.2 (= *Poimandres*) (2nd–3rd century AD)
9. *PSI* 870.18 (2nd/3rd century AD)
10. *P.Diog.* 17.31 (2nd/3rd century AD)
11. Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 2.3.36.1 (ca. AD 200)
12. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 4.1.2.2 (ca. AD 200)
16. Hippolytus, *Haer.* 7.82.2 (Saturnilus) (early 3rd century AD)
17. Hippolytus, *Haer.* 7.33.2 (Cerinthus)
20. Origen, *Commentary on John*, frag. 95 (= *558.18 Preuschen*) (ca. AD 236)
21. *P.Oxy.* 3048.1 (AD 246)
22. *P.Oxy.* 2664.1 (AD 245/248)
23. *P.Oxy.* 3050.2.18 (3rd century AD)
24. *SB* 11547B.10 (AD 252/53)
25. *P.Oxy.* 1410.1 (AD 285/86)
26. *P.Panop.Beaty* 2.4.92 (AD 300)
27. *P.Panop.Beaty* 2.6.156 (AD 300)
28. *P.Panop.Beaty* 2.9.222 (AD 300)
29. *P.Panop.Beaty* 2.9.229 (AD 300)

Appendix E-F: Occurrences of Other Derivatives

E. \(\text{αὐθεντησις}\). Vettius Valens, *Anthologiae* 1.1 (ca. AD 175)

F. \(\text{αὐθεντησια}\). *Tituli Asiae Minoris* V 795.17 (AD 236/45)
I would like to thank the following scholars for commenting on earlier drafts of this article: H.S. Baldwin, S. Baugh, M. Silva, J.A.D. Weima, and M.O. Wise.


11. L.E. Wilshire, 'The TLG Computer and Further Reference to auvqe,nthj in 1 Timothy 2.12', *NTS* 34 (1988), pp. 120-34; and idem, '1 Timothy 2:12 Revisited: A Reply to Paul W. Barnett and Timothy J. Harris', *EvQ* 65 (1993), pp. 43-55. Although the present essay covers much of the same ground as Wilshire's first article, it assesses the evidence quite differently. I will occasionally note points where I differ from Wilshire, but pass over many others in silence.


13. H.S. Baldwin, 'A Difficult Word—auvqe,nthj in 1 Timothy 2:12', in A.J. Köstenberger, T.R. Schreiner and H.S. Baldwin (eds.), *Women in the Church: A Fresh Analysis of 1 Timothy 2:9-15* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1995), pp. 65-80. See also H.S. Baldwin, 'Appendix 2: auvqe,nthj in Ancient Greek Literature' in *ibid.*, pp. 269-305. Baldwin's investigation deals only with the verb auvqe,nthj, and examines its usage well into medieval times, whereas the present essay deals with the auvqe,nthj family, concentrating on the pre-Constantinian era. Consequently, my study overlaps with Baldwin's only in its treatment of the few pre-AD 312 occurrences of the verb.

14. Although to some extent arbitrary, serving simply to delimit the material to be covered exhaustively, the date 312 also marks the threshold of the Golden Age of Greek patristic literature in the fourth and fifth centuries AD. On the overall historical significance of the date, see also R. MacMullen, 'The Meaning of A.D. 312: The Difficulty of Converting the Empire', in *The 17th International Byzantine Congress: Major Papers* (New Rochelle, NY: Ariste D. Caratzas, 1986), pp. 1-16.


17. See Appendix A1.


20. *auvqe,nthj* here is sometimes emended to *auphentos* or *auvthn*, but its authenticity is defended in C. Collard, *Euripides, Supplices*. II. *Commentary* (Groningen: Bouma, 1975), pp. 228-29. D. Kovacs (‘Tyrians and Demagogues in Tragic Interpolation’, *GRBS* 23 [1982], pp. 36-39) also accepts the reading *auvqe,nthj*, but argues that the context in which it occurs (lines 442-55) is a later interpolation.


22. See SEG 34.260.25 (= *Die Inschriften von Klaudiu Poli* [ed. F. Becker-Bertaun; Bonn: Habelt, 1986], 70.25), and SEG 39.1180.109 and 123.


24. See Appendix A2.

25. See *Sib. Or.* 7.69 and 8.309.


28. I have found post-AD 312 examples mainly in the writings of Eusebius, where it perhaps reflects the influence of Latin *auctor*, see his *Eccl. Hist.* 8.16.2; *Dom. evang.* 1.7.1.4; 3.1.3.5; *Eccl. Theol.* 3.5. It is also found in *Const.* 2.54, as part of Eusebius’s transla-
tion of a Latin speech by Constantine. The claim that 'Clemens, Athanasius und Eusebius das Wort ἀναστατικός in the communication ‘Urheber, Täter’ verwenden’ (Dihle, ἀναστατικός, p. 83) is true only of Eusebius. Note that the one example of ἀναστατικός in Athanasius occurs in the citation of an originally Latin document (PG XXV, col. 353C).

29 See, e.g., Ps.-Clement, Hom. 18.12.1.4 in the translation of J. Donaldson, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Edin-


30 See LSJ, s.vv ἀνασσασσα (‘queen and 'authors') and ἀρχηγός (‘chief’ and ‘originator’). It seems probable that the masculine ἀνασσασσα had the same semantic range as the feminine ἀνασσασσα, but the lexica do not record the meaning 'author' for the former.


32 LSJ, s.vv. 2. See also Dihle, ἀναστατικός, p. 79.


34 See, e.g., Harpocrateon, Lexicon in decem Oratores Atticos (ed. W. Dindorf; Oxford: Typographo aca

demico, 1853; repr. Groningen: Bouma, 1969), 66.7; Die Eikloge des Phrynichos (ed. E. Fischer; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974), p. 68 (#89); Suidae Lexicon (ed. A. Adler; Leipzig: Teubner, 1928), p. 412 (#4426). The meaning 'suicide' is sometimes assigned to the Attic writer Antiphon, but this is based on a misunder

standing; see Gernet, ‘the great number of words and phrases reminiscent of the language of Greek tragedy’ (p. 384), one example of which is ἀναστατικός in v. 6 (p. 385).

35 Larcher, Livre de la Sagesse, I, pp. 60-61.

36 See Thesaurus Linguarum Latinarum, which lists Wis. 12.6 under auctor IV, 2 ('generis conditor'). The rendering of ἀναστατικός by auctores is one of a number of mistranslations in the Old Latin of the book of Wisdom. See P. Thiellmann, ‘Die lateinische Übersetzung des Buches der Weisheit’, Archiv für lateinische Lexiko


37 The Armenian word in question is chokh. As a noun, this word means ‘master, lord, grand seigneur’. See M. Bedrossian, New Dictionary Armenian–English (Venice: St. Lazarus Armenian Academy, 1875–1879; repr. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1973), p. 444. The meaning of the Armenian here is misleadingly given as ‘les riches’ in Larcher, Livre de la Sagesse, III, p. 710. (I am grateful to Claude Cox of the McMaster Divinity College, Hamilton, Ontario, for help with the Armenian.)

38 The Syriac word in the Syro-Hexapla is šālītā’, which does not have the pejorative connotation of the French rendering ‘despoîtes’ given in Larcher, Livre de la Sagesse, III, p. 710. See R. Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879–1901), col. 4180, which gives the meaning ‘præfectus’, citing this place. The basic meaning is simply ‘ruler’.


42 See Brox, Hirt des Hermas, p. 43.


Cicero, *Att. 9.14.2 and 10.9.1*; Ptolemys, *Apotellismatikē* (*Tetrabiblos*) 4.3.6 (p. 178 in the Boll-Boer edition); 4.4.11 (p. 184); 4.7.5 (p. 195); 4.7.10 (p. 197); 4.10.9 (p. 207). See also Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 1.7.38.6, and Vettius Valens, *Anthologiae*, Appendix I (ed. D. Pingree; Leipzig; Teubner, 1986), 381.21.


See the places marked with an asterisk in Appendix B. It is probably because Wilshire does not recognize this meaning that he excludes αὐθεντικός and αὐθεντικῶς from his survey of αὐθεντέω and its cognates (‘The TLG Computer’, pp. 120-21).

See the unmarked places in Appendix B (excluding the two places listed in note 57).


See Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘authentic’, A, 1. The meaning ‘authoritative’ is also attested for French authentique, Italian autentico, etc.

See E.A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (From B.C. 146 to A.D. 1100) (2 vols.; New York: Frederick Ungar, 1887), s.v. αὐθεντικός 3, who refers for this meaning to Clement of Alexandria II, 352B (= *Strom.* 6.15.128.1 = *Kerygma Petri*, Frag. 9). Besides this place, I take αὐθεντικός to have this sense also in Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 4.13.90.1 (reading the subsequent word as ἐρημηθὴς rather than εὐρημηθη, following the 1592 edition of F. Sylburg).

The inscription (which has αὐθεντικός in lines 2 and 5) was first published in *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 5 (1881), pp. 101-102, and more recently in W. Blümel, *Die Inschriften von Mylasa* (Inschriften Griechischer Städte aus Kleinasiener, 34-35; 2 vols.; Bonn: Habelt, 1987–1988), I, pp. 56-57 (Inscription #134). No date for the inscription is indicated in either one of these publications, but it is assigned to the second century BC by LSJ, *Revised Supplement*, s.v. αὐθεντικός. Blümel confirms this dating, although he would not rule out the first half of the first century (letter to A. Wolters dated 20 June 1993).


On the derivation of αὐθεντέω, see Moulton and Howard, *Grammar*, II, p. 278; and Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique*, p. 138. All the verbs mentioned (compare also γεγραμμένοι, γεγραμμένοι, and τυπωμένοι) have the general meaning ‘rule’, and as such are construed with the genitive. On the genitive with verbs of ruling, see W.W. Goodwin and C.B. Gulick, *Greek Grammar* (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1930), § 1109; and BDEx, § 177.

See Appendix C.


This possibility is correctly noted by Kroeger and Kroeger, *I Suffer Not*, p. 96. Since the immediate context contains a quotation from Euripides, it is possible that Philodemus may here be citing a lost Attic work (note that Sudhaus prints the words σὺν αὐθεντικῷ αὐθεντῷ between quotation marks), which contained the Old Attic dative plural
This passage is specifically mentioned in the entries on ἀνατενάω in F. Freigkste, Wertherbuch der grichischen Papyrusurkunden (3 vols.; Berlin: Selbstverlag der Erben, 1925–1931), s.v. (Herr sein, fest auftreten); and Diccionario Griego–Español, s.v. (‘ejercer la autoridad’). See also Knight, ‘ἀνατενάω’, p. 145.

In the context, Achilles (ὁ ἀνατενάων τοῦ λόγου) is contrasted with Odysseus (ὁ μνήσεται τὰ ὑπ’ Ἀχιλλῆς εἰρμόμενα). The former is the one who did the actual speaking, while the latter is the one who reported what was spoken.

The relevant passage was published in C. Jenkins, ‘Origen on 1 Corinthians. IV’, JTS 10 (1909), pp. 29-51. The reference to 1 Tim. 2.12 is found on p. 42.

The passage is discussed by Wilshire, ‘The TLG Computer’, p. 126, but Origen’s paraphrase is not given.

Nor is there any evidence that ἀνατενάω refers to ‘the assumption or implementation of authority as an action’ as distinct from ‘having authority as status or office’, pace Perriman, ‘What Eve Did’, pp. 136-37.

According to Baldwin, ‘A Different Word’, p. 72 n. 15, the verb ἀνατενάω is found about 110 times in the Greek corpus which can presently be electronically searched. He discusses 82 of these in his ‘Appendix 2’, excluding only citations of 1 Tim. 2.12 and the various recensions of the medieval Alexander Romance (p. 72 n. 17).

See Baldwin, ‘Appendix 2’. As Baldwin points out, only one of the 82 passages which he discusses has a clearly pejorative sense (‘A Difficult Word’, p. 75).


See Eusebius, Const. 2.48.1.8; Athanasius, Ep. Rufin. 78.8; Basil, Ep. 51.1; Didymus the Blind, Comment. Job 285.4; John Chrysostom, In Acta Apostolorum 60.37.13; Second Council of Nicaea 721D bis. It is largely on the basis of this usage that the Kroegers make their extraordinary claim that ἀνατενάω confirms that of Knight, ‘ἀνατενάω’, pp. 150, 152, 154.

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of the Jews in Alexandria; see A. Kasher, The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt: The Struggle for Equal Rights (Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum, 7; Tübingen: Mohr, 1985), p. 32 and passim. Compare ἀνθρώπων in the sense ἀνθρώπῳ, ‘to have independent jurisdiction’, which was noted above in Moeris, Hesychius, and Thomas Magister.

87 See Appendix D.
88 It is striking that eight of the 29 occurrences listed in Appendix D refer to gnostic sources.
90 See Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 2.3.36.1 and Strom. 4.1.2.2; PSI 870.18; PDio 17.31; P.Oxy. 3048, etc., as well as the inscription of the preceding note.
91 The examples of a pejorative sense given in LPGL, s.v., D all postdate AD 312, and many are debatable.
92 Vettius Valens, Anthologiae 1.1. Dilhe, ἀνθρώπης, p. 80, translates the term as ‘die Berufsstellung des selb-Ständigen Unternehmens’, which was noted above in the fifth century in Leo Magnus, 17–18 (third century). The rare word is found again in Academia Scientiarum Austriaca, 1981), #795, lines 7; Tübingen: Mohr, 1985), p. 32 and LPGL, s.v.
93 Dio Cassius, Roman History, 58.24.4. The form ἀνθρωπότης is in fact a variant reading here. Not only does this reading match Dio’s usage elsewhere, but the emergence of the otherwise unattested form ἀνθρωπότει can be plausibly explained as a scribal corruption of it.
94 For example, in the Greek translation of Jerome’s Vir. ill. 8 (PL XXIII, col. 622B), the form ἀνθρωπότας should probably be read ἀνθρωπότας (so LPGL, s.v. ἀνθρωπότας, la). See also Zucker, ἀνθρώπης, p. 19, on the form ἀνθρωπότας in BGU 1.103.
95 LSJ, s.v.
97 LSJ, Revised Supplement, s.v.
104 See the apparatus in Horner, Coptic Version, V, p. 450 (etbreserjój, from jōj ‘head’).
107 See Margoliouth, Syriac Dictionary, s.v. maran (p. 302), which is identified as ‘denom. Verb from màrə’. Cf. Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus, col. 2209.
109 So often in the Pistis Sophia; see C. Schmidt (ed.), Koptisch–Gnostische Schriften I (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 4th edn, 1981), 133.25, 151.23, 207.23, etc. See also F. Siegert, Nag–Hammadi–Register (WUNT, 26; Tübingen: Mohr, 1982), p. 223. The word is also used in the sense ‘legitimate’ (said of children) in the Coptic papyrus P.Lond. 1709.26.
110 Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus, s.v. ῥατατένς (col. 102): ‘(ὑμᾶς ἀνθρώπος) de Deo sui potente, suo jure agente’.
111 Lewis and Short, Latin Dictionary, s.v. auctor: ‘(ventus) de Deo sui potente, suo jure agente’.
117 English ‘authentic’ is flanked by French authentique, German authentisch, Dutch authentiek, etc.
118 Dalman, Aramaïsche–Neubeuhäisches Wörterbuch, s.v. ‘auvteutj:i’; ‘Selbständigkeit, Wurde’.
119 See Folkert, Nag–Hammadi–Register, p. 223.
120 Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus, s.v. ‘avtoantj:i’ (col. 102); ‘āvtoe,ntj:i, su/si ipsius potentia’.
121 The editio princeps of this work was published by Melanchthon in 1554 (see n. 75 above). Two subsequent editions, with a Latin translation by Leo Allatius, were published in the seventeenth century (Leiden, 1635 and 1654). I have consulted the editio princeps available at the University of Michigan library (a copy formerly belonging to F.E. Robbins). Robbins expresses some doubt about the attribution to Proclus; see his edition of the Tetrabiblos (n. 73 above), p. xvi.
122 An English translation of the Paraphrasis is available in J.M. Ashmand, Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos or Quadrupartite (Chicago: Aries Press, 1936).
123 The numbers in the second column represent the page numbers of the editio princeps of the Paraphrasis (see n. 75).
124 This translation is conjectural. It is clear from the context in the Tetrabiblos that Ptolemy is referring to a position of higher authority or influence (τό αὐθέντικον is contrasted with τό ύποτεσσαρέων). Perhaps the Greek adjective ἄστικος, literally ‘of the city’, is to be understood here as ‘close to the center of power in Rome’. The English translation by Ashmand renders it as ‘important’.
125 For example, much is made of αὐθέντευιν in the sense ‘murder’ in Kroeger and Kroeger, I Suffer Not, pp. 86, 95–98, 185–88.
126 Dio Cassius, Roman History, 37.13.4 and 58.15.4, in both cases with γίγνεσθαι to mean ‘to commit suicide’. Oddly enough, in Roman History, Frag. 9.38 he expresses the same idea with the reflexive pronoun, αὐθέντης...ἐκατo τό γίγνεσθαι, thus using the noun in its proper Attic sense of ‘murderer’. Perhaps the reflexive pronoun was added by a scribe who realized that Dio’s usage was un-Attic. We also find the correct Attic use of αὐθέντης in the remains of Book 20 of the Roman History, but this is extant only in a medieval paraphrase (Zonaras 9.25.5). On Dio’s peculiar usage, see also Zucker, ‘I Timothy 2:12 Revisited’, p. 16.
128 See n. 94 above.
129 See LSJ, s.vv. αὐσοχειρ, αὐσοχειρί, αὐσοχειρία, αὐσοχειρίω.
131 There is a similar explanation in Zucker, ‘I Timothy 2:12 Revisited’, p. 16: ‘Sehr merkwürdig ist, dass noch in späterer Zeit das Verbum αὐθέντευιν in attizistischem Sinn “Mörder sein” heissen kann gegen die lebendige Sprache’.
132 See Smith, Scholia Graeca, pp. 45, 208. The expanded scholion is first found in the Tractatusii Scholii (14th century) on Aeschylus, Eum. 40.
133 See Kretschmer, ‘ἀθέντης’, pp. 291–93, as well as Zucker, ‘ἀθέντης’, p. 14, who came to the same conclusion independently. Actually, the scholarly tradition of identifying different etymological roots for αὐθέντης goes back to Byzantine times; see T. Gaisford (ed.), Etymologicum Magnum (Oxford: Typographo Academico, 1848; repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1962), s.v. (p. 168). In the above I have myself deliberately refrained from invoking etymological evidence as part of my semantic argument, for fear of falling into the etymological fallacy.
134 The proposal by Wilshire, ‘I Timothy 2:12 Revisited’, p. 48, to conflate the meanings of αὐθέντης ‘murderer’, and αὐθέντης ‘doer’, and thus to arrive at the sense ‘instigate violence’ for the verb αὐθέντευιν in 1 Tim. 2.12, fails to observe (among other things) this difference in register.
135 See nn. 84 and 91 above.
136 The non-pejorative meaning of αὐθέντευιν in 1 Tim. 2.12 is also supported by syntactical considerations. See A.J. Köstenberger, ‘A Complex Sentence Structure in 1 Tim 2:12’, in Köstenberger, Schreiner and Baldwin (eds.), Women in the Church, pp. 81–103.
When I was growing up, my dad received Father's Day cards from kids all over the neighborhood. No, they were not his children, checking in from broken homes all around the block. They were from boys growing up in homes without men, who saw something fatherly in my dad. Those Father's Day cards reminded me that, even if I did not know all the reasons why, we had something good at our house, something other kids wanted.

I thought about those Father’s Day cards as I read *To Own a Dragon: Reflections on Growing Up Without a Father* (NavPress, 2006) by Donald Miller and John MacMurray. The book is almost guaranteed to be a best-seller, since it is written by Miller, one of the gurus of the “emerging church” movement of liberalizing evangelicalism and the author of the runaway bestseller *Blue Like Jazz*. This book is different though. Miller’s other books try to be theological and “relevant,” but often fall short. In his other books, Miller tries to engage theological debates but often does not even understand terms (the “inherency of the Bible” issue, for instance, or the debate between Calvinists and “Armenians”). He tries to be socially relevant, but can not seem to see the difference between “social justice” and partisan Republican-bashing.

There is very little of that here. Instead, the book is a sad look into the thoughts and affections of a thirty-four year-old man who seeks to understand a “father wound” left by an absent dad. The result is a mix of some good insights, some bad answers, and, occasionally, some somewhat ugly theology.

**Father Knows Best**

Miller traces some of his thoughts on this subject to a television documentary on elephants. The program mentioned an elephant’s need for an older elephant to show the youngster the ways of elephant life. Miller writes that he “began to wonder if those of us without dads aren’t making mistakes in our lives we wouldn’t make if we had a father to guide us” (34). He continued,
“I wondered if people who grow up with great fathers don’t walk around with a subconscious sense they are wanted on this planet, that they belong, and the world needs them” (34).

What kinds of ways would a father help a son? “Is there practical information we are supposed to know about work, women, decisions, authority, leadership, marriage, and family that we would have learned if there were a guide around to help us navigate our journey?” (34) And so the author sets out to catalog what he never learned from a father, to try to be the elephant to guide other young men. The book moves chapter by chapter with sections on spirituality, submission to authority, decision-making, work ethic, education, and, of course, sex.

Miller admits that he has been passive in his choices, often believing life “was something you had to stumble through alone” (33). After moving to Oregon, however, Miller found something he had seldom had: a mentor. Bible teacher and professional photographer John MacMurray models manhood and fatherhood for Miller, as Miller lives with the MacMurray family and sees his mentor close-up. Miller writes, “For the first time in my life, I saw what a father does, what a father teaches a kid, what a husband does around the house, the way a man interacts with the world around him, the way a man—just as does a woman—holds a family together” (43).

And even though Miller, at times, would have preferred to come home drunk and play his music as loud as he liked, he realized that “playing your music as loud as you want and coming home drunk aren’t real life” (43). He writes, “Real life, it turns out, is diapers and lawnmowers, decks that need painting, a wife that needs to be listened to, kids that need to be taught right from wrong, a checkbook, an oil change, a sunset behind a mountain, laughter at a kitchen table, too much wine, a chipped tooth, and a screaming child” (43).

It is here that Miller says he rethought his “suspended adolescence” (34) and started out toward manhood.

**More than Equipment**

Aside from Miller’s implication that drunkenness (“too much wine”) is part of life, he is on to something here. He at least recognizes the vacuity of responsibility-fleeing males, many of whom are found in the pews of Christian churches. Unfortunately, Miller begins to lose his way as he tries to define terms. In communicating manhood to younger boys, Miller decides he “had to accept the terms ‘man,’ ‘manliness,’ and ‘manhood’ as biological terms, and while the sales tactics played on emotions, what I had to focus on was facts” (104).

Miller plays this out in his recounting of an interaction with 900 male high school students. When asked to define what a “real” man is, many of them respond with “somebody who provides for his family” or who “is honest, he doesn’t lie” (105). Miller turns these back, suggesting that these answers speak of what a man does, not what makes a real man. Instead, he tells them, a real man is “a person with a penis” (106). He looks the students in their eyes and tells them, “You are men. Some of you have never heard this before, but I want to tell you, you are men. You are not boys, you are not children, you are not women; you are men. God has spoken, and when God speaks, the majority has spoken. You are a man” (107).

To the extent that Miller is demonstrating that all males are held accountable to be men, he is right on target. Every “person with a penis” is indeed
called on to *act like a man*. But is Miller really approaching a biblical definition of manhood when he distinguishes between what a man *does* and what a man *is*? Does the Bible not speak of manhood specifically in the terms some of these students provide (Matt 7:9-11; Eph 6:4; 1 Tim 5:8)? And, as Miller himself has shown, are there not virtually generations of “persons with penises” who have acted like anything but men—leaving “father wounds” in their collective wake?

Who's Your Daddy?

As he watched his mentor interact with his son, Miller realized that what he was looking for was more than just the physical presence of a father. What he longed for was *belonging*. “By that I mean I wanted a father to take ownership of me, to care about me more than he cared about anything else in the world, or, for that matter, anybody else in the world” (52), he writes.

This led Miller to reconsider his idea of God as Father. “This idea of God fathering us was new to me, and while I confess I liked it, I didn’t know if I could buy in,” Miller acknowledges. “I liked the idea of God up in heaven, offering guidance and counsel and reward in my life. And I liked the idea I hadn’t been completely abandoned” (61).

Miller writes clearly and poignantly about some aspects of God’s Fatherhood: his provision, his concern for his children’s best interests. Miller’s God evidences none of the disappointing characteristics of so many human fathers. And even though the idea of a fathering God “feels creepy” (65) to Miller at times, he grasps a central biblical message when he quotes MacMurray telling him that “if God is our Father, we’ve got it good. We’ve got it really good” (63).

Miller’s book would have answered many more questions for a fatherless generation, though, if he had spent more time with God’s self-revelation of his Fatherhood. He confuses the question when he asserts that “though some of us grow up without biological fathers, none of us grows up without our actual Father” (62). This is especially so when he admits that his fatherless reader may be “a Muslim or a Jew or an agnostic or just (one who prefers) not to think about it” (38).

Miller does not probe the truth that God is Father indeed to those who have “received the Spirit of adoption as sons” (Rom 8:14-17). Yes, the Bible teaches that, as Baptist pastor-theologian Herschel Hobbs once put it, God is “fatherly in his attitude toward all men,” but he is Father in truth only through the sonship of Christ Jesus. The hurting fatherless reading Miller’s book face the same call Jesus’ first followers faced: to find identity not in genetic descent (Matt 12:46-50) but in being “sons of God” through union with Christ (Gal 3:28-29).

In fact, Miller’s central thesis obscures one of the scariest truths of the New Testament. In one sense, none of us are really “fatherless.” Jesus teaches that outside of Christ, we do have a father, the devil (John 8:39-47). And, like the elephant in Miller’s documentary, he teaches us quite well what it means to share his nature and to walk in his ways.

The Rest of the Story

Miller is on more solid ground when he offers practical insights, which are plentiful through the book. His discussion of authority, just by its inclusion, is a helpful corrective to an entire generation of men who resent the very idea of hierarchy. He wisely suggests that men should not glean wisdom from men who themselves evidence a refusal to submit to authority. He rightly warns
that making decisions means hard work, and gives welcome guidance on relying on counsel—especially that of Scripture (for example, the Book of Proverbs). Not surprisingly, he doesn’t downplay the moral aspect of human sexuality. Refreshingly, he affirms the moral nature of work, as well as its existence as a grace gift of God.

Perhaps it is because he is writing about authority and humility, but To Own a Dragon does not evidence the anti-authoritarian sarcasm of his previous books toward conservative evangelical Christianity. There are not the caricatures (at best) or near false-witness (at worst) of the motives of evangelical leaders and ministries. Maybe this is the influence of MacMurray on this project. Or maybe it is a growing and maturing Donald Miller. In either case, one can hope this attitude might be the rule for Miller’s future writings instead of the exception.

A Father, On Earth as in Heaven

Evangelicals reading Miller’s book might best benefit from its first-person testimony that fathers can and must instill worth and meaning into the lives of their children, especially their sons. Miller honors his mother for keeping him in church, for valiantly trying to fill both parental roles, and for doing everything within her power to raise him to be, well, a man. But, despite all this, Miller says he needed a father to assure him: “I was here on purpose, and I had a purpose, and that a family and a father and even a world needed me to exist to make himself and themselves more happy [sic.]” (51).

Evangelicals should also find in Miller’s testimony one more reminder that, in Christ, God is indeed “Father to the fatherless and protector of widows” (Ps 68:5). Our desire for an earthly father is to point us toward a heavenly Father, just as the earthly father is to reflect the love, care, and provision of the heavenly Father. The gospel proclaimed by our churches needs to point to the adoption into the household of God, a bowing of the knee “before the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named” (Eph 3:15).

Not Just Breathing Smoke

To Own a Dragon is not the book to teach a man how to be a father, or a son to love his dad. It is what it is, one man’s reflections on growing up fatherless. His answers sometimes are not what we need, but we need to hear the questions, because they are being asked all around us by men without the platform or eloquence of Donald Miller. Some of them cannot look us in the eye, hiding behind a ball-cap or an unruly swath of hair.

This is a sad book, but it is a sadness we need to hear. The title comes from Miller’s belief that he knows as much about what it is to have a father as he knows about what it is to own one of the dragons he read about in his childhood fairy tales. We need to hear this man’s story, but we need more than this to confront the dangers of father hunger. We need a more robust announcement of the gospel, even when that means saying some hard things to fatherless non-Christians. A generation of lost young men may not know what it is to own a dragon, but the Bible tells us that a Dragon owns them (Rev 12). That is what is really at stake when fathers abandon their children—the gospel itself. And that’s even sadder than Miller’s tale, even bluer than jazz.
In this issue of the journal we profile some of the most significant gender-related articles from 2005. Here is a brief reminder about the categories we are using and our intent in using them. Complementarian designates an author who recognizes the full personal equality of the sexes, coupled with an acknowledgment of role distinctions in the home and church. Egalitarian classifies evangelicals who see undifferentiated equality (i.e., they see no scriptural warrant for affirming male headship in the home or the church). Under the Non-Evangelical heading, we have classified important secular works and books that address the subject of biblical gender issues from a religious, albeit, non-evangelical point of view. This category also serves as our classification for liberal scholars wanting to retain some sort of Christian identity. Finally, under the Undeclared heading, we have listed those books that do not give sufficient indication of their fundamental stance for us to classify them more specifically.

Complementarian Authors/Articles

Brighton believes that marriage is a holy covenant created by God and that when the respective roles of the husband and wife are lived out according to Scripture, then it is both a blessing to the world and “an icon that illustrates and points to the love of God through Christ for all mankind.” Using Joseph and Mary as the supreme example to be emulated by families today, his main points are (1) for husbands to be imitators of Christ as they “give themselves to their wives in order to care for them and nourish them in the giving and sacrificial love of Christ,” and (2) for wives to “become such icons and living examples of the church’s subjection to the Lord Christ as they place themselves under the loving care and protection of their husbands.” When Christians strive to be faithful to God’s design for
marriage, “they emulate the holy family of Joseph and Mary as they collectively and individually proclaim the blessed Gospel of Christ’s salvation within the manner in which the husband loves his wife as Christ loves the church and as the wife submits herself to the husband as the church does to Christ.”


The Spring 2005 issue of JBMW provides a timely and valiant response to the egalitarian work, Discovering Biblical Equality: Complementarity Without Hierarchy (DBE), edited by Ronald W. Pierce and Rebecca Merrill Groothuis, with contributing editor Gordon D. Fee (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2004). DBE is clearly a response to Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood, edited by John Piper and Wayne Grudem, and is intended to provide a comprehensive, scholarly argument for the egalitarian position. Although every chapter in DBE is not treated, the most important chapters are evaluated and critiqued by an extraordinary group of complementarian scholars, namely, J. Ligon Duncan III, Wayne Grudem, H. Wayne House, Rebecca Jones, George Knight III, Andreas Köstenberger, David Nelson, Dorothy Patterson, Paige Patterson, Robert Saucy, Peter R. Schemm Jr., Thomas Schreiner, Justin Taylor, and Bruce Ware, who present a unified front for the traditional understanding of the Bible’s teaching concerning the roles of men and women in the home and church. Each article is packed with rich exegetical and theological insights from Scripture that demonstrate the clear biblical teaching regarding God’s good design in the created order. Contrary to DBE’s use of the term “complementarity,” the contributors show why there is no middle ground between the two groups since complementarity has always included the idea of male headship. This critique will be used for years to come to demonstrate why the complementarian position presents the most faithful teaching of the Word of God.


The Fall 2005 issue of JBMW was devoted entirely to an evaluation of the completed Today’s New International Version (TNIV), released in early 2005. Since the TNIV is a revision of the popular and widely read New International Version (NIV), the aim was to give a “charitable yet discerning” critique of the TNIV and to provide a thorough response. While not wanting to judge the motives of the Committee on Bible Translation (CBT) for the translation of the TNIV, the contributors honestly questioned if their pre-understandings and presuppositions that guided the translation process resulted in an improved translation. In other words, to what extent should modern culture and ideologies influence the use of the English language in translating God’s written Word? Does their translation methodology actually “distort or obscure the message of the text” as a result of “limiting readers’ interpretive options”? To what degree does the TNIV misrepresent the Bible’s overall teaching on gender? Although the need for modern translations of the Bible is acknowledged, it is agreed that those translations should follow “certain proven principles” which have benefited the church since its inception. This will
result in a translation that is “accurate and faithful to the original languages, not one informed by contemporary ideologies or modern sensibilities.” The contributors to the journal are Robert Cole, Russell Fuller, Wayne Grudem, Russell Moore, Vern Poythress, John Mark Reynolds, Peter R. Schemm Jr., Justin Taylor, and Michael Travers.

Egalitarian Authors/Articles


Bearden sets out to uphold an egalitarian interpretation of 1 Cor 11:2–16, believing that this interpretation “can be fully justified from the text itself.” He uses Gal 3:27–28 as the starting point for all interpretations of passages pertaining to men and women’s relationship and states that “when a proper and thorough exegesis, with attention to the world behind of, and in front of the text, is complete, it will reflect the egalitarian view and not contradict other biblical passages.” In shifting to the passage, he points out that “to solve the problem in the Corinthian church, Paul uses a metaphor, and therefore does not lay down a universal command which is applicable cross-culturally.” In doing so Bearden fails to see that Paul grounds his argument in the Trinitarian relationship between the Father and the Son, thus demonstrating that it does apply cross-culturally. As is common among egalitarians, in v. 3 he takes *kephalē* to mean “source” and says that there is “no mention of authority in the text (except for a woman’s over her own head); if authority were to be understood in that way, it would have to be read into the text.” This understanding permeates his interpretation of the rest of the passage.

Citing Bultmann, Bearden is correct in stating that “exegesis cannot be done without presuppositions” and confesses that his own “are egalitarian by nature.” However, in accusing complementarians of beginning with a “presupposition of subordination,” he denies the most natural reading of the text and cannot see how unity can exist when men exercise godly headship in marriage. This stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of Gal 3:27–28 where men and women can be both spiritually equal in Christ before God yet different in respect to roles (for a response see Peter R. Schemm’s “Galatians 3:28—Prooftext or Context?” *JBMW* 8, no. 1 (2003): 23–30 [accessible online]).


Belleville argues that, although early church tradition and fathers onward affirm a female apostle in Rom 16:7, twentieth-century translations have not been comfortable with this rendering. She employs the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* computer database to assert that Junia was “of note among the apostles” and to argue that “the masculine Junias and the attribution ‘well-known to the apostles’ are without linguistic or grammatical foundation.” Arguing primarily against Michael Burer and Daniel Wallace in “Was Junia Really an Apostle? A Re-examination of Rom 16:7,” *NTS* 47 (2000): 76–91, Belleville concludes that the overwhelming “time-honored attribution” of Junia being feminine and “esteemed among the apostles” places the burden of proof on those who would argue that the apostolate excludes women.

Hess’s aim in this article is to present new evidence in the gender-inclusive translation debate by examining three pivotal areas in the OT: (1) the rendering of *adam* in Hebrew in Genesis 1–4, (2) the term for “father” or “parent” in Proverbs, and (3) the “so-called generic ‘he’” in Hebrew. From the beginning of his article, he clearly affirms his position as that of favoring gender-inclusive translations. He rejects “male orientation,” “male emphasis,” and “various patriarchal concerns,” and also the dichotomies that exist in the gender roles and translation debates. Hess argues that the gender distinctions in Genesis 1–4 do not support a male/female hierarchy, but, rather, serve to communicate “harmonious relationships as created by God.” However, he fails to address why Paul appeals to Genesis 1–3 to affirm that God has placed the man as the godly head of the woman. He then looks at the context of Proverbs and, by reading through the lens of the father/mother parallel in 1:8, he concludes that translating the word for “father” as “parent” is supported when it occurs in phrases that “do not require a biological male.” Lastly, Hess examines the extrabiblical and pre-Hebrew third person pronoun for “he” and concludes that wherever the text does not require an “exclusively masculine or feminine pronoun,” it may allow for “either gender, i.e. ‘one’, ‘someone’, ‘anyone’, etc.” He then applies this assumption to other books of the Bible and brings into question the “so-called masculine oriented forms.”

Johnson, Kristin L. “Just as the Father, So the Son: The Implications of John 5:16–30 in the Gender-Role De-

Johnson’s aim in this article is to show that, since Jesus argues that “his equality in function with the Father is what demonstrates the equality of his divine status,” then a parallel is to be made in the relationship between men and women—namely, that “the spiritual equality of Christian men and women is revealed in their functional equality” [author’s emphasis]. Johnson denies the subordination of the Son to the Father claiming that this view has historically been rejected by church fathers and the reformed councils and confessions. This claim fails to recognize the distinction between ontological subordination, which the church has historically rejected, and functional subordination, which the church has historically affirmed. She accuses those who affirm the differentiated roles of men and women of reading this “hierarchy” back into the relationship between the Father and the Son. While one can agree with Johnson that as male and female we are made in the image of God and, therefore, should “look for our true reflection in our Creator,” the biblical teaching of the eternal functional subordination of the Son to the Father cannot be denied. It is irresponsible scholarship and unfair to readers to claim that this view has been rejected by Christians and councils throughout church history. The Trinitarian doctrine that Johnson rejects is in fact the unanimous position of the church fathers and councils throughout the history of Christianity. Complementarians affirm the scriptural teaching that the Son is both equal to the Father with respect to his essential being and eternally subordinate to the Father with respect to role. For more detailed interactions concerning these issues see Peter R. Schemm’s “Trinitarian Perspectives on

Kaiser argues that there are mis-translations and misinterpretations in modern translations of key passages concerning the biblical teaching on women. For example, Gen 2:18, he argues, should be translated as the woman possessing “power” or “strength” corresponding to the man, or to be “his equal.” He then uses this to argue in 1 Cor 11:2–16 that women are to exercise authority and that neither veils nor symbols of authority are required, since this “false and thoroughly intrusive” thought was “forced into the translations of this verse from the days of the Gnostic religions . . .” He uses passages such as Exod 38:8 and 1 Sam 2:22 and examples such as Miriam, Deborah, and Huldah to argue that God sent women to serve in leadership positions over men. He also argues from 1 Tim 2:8–15 that Paul’s restriction on a woman “not to teach or to have authority over a man” applies only to women who have not been taught; however, once they have been taught they are allowed to prophesy, which he equates to preaching. While complementarians agree with Kaiser that women are “joint heirs in the grace of life (1 Pet 3:7, 11)” and are given “places of honor and credit along with their male counterparts,” they do not agree that to differentiate roles for men and women based on God’s created design diminishes this equality in any way.


Miller discusses a “less common text” in Scripture that uses imagery of God giving birth, which, he argues, is less common because “its imagery has often been suppressed in the copying and translating of Scripture.” The reason he gives for this suppression of birth imagery is “the discomfort some scribes and translators have for a feminine image of God.” He finds this particularly interesting among those who hold to a more “literal reading of Scripture,” such as the English Standard Version. He concludes with a reminder for translators to take seriously that “metaphors mirror meaning, and imagery influences interpretation,” especially in the case of Jas 1:18 where “the Father of Lights gives birth.” However, while the Bible may on occasion use feminine figures of speech for God, it should be noted that (1) all feminine metaphors for God are verbal—describing some of his actions—not names or titles, like “Father”; (2) the Bible also uses similar feminine figurative language to speak of the actions of male human beings (2 Sam 17:8; Isa 60:16; Gal 4:19; 1 Thess 2:7), but this is a literary device—not an affirmation about one’s gender; and (3) the Bible consistently uses masculine names, titles, and pronouns for God.


Preato’s aim in this article is to present a “fresh perspective” on submission and authority in marriage in order to promote healthy and happy marriages. Using statistics and empirical data, Preato rightly sees a serious problem with divorce in America’s churches; however, his diagnosis goes against God’s created design as he argues that marriage be based on equality of roles and the mutual submission of husband and wife. He
says that “promoting healthy marriages may require that some churches look beyond current understanding of how marriages should function and discover how healthy marriages really do function” (author’s emphasis). In the end, this pragmatic approach is damaging to marriages because it denies God’s good and wise design for husbands and wives to faithfully live out their God-ordained roles for his glory and their good.

Non-Evangelical Authors/Articles


Downing’s aim is to place Gal 3:28 in its first-century context in order to better understand its role in the gender debate. Recognizing a “defect in previous discussions,” that only dealt with issues of social standings and functions, he argues that status and function follow from an understanding of the nature of men and women. He says that although Paul might have “succumbed to social pressure” in other places, such as 1 Cor 11:2–14, the new natures of men and women in Christ guarantee equality for “any service [and] any ministry in the Christian community.”


Hester argues that the eunuch in Matt 19:12 stands in opposition to the traditionally accepted sex-gender distinction between male and female. He explores the “problem” of the eunuch in an effort to reject any notion of the Christian identity existing only as a “binary sex paradigm.” He sees this problem caused by a “conservative heterosexist reading of the Bible” throughout history and argues that Jesus’ literal example of the eunuch “confronts us and demands that we face up to and reassess the assumptions we have about the sanctity of heterosexist ideology.” It is important to note that he sees other places in the canon which affirm this rejection such as Jesus’ controversy with the Sadducees in Mark 12:18–27 and the “pre-Pauline baptismal formula of Gal 3:28,” which stand in opposition to other texts in the “deutero-Pauline tradition” that affirm this binary paradigm.


Methuen discusses women’s leadership in the early church and examines and evaluates reasons for the exclusion of women. In her survey of the NT, she includes many examples of women who served as apostles and overseers in house churches. From this she concludes that, in the early church, regular patterns of leadership were not established and that the use of the gifts of the Spirit was more important than the role or office of men and women. She attributes the change of leadership roles for men and women in the Pastoral Epistles (which she dates around the late first or early second century), as well as the letters of Ignatius, to cultural factors, which ultimately hindered the spread of the gospel. She argues that today this hindrance no longer exists; in fact, the impact of such a hindrance has reversed with the elevated status of women. Thus, the offices and leadership positions within the church should be “(re-)” opened to women.
Scholz presents the main arguments of the three major evangelical Christian views concerning gender and the Bible so that “mainstream and progressive Bible scholars, feminist and otherwise,” can learn about and understand their ideas and arguments. Stating that each position upholds the conviction that the Bible is the inspired Word of God, she surveys complementarians, or “traditionalists,” egalitarians, and moderate evangelicals, and then considers the implications on “progressive feminist studies on the Bible.” Classifying complementarians as the “most influential and politically powerful position” in “the Christian Right,” she spends the most time examining them. Scholz sees The Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood as most prominent among the conservative evangelical organizations and publications, stating that “the mostly male and seemingly white authors” have a wide influence on conservative Christianity. According to Scholz, the five main characteristics of the complementarian position are (1) a sincere commitment to the Bible, (2) support for patriarchal gender roles, (3) failure to engage mainstream scholarship, (4) response to the challenge of evangelical feminism, and (5) attachment to gender essentialism. She then briefly surveys the egalitarian position that, along with the complementarian position, also holds to biblical authority and inerrancy. Scholz focuses her discussion on the egalitarian’s upholding of equality of men and women. The last position Scholz discusses is the “moderate evangelical” position, a position that is neither complementarian nor egalitarian, but which nonetheless is in agreement on other issues with conservative evangelicals. She describes this position as mostly an antifeministic one which strongly supports retaining masculine God-language. She concludes with a call to “progressive feminist Bible scholars” to recognize these developments and their effect on the “Christian Right” in America.

Vacek discusses and critiques the “Letter on the Collaboration of Men and Women,” which was published by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith under Pope John Paul II, in which he affirmed women in church teaching, but “unfairly” critiqued the forms of feminism. Rather than agreeing with the Pope’s view of equality, difference, and complementarity between men and women, Vacek proposes a new way to affirm equality and differences without restricting women from roles in parenting or leadership.

Undeclared Authors/Articles  
Gombis’s aim in this article is to explain the function of the Haustafel (Eph 5:22–6:9) in the argument of Ephesians rather than how it is commonly used in the debate over the role of women in ministry and in the home. He argues that the Haustafel presents a vision of the “eschatological New Humanity” realized under the conditions of this present fallen age. This, he says, paints a picture of how Christians ought to live, thus demonstrating “the triumph of God in Christ.”
Roles of husbands and wives, parents and children, slaves and masters are to be read as an extension of the command to “be filled by the Spirit” in 5:18–21. The main points of this passage are that there is order in this New Humanity and that it is ordered under the Lordship of Christ, the model of headship and authority “follows that of God in Christ: self-giving and cruciform,” that those in positions of subordination are to be subordinate “from the heart,” and that this hierarchy in the New Testament reflects the character of Christ. Gombis then compares the Haustafel with other similar traditions prevalent at that time, such as the *oikonomia* tradition. He rejects reading this passage only as a command for mutual submission, because it is clear as the passage unfolds that Paul has in mind a new humanity, which involves hierarchical structures and subordination. In contrast to other contemporary household traditions, the Haustafel in Ephesians (1) was given for the benefit not only of the “head” of the family, but also for the good, protection, and nurture of those subordinate to them, (2) “accords dignity to women and wives, while denying that the subordinate position is based on any alleged inferiority,” and (3) is patterned after Christ and the church. Gombis then briefly discusses the counter-cultural relationships between parents and children and slaves and masters. As opposed to other traditions at the time, Gombis demonstrates how dignity and value are accorded to children and slaves through being directly addressed and through the father and mother acting on behalf of their best interests—both because of the lordship of Christ. Through these ordered relationships, the New Humanity—the Church—is displayed as “the new creation people of God, created according to God in righteousness and holiness of the truth” (Eph 4:24), and wholly oriented by the self-sacrificial love of Christ.


Liefeld argues that there is a connection between conspiracy theories of Christ and the early church, such as *The Da Vinci Code*, and feminism, which both undermine the biblical canon and consider history and reality a part of the “creative imagination” rather than fact. It is an epistemological attack that is connected to our “postmodern conspiracy culture,” which is dominated by a “hermeneutic of suspicion.” Inherent in this suspicion is a distrust of all forms of authority and institutions that results in an undermining of the historical narratives of Scripture. This, he says, opens the door for complete subjectivity. His solution to the problem is for the Church to present a comprehensive defense of the Christian faith, which is objective and rooted in history, which “is grounded in an authoritative Scripture.”


Shin examines the issue of whether homosexuality is a sin, how passages dealing with it should be interpreted, and how the church should respond. He concludes that homosexuality is a sin because it perverts the image of God both functionally and ontologically. Functionally, it goes against the nature of God’s created plan for male and female. Ontologically, it perverts the picture of the
perfect relationship of the Trinity, which is the pattern for relationships between men and women. Secondly, it is a sin because the Bible clearly condemns it. Shin says those who reject this position in Scripture either misinterpret it or deny its infallibility. Lastly, he concludes that the response of Christians should be to extend the grace of Christ with the goal that homosexuals, as with every person who is a sinner, might repent from their sin and believe in the God who graciously saves.